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Abstract:   In   this   thesis   we   propose   two   semantic   ontological   role­based   access   control   (RBAC)   reasoning
processes.   These   processes   infer   user   authorisations   according   to   a   set   of   role   permission   and   denial
assignments, together with user role assignments. The first process, SO­RBAC (Semantic Ontological Role­Based
Access Control) uses OWL­DL to store the ontology, and SWRL to perform reasoning. It is based mainly on RBAC
models previously described using Prolog. This demonstrates the feasibility of writing an RBAC model in OWL and
performing reasoning inside it, but is still tied closely to descriptive logic concepts, and does not effectively exploit
OWL features such as the class hierarchy. To fully exploit the capabilities of OWL, it was necessary to enhance
the SO­RBAC model  by programming  it   in  OWL­Full.  The resulting  OWL­Full  model,  ESO­RBAC (Enhanced
Semantic Ontological Role­Based Access Control), uses Jena for performing reasoning, and allows an object­
oriented definition of roles and of data items. The definitions of roles as classes, and users as members of classes
representing roles, allows user­role assignments to be defined in a way that is natural to OWL. All information
relevant to determining authorisations is stored in the ontology. The resulting RBAC model is more flexible than
models based on predicate logic and relational database systems.
There are three motivations for this research. First, we found that relational database systems do not implement all
of   the   features   of  RBAC   that  we  modelled   in  Prolog.   Furthermore,   implementations   of  RBAC   in   database
management systems is always vendor­specific, so the user is dependent on a particular vendor's procedures
when   granting   permissions   and   denials.   Second,   Prolog   and   relational   database   systems   cannot   naturally
represent hierarchical data, which is the backbone of any semantic representation of RBAC models. An RBAC
model should be able to infer user authorisations from a hierarchy of both roles and data types, that is, determine
permission or denial from not just the type of role (which may include sub­roles), but also the type of data (which
may   include   sub­types).   Third,  OWL   reasoner­enabled   ontologies   allow   us   to   describe   and  manipulate   the
semantics of RBAC differently, and consequently to address the previous two problems efficiently.
The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, we propose semantic ontological reasoning processes, which are
domain and implementation independent, and can be run from any distributed computing environment. This can
be developed through integrated development environments such as NetBeans and using OWL APIs. Second, we
have pioneered a way of  exploiting OWL and its reasoners  for  the purpose of defining and manipulating  the
semantics of RBAC. Therefore, we automatically infer OWL concepts according to a specific stage that we define
in our proposed reasoning processes. OWL ontologies are not static vocabularies of terms and constraints that
define the semantics of RBAC. They are repositories of concepts that allow  ad­hoc  inference, with the ultimate
goal in RBAC of granting permissions and denials.
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1 Introduction
An increasingly important issue in data and application security is the use of security models. This thesis focuses
on data security models for medical data, although the same principles are equally applicable to other fields, such as
banking. The information that medical databases contain is highly sensitive, holding personal data about individuals and
needing a strict way of protecting the privacy of patient personal and medical data [1][2][3]. When referring to the use
of electronic medical records, of utmost concern is the privacy and security of individual patient information in clinical
databases [4]. Measures for protecting medical data are supported by law in the UK by the Data Protection Act 1998 in
the UK [5], in the US by the Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994 [2], and elsewhere.
Wiederhold et al. [6] proposed Trusted Interoperation of Healthcare Information (TIHI), a centralised solution
for  assigning  a  security  officer  the  responsibility  to  manage  the  sharing  of  sensitive  information.  However,  this
approach may not be appropriate for healthcare environments, as the dynamic and ad hoc nature of sharing healthcare
and medical  data would place considerable burdens on the workload of such an officer  [7].  Some other works on
security  requirements  include  security policies  and  policy models  [8][9] that  put  forward  the  concepts  of  clinical
governance and availability of clinical knowledge.
The traditional methods of database access control are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) [10]. In DAC, the owner of the data determines who has access to it. [11] This is a very widely
used security model, and is widely used in operating systems and relational databases, but is rather insecure and hard to
maintain. MAC grants access according to a hierarchical control structure. It is commonly used in the military, but is
generally considered to be too rigid for use in the corporate context. [12]
There  has  been  much interest  recently in  the  development  of  flexible  Role-Based  Access  Control  (RBAC)
models, in which access to data depends on a user’s role. In RBAC, permissions and users are both assigned to roles.
RBAC systems can be divided into two types: static RBAC, in which the permissions assigned to users and roles do not
change, and dynamic RBAC, in which permissions assigned to roles may change according to internal and external
contexts. This is particularly useful in pervasive software applications, which are dependent on changeable context. In
these situations, access control requirements are likely to change constantly [13].
RBAC models have been built in logic programming languages such as Prolog [14] for almost two decades, and
have  been  implemented  in  database  management  systems  such  as  Oracle,  Postgres  and  MySQL.  With  the
standardisation of Semantic Web Technology [15] and introduction of web languages based on predicate logic such as
OWL (Web Ontology Language)  [16] and SWRL [17], we have been able to build RBAC models that are database
independent in their implementations and which can use natural inheritance available in SWRL in order to address
hierarchical nature of RBAC models. 
This thesis first examines the modelling of static and dynamic RBAC using predicate logic and its applicability
to relational DBMS (Database Management Systems). The static RBAC elements are those of Barker & Stuckey [18]
[19], and the dynamic elements are devised by Strembeck & Neumann  [20][21]. The static and dynamic RBAC are
implemented in Prolog as described by those authors, and then in the Oracle relational DBMS.
We then explore the possibility of developing an RBAC model developed in OWL, and creating a reasoning
process with SWRL upon RBAC concepts codified in OWL. We have used our experiences of defining RBAC model in
Prolog and converting its facts and rules into OWL modelling concepts and reasoning. This new ontological RBAC
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model is called SO-RBAC (Semantic and  Ontology-based  Role-Based  Access  Control). SO-RBAC uses OWL-DL,
with reasoning performed by SWRL, and directly translates the static RBAC model from Prolog.
We then  extend  SO-RBAC  to  develop  ESO-RBAC  (Enhanced  Semantic and  Ontology-based  Role-Based
Access  Control). ESO-RBAC uses OWL-Full, with reasoning performed by Jena, and represents a novel method of
modelling a more flexible RBAC by taking advantage of some of  the native features of ontologies,  such as  class
hierarchy.
Early iterations of the systems now known as SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC were called Dynamic Ontology-based
Role-Based Access Control (DO-RBAC) [22][23].
In the ontological models, the reasoning process upon OWL concepts grants permissions or denials solely within
OWL-enabled  ontological  environments.  Therefore  OWL RBAC implementation  in  any data  centric  environment,
where RBAC is needed, will be managed by accessing OWL classes though the Protégé OWL-API [24]. Consequently
our reasoning process is application and database independent and the process of reasoning, which results in either
permissions or denials, is being done within OWL/SWRL enabled environment.
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the access control models DAC, MAC and
RBAC.
Chapter  3 examines the feasibility of implementing, in a relational database management system (DBMS), a
dynamic RBAC model for a hospital database originally written in Prolog. The static RBAC model is first described,
followed by its implementation in Oracle. The dynamic RBAC is then described in the same way. The dynamic RBAC
is built upon the static RBAC model of Barker & Stuckey [18], and has dynamic constraints separately defined through
their context constraints. Table 2 shows the roles of Hospital staff and the permissions assigned to them as defined in
the static RBAC model. The static RBAC schema is reused from earlier research prototypes where we experimented
with solutions for data sharing across the NHS [25]. The dynamic RBAC design is built upon the semantics of the static
RBAC and extended by Strembeck & Neumann [21].
Chapter  4 describes  some of  the problems with implementation of  RBAC in traditional  relational  database
systems, and introduces the modelling of RBAC using the XML and the Semantic Web.
Chapter  5 presents SO-RBAC, the first of our proposed  ontology-based RBAC models, which was translated
from our traditional RBAC in Prolog as described in Section  3.2.1 into OWL-DL with reasoning performed using
SWRL. It is important to note that the purpose of SO-RBAC was not to create a pure ontological RBAC model, but to
demonstrate the feasibility of mapping an RBAC model based on Prolog facts and rules into an ontology. Therefore, the
proposed SO-RBAC is not designed from ‘scratch’. It is instead based on a set of existing Prolog facts and rules, which
are translated into an ontological schema. Prolog facts are modelled as instances within OWL classes, or as properties of
these classes. RBAC rules are modelled through domain and range constraints, is-a relationships and inheritance, or
using SWRL rules. The model is described, and the results of implementation are shown.
Chapter 6 describes the Enhanced Semantic Ontology-based RBAC (ESO-RBAC). Most previous ontologies for
access control  have used OWL-DL. Although this is widely supported and easy to understand, it  was found to be
inflexible. ESO-RBAC uses OWL-Full so that classes, as well as instances, can be used as the Domain and Range of
properties.  This increases  flexibility in defining properties,  and allows the use of OWL’s native class hierarchy in
defining roles in an object-oriented fashion. Therefore, roles need to be defined as classes, not as instances. However,
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some properties in the ontology take roles as their domains and/or ranges. Unlike OWL-DL, OWL-Full permits the use
of classes as property parameters.
Chapter  7 evaluates the work in this thesis on modelling RBAC in Prolog, relational  database management
systems and ontologies. It contrasts OWL with description logic, and considers the advantages and disadvantages of
each. the main advantages of OWL over predicate logic in modelling RBAC are as follows:
• the  ability to  use  the  ontological  class  and  property hierarchies  as  part  of  the  model,  allowing a  natural
representation of hierarchical relationships and eliminating the need for certain computations;
• the ability to query static ontologies quickly without recomputation;
• independence of the querying layer from the ontology;
• OWL and reasoning languages are not vendor-specific.
However, the ontology needs to be rebuilt every time the data or permissions change, and the reasoning process
is slow and the OWL files are large. Issues are also identified with the ability using currently available tools to perform
reasoning, particularly for the ESO-RBAC model using OWL-FULL.
Further development of ESO-RBAC is also discussed in Chapter 7, in order to refine the dynamic RBAC model
by, for instance, introducing a hierarchy of context constraints.
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2 The Domain: Access Control Models
2.1 Database Security and Access Control
Database security is  mainly concerned with the availability, integrity and confidentiality of  data stored and
shared within structured data repositories [1]. We understand availability to mean that authorized access to a database is
never  denied,  and  integrity  to  mean  that  database  rules  (such  as  integrity  constraints  and  rules  defining  who  is
authorized to access the database) are not breached. Confidentiality refers to the protection of data about individuals.
Security in general has three stages [11]:
1. authentication (are you who you claim to be?),
2. access control (protection from unauthorized access requests), and
3. audit (checking for security breaches as they happen or after they have occurred).
We are concerned with stage 2, access control. Authorizations and access control mechanisms reduce the risk of
confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  of  data  being  breached,  and  consequently  contribute  towards  secure
mechanisms  for  data  sharing  and  collaborations  in  database  applications.  Access  control  involves  analyzing  and
checking each access query against resources [26]. It requires access control rules to define the basis upon which access
is granted or denied, as well as procedures to check requests for access against the rules.
The traditional methods of database access control are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) [10].
In DAC, the owner of the data determines who has access to it. [11] DAC is a very widely used access control
mechanism. For example, Unix file system permissions and the SQL GRANT/REVOKE model [27] are based on DAC.
DAC is simple to apply and understand, but has two problems in a large corporate context. DAC is not very secure. In
many corporate settings it is inappropriate for any individual user to “own” an object, thus enabling him possibly to
revoke access to it for any other individual in the organization. DAC is also difficult to maintain in an organization with
many users.  The same permissions  that  apply to  a  number  of  users  performing the  same job  need  to  be  defined
individually for each user, which is likely to lead to inconsistency in definitions of different users with the same role. If
the access rights for a particular group of users needs to be changed (for example, if the database is restructured, or if
the business rules change), then this change needs to be made not only to new users, but also to every existing user in
that group.
In MAC, users do not own objects, and access is granted according to a hierarchical control structure. A typical
MAC system has four levels of security (‘Top Secret’, ‘Secret’, ‘Confidential’ and ‘Unclassified’), to which both data
and users are assigned. A strict rule of ‘write-up, read-down’ is applied, where users can only write to data in a security
classification above their own, and can only read data assigned to a security classification below their own (anyone can
sign in the President, but no-one can check whether he is signed in). [28]. MAC is commonly used in the military, but is
generally considered to be too rigid for use in the corporate context. [12]
2.2 Introduction to RBAC
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [29] is an increasingly popular security mechanism that unlike DAC and
MAC does not directly assign access rights to users. Instead, users are assigned roles, and the roles are assigned access
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rights. Thus, access rights of users are determined their according to their functions within the organization. “Control is
based on employee functions rather than data ownership.” [27]
RBAC allows a business-oriented and non-technical administration approach to managing access to database
records. The idea is to break the association between database users and their permissions for accessing databases, by
introducing roles authorized to users and permissions authorized for such roles. In other words, access control is being
administered by managing associations between users and roles and between roles and permissions [30][31][32]. Note
that MAC can be regarded as a simple case of RBAC with four roles and a particular set of permissions. Similarly, DAC
can be regarded as a simplified RBAC where each user has his own ‘role’.
A user may have more than one role. RBAC fits in very well with the division of roles in a typical health service,
where doctors, nurses, receptionists, etc. all have particular jobs and thus access particular data. RBAC has been defined
in terms of three factors, namely secrecy (confidentiality), integrity and availability [28]:
“Security is  compromised if information is disclosed to users not authorized to access it.  Integrity is
compromised if information is improperly modified, deleted or tampered. Availability is compromised if
users are prevented from accessing data for which they have the necessary permissions.”
A fundamental difference between RBAC (and MAC) and DAC is that “users cannot pass access permissions on
to other users at their discretion”. [27] Generally, only the database administrator is given the power to assign roles to
users.
RBAC is seen as the most comprehensive access control method and a powerful concept for addressing security
administration needs  in  database  applications  [33].  It  was standardized by the  National  Institute  of  Standards and
Technology (NIST)  [34] and reduces the complexity of  authorization management  [35].  RBAC controls access  to
information  based  on  users’ work  activities  [12].  It  is  easy  to  change  users’ permissions  without  modifying  the
underlying access structure by simply adding or removing people from roles [35]. As a result, RBAC is adaptable to any
organizational structure and can evolve over time as the organization changes. This concept has been further developed
to allow roles to be composed of other roles [12] using a role hierarchy, which prevents repetition of role-permission
assignments. It has also been developed for use in networked environments [36].
RBAC can be represented using predicate logic [37], which enables the building of models in logic programming
languages such as Prolog  [14].  RBAC has been implemented in a trust infrastructure  [38], in order to comply with
wider security and safety requirements in healthcare applications, using the DRIVE RBAC model. They distinguish
between static role assignment to users and dynamic allocation of roles at session time.  Zhang  et al. [7] proposed a
delegation framework. based on the RDM2000 RBAC model [39], that addresses how to advocate selective information
sharing in role-based systems while minimizing the risks of unauthorized access in healthcare information systems. The
formal specification of access control policies in clinical information systems can be found in  [37]. They leverage
characteristics of temporal  First-Order Logic to cope with dynamic access control policies and reduce the risks to
confidentiality, integrity and availability of medical data.
RBAC concepts appear to be exploited in many healthcare projects, and it has been accepted that RBAC is more
appropriate than any other approach in the domain of security in medical databases [40][41]. Mavridis [1] developed a
security policy called eMEDAC which was based on DAC, MAC and RBAC, and was able to preserve the availability,
integrity, and confidentiality of a medical records system. In 2000, they extended eMEDAC with the development of
DIMEDAC which incorporated additional features such as the hyper node hierarchies and the three-dimension access
matrix  [42].  Another  solution  that  employs  role  hierarchies  was  proposed  in  [43].  It  uses  digital  certificates,
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cryptography and security policy to control access to clinical intranet applications. Their system consists of two phases:
the ways users gain their security credentials; and how these credentials are used to access medical data.
2.2.1 Simple Static RBAC
Static RBAC consists of a set of fixed rules concerning access to data. In other words, a user in role A can read
and write to object X, while a user in role B can read objects Y and Z. These permissions are determined at compile-
time.
Figure 1: Simple RBAC
Figure 1, redrawn from an image in [27], depicts an example of a simple static RBAC scenario involving a role
with several users and objects assigned to it. Generally, only the database administrator is given the power to assign
roles to users. This figure shows an abstract assignment of a Role to two Objects, and of 3 Users to the Role.
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2.2.2 Extensions to Static RBAC
Figure 2: Path inheritance example
d_s(programmer,software_engineer).
d_s(software_engineer,senior_ software_engineer).
d_s(senior_ software_engineer,manager).
Code 1: An example of a seniority hierarchy written in Prolog.
A widely used model for static RBAC based on predicate logic is that of Barker & Stuckey [18]. Their model is
discussed in detail in the next few paragraphs.
Permission refers to a user’s right to perform an action. In a hierarchical RBAC model, permissions are inherited up
the  hierarchy.  Denial means  that  a  user  is  prevented  from  performing  an  action.  Denials override  permissions.
Seniority refers to the grouping of roles into a hierarchy. Permissions are inherited up the hierarchy, while denials are
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inherited down the hierarchy. The RBAC model considers when users are online (‘active’), and only give permissions
to currently active users.
While hierarchy in an RBAC system is useful in determining flow of command, it is not always appropriate that
people higher up in a hierarchy should inherit the permissions of those below. For example, in a software development
setting,  managers  might  not  inherit  the permissions of  senior  software engineers  to  modify programs or  technical
settings. A seniority hierarchy representing this scenario can be represented as in Code 1.
A path inheritance rule specifies that a permission can inherit this far, but no further, in this case only as far as
the senior_software_engineer level, but not beyond into management grades. Figure 2 illustrates this scenario,
where  the  square  arrow  pointing  to  manager  indicates  that  the  manager does  not  inherit  any  privileges  from
senior_software_engineer.
Equal-status  roles  with  slightly different  permissions  can  be  defined  using  role  inclusion.  An  example  of  its
application is to define the permissions of employees on different duty rosters (employees on day and night duty have
the same permissions, but are only allowed to access data at particular times). An inclusion relationship can be thought
of as a relationship between an inner role and an outer role. Thus, if is_a(inner_role, outer_role) defines a
direct inclusion relationship, then inner_role inherits the privileges of outer_role.
Figure 3: Example of role inclusion
Consider an example of hospital doctors and nurses with day and night duty rosters (Figure 3).  Here, the role
doctor_day,  referring to a doctor on day duty, ‘is a’ doctor, and also ‘is a’  day_duty staff member. The role
doctor_day thus inherits the privileges and constraints of both roles doctor and day_duty, but not vice versa.
An inclusion hierarchy can also be created, similar to the seniority hierarchy. Generally, users will be assigned to roles
within the inclusion hierarchy (inner roles). That is, a user will be assigned as a doctor_day, rather than to doctor
or day_duty.
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is_a(doctor_day, doctor).
is_a(doctor_day, day_duty).
is_a(doctor_night, night_duty).
is_a(nurse_day, nurse).
is_a(nurse_day, day_duty).
is_a(nurse_night, night_duty).
Code 2: Role inclusions of Figure 3
Permissions  and  denials  are  both  inherited  inside inclusion  relationships.  Thus,  if  is_a(inner_role,
outer_role), then inner_role inherits both the permissions and the denials of outer_role. This is in contrast
to  the  seniority hierarchy, where  permissions  and  denials  are  inherited  in  opposite  directions.  Figure  3 shows an
example of role inclusion to represent day-duty and night-duty doctors and nurses. This figure represents the facts in
Code 2.
Thus, the role  doctor_day, referring to a doctor on day duty ‘is a’ doctor, and also ‘is a’ day_duty staff
member. The role doctor_day thus inherits the privileges and constraints of both roles doctor and day_duty, but
not vice versa. Generally, users will be assigned to roles inside the inclusion hierarchy (inner roles). That is, a user will
typically be assigned to doctor_day, rather than to doctor or day_duty.
Separation of duties refers to rules whereby users are restricted in the combinations of roles that they can
possess. Static separation of duties (SSD) means that a user can never be assigned to a particular combination of rules.
The classic example where this is appropriate is that  an employee of an organization cannot be both a purchasing
manager and an accounts manager. Dynamic separation of duties (DSD) means that a user can have a combination of
permissions, but cannot be activated for both at the same time. Using the above example, a user might be an accounts
manager for one department, and purchasing manager for another. To prevent conflict, the user cannot be active as both
roles at once.
Static RBAC is easy to implement in most standard off-the-shelf relational DBMSs, including Oracle (version 7
onwards) [44] and Postgres (v8.x onwards) [45], which have native support for roles (CREATE ROLE). However, these
do not implement all the features described above.
2.3 Dynamic and context-aware RBAC
Barker & Douglas [19] have implemented an RBAC system for protecting federated DBMSs. This includes one
context element, namely checking a user’s IP address. However, their system is implemented in Java, which while
having the advantage of being DBMS-independent, is inefficient and has an additional layer between the database and
the application. A more efficient method would be to use the DBMS own features to define the context-aware RBAC
model. These include procedural languages, such as PL/SQL in Oracle. While dynamic RBAC can be implemented in
certain standard off-the-shelf database management systems, the implementation is often complex.
Traditional  static  RBAC  is  difficult  to  apply  in  context-aware  applications,  since  it  fixes  a  user’s  access
privileges when the user logs on. In dynamic RBAC, the access rules are determined at run-time when a user attempts
to access data. These may be based on time of access, or specific values in the data being accessed, or environmental
factors such as ambient temperature or location. [21]
Various alternatives and extensions to RBAC have been proposed to provide context-aware access control, in
which rules are enforced according to runtime parameters. [46] The basic RBAC model can be extended to take account
of contexts, by varying the range of active roles, the roles in which users may be active or assigned, or the permissions
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that  are assigned to roles, according to context. In  other words,  in which user-role assignments or role-permission
assignments can be changed dynamically during program run-time, rather than statically when a user logs on. This is
called context-aware RBAC, or Dynamic RBAC (DRBAC). Factors that may cause changes in the RBAC assignments
include time of day, ambient temperature and user location. Users may also be restricted to accessing particular rows in
a database table,  rather than necessarily being given access to an entire table.  These include location-based access
control system such as M-Zones Access Control [47] and GEO-RBAC [48], as well as Temporal RBAC (TRBAC).[49]
TRBAC has been further extended as Generalized T-RBAC (GTRBAC) to incorporate hierarchy and separation of
duties.  [50] Another extended RBAC model is the OASIS (Open Architecture for Securely Interworking Services)
model [51][52] for RBAC in heterogeneous data sources. Belokosztololszky et al. [53] propose a mechanism for using
defining parameters used by RBAC models as contexts.
Tolone  et  al. compared  and  contrasted  the  applicability  of  various  access  control  models  for  collaborative
systems. [54] These are DAC (called the Access Matrix Model in their paper), static RBAC, TBAC (Task-Based Access
Control), TMAC (Team-Based Access Control), Spatial Access Control and Dynamic RBAC (called Context-Aware
Access Control). They found that context-aware RBAC provides the best support for such applications, but also that it
is the most complex.
Corradi et al. [55] have designed a context-based access control system where “privileges are directly associated
with contexts, and users acquire their proper set of permissions dependently on their current contexts.” This approach
appears to regard context awareness as a substitute for roles.
The proposed RBAC system has dynamic features. The dynamic RBAC features can be divided into two types:
temporal and row-level. In TRBAC, access to a resource depends on the time when it is accessed. In row-level RBAC,
particular staff can only access particular rows in the table depending on some formulation. Context constraints filter
down the seniority hierarchy, and inside the inclusion hierarchy. TRBAC has been successfully implemented in Oracle
8i. [49] 
Environment roles have been proposed as a way of modelling environmental factors by specifying each one as a
role [56]. 
The extension of roles beyond users to environments has been proposed [56]. Roles are used to capture environment
conditions. Whereas a user role is ‘active’ when a user assigned to that role is logged in, an environment role is active
when a particular set of environment conditions are true. For instance, an environment role for office_hours can be
set up, which is automatically activated at 09:00 and deactivated at 17:00. Other environment roles can be related to
factors such as ambient temperature and locations. Permissions assigned to user roles may only be valid if particular
environment roles are also active.
rpa(child,use,intercom) ← 
  active(weekday),
  active(free_time)
  ;
  active(weekend).
Code 3: Example of a dynamic RBAC rule.
For example, the predicate logic code in Code 3 can be used to determine whether a child can use an intercom in
a home. The rule states that a user with the role child can use the intercom during their free time at weekdays, and at
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any time at weekends. In this case, weekday, free_time and weekend are environment roles, which are defined as
active in particular conditions using additional predicates.
From this, it can be noted that a security model can be applied to access control for resources of any kind, such
as access to buildings or rooms, or permission to use particular computers or systems, not only to access to data.
Although  this  is  not  specifically mentioned  in  the  paper,  environment  roles  could  also  be  used  to  capture
environment  conditions  intrinsic  to  a  particular  person.  For  example,  this  indicates  the  validity  of  the  rule
rpa(nurse, read, patient) (a user with role nurse can read a patient’s file).
Here, P is a patient, and the predicate states that the rpa rule is valid for patient P if the high_heartbeat
role is active for P. Additionally, role hierarchies can be applied to environment roles in an analogous fashion to user
roles, as can static and dynamic separation of duties.
Extending this concept further, GRBAC (Generalized RBAC) [57] treats not only environment conditions, but also
objects, as roles. The treatment of objects as roles, when applied to a hierarchical RBAC system, makes sense in object-
oriented databases, but perhaps less applicable to relational database systems, where database objects are not organized
hierarchically.
rpa(nurse,read,patient(P)) ←
  active(high_heartbeat, P).
Code 4: Another example of a dynamic RBAC rule.
An alternative method of modelling contexts is to define context constraints and assigning these to user roles, as
described by Strembeck & Neumann [20][21], who also devised a series of predicates to aid in modelling.
 This model can be represented in predicate logic using an example in Code 4, based on the model in [21].
A dynamic RBAC system based on this model has been implemented in Oracle 10g using its row-level access
control feature [58]. We propose to extend this work, to implement more complex context-aware access control models
using DBMSs, so that  access  to data from database-driven applications can be controlled directly by the database
according  to  the  usernames  entered  by  the  application  user,  without  the  need  for  any  additional  middleware  or
application-level access control.
Applying context-aware access control models to DBMSs involves capturing the environmental conditions, and
using the DBMS security features to ensure that only the appropriate level of access is achieved by any user, based on
the rules determined by the environmental conditions. An extension to RBAC is the ARBAC97 (Administrative RBAC
1997) model that brings in the possibility of “using RBAC itself to manage RBAC” [33] by allowing users who are
members of administrative roles to assign (and revoke) users and permissions to (and from) roles. TMAC  [59] and
TBAC [60] both model access control from a context-oriented perspective. However, it has been argued that such an
approach does not bring anything new from the RBAC perspectives in medical database security [7]. TRBAC restricts
the roles available to users depending on the time period, by enabling or disabling roles using role triggers at specified
times. TRBAC has been implemented using database triggers on an Oracle database [49].
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context_clause(patient_consulted_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,Patient_ID) ← 
  ae_consultation(_,_,_,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID).
context_clause(patient_diagnosed_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,Patient_ID) ← 
  ae_consultation(Cons_Number,_,_,Patient_ID,_), 
  patient_diagnosis(_,Doctor_ID,_,Cons_Number,_).
context_constraint(patient_treated_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,P,
 patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)) ←
  context_clause(patient_consulted_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,Patient_ID)
  ;
  context_clause(patient_diagnosed_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,Patient_ID).
Code 5: Context clauses and constraints with predicate logic.
A context hierarchy can be devised by defining context constraints in terms of other context constraints. Hu &
Weaver [46] suggest how this can be done systematically by defining context conditions, clauses and context constraints
as in Code 5.
Context Constraint := Clause1 ∪ Clause2 ∪ … ∪ Clause3
Clause := Condition1 ∩ Condition2 ∩ … ∩ Condition3
Condition := <CT> <OP> <VALUE>
Formula 1: Mathematical definition of context constraints and conditions.
In Formula 1, <CT> is a context parameter, <OP> is a comparison operator, and <VALUE> is a parameter value
for comparison. Thus, an example of a context condition might be Temperature ≥ 25.
Bertino  et al. [61] proposed a general framework for reasoning about access control models using C-Datalog
[62], which is an object-oriented extension of Datalog [63]. Their framework is “general enough to model discretionary,
mandatory, and role-based access control models”. It  can model static and dynamic RBAC, and the object-oriented
nature of the C-Datalog language allows hierarchical RBAC to be modelled more simply in their model than in models
using traditional predicate logic languages such as Prolog and Datalog.
Seitz  et al. [64] proposed an access management system, called Semantic Access Certificates, for use in grid
environments, and illustrate its use in a medical environment. This system extends RBAC by enabling access control
based not only on the role of the users wishing to access the data, but also the semantics of the data. In this sense, it acts
like dynamic RBAC.
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3 RBAC Implementation in Prolog and Relational DBMS
3.1 Introduction
In this section we examine the feasibility of implementing, in a relational DBMS, a dynamic RBAC model for a
hospital database originally written in Prolog. The static RBAC model is first described, followed by its implementation
in Oracle. The dynamic RBAC is then described in the same way.
The dynamic RBAC is built upon the static RBAC model of Barker & Stuckey [18], and has dynamic constraints
separately defined through their context constraints.  Table 28 (Appendix VII, page  219) shows the roles of Hospital
staff and the permissions assigned to them as defined in the static RBAC model. The static RBAC schema is reused
from earlier research prototypes where we experimented with solutions for data sharing across the NHS  [25].  The
dynamic  RBAC design  is  built  upon the  semantics  of  the  static  RBAC and extended by Strembeck & Neumann
[21].The DRBAC model was written in SWI-Prolog [14], a free/libre implementation of Prolog using the Edinburgh
syntax. The model requires SWI-Prolog v5.6.17 or above to run, due to the use of date and time handling syntax only
available in the most recent versions. We have implemented a hierarchical  DRBAC model in which denials override
permissions.  Additionally,  the  proposed  DRBAC model  has  the  following  extended  features  discussed  in  [18]:
separation of duties, inheritance paths and role inclusion. 
Table 1: Tables for hospital database used in testing
Table Description
Ward Hospital wards.
Room Rooms within hospital wards.
Bed Beds within rooms in wards.
Patient Patient demographic details.
Diagnosis List of coded diagnoses.
AE_Consultation Consultations by doctors with patients. Links to RBAC table usr for doctor.
Patient_Diagnosis Diagnoses given during consultations. Links to RBAC table usr for doctor performing 
diagnosis.
Nurse_Ward Assignments of nurses to Wards. Links to RBAC table usr for nurse. 
Ward( Ward_ID, Type, Ward_Capacity )
Room( Room_ID, Ward_ID, Type, Bed_Capacity )
Bed( Bed_ID, Room_ID, Type )
Patient( Patient_ID, Last_Name, First_Name, Address, DOB, Bed_ID )
Diagnosis( Diagnosis_code, Illness_name, Usual_Symptoms )
AE_Consultation( Cons_Number, Cons_Date, Cons_Description, Patient_ID, Doctor_ID )
Patient_Diagnosis( Patient_Diagnosis_Number, Diagnosing_Doctor, Diagnosis_Desc, Cons_Number,
Diagnosis_Code )
Nurse_Ward( usr, Ward )
Text 1: Hospital Database Schema
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Figure 4: ERD of hospital database schema. Arrows show ‘many’ end of 1:many relationships. A simple line represents a
1:1 relationship.
 The hierarchical RBAC is modelled in this section using a database and RBAC model that could be applied to a
hospital scenario. The data model includes basic information about Patients hospital Beds. There are a number of beds
in each Room, and a number of Rooms in each Ward. A ward may be looked after by one more Nurses. A Patient may
be diagnosed during a Consultation with a Doctor, according to a specified list of diagnosis. Table 1 shows the database
tables of a hospital database that is used to model RBAC in the system. Note that the information about Doctors and
Nurses  is  stored  in  an  RBAC  table,  usr,  to  which  the  tables  AE_Consultation,  Patient_Diagnosis and
Nurse_Ward link. Therefore, no table in  Table 1 lists either Doctors or Nurses.  Text 2 shows the schema.  Figure 4
shows the ERD (Entity Relationship Diagram).
Figure 5: Role hierarchy in Hospital database, excluding day_duty and night_duty in doctor and nurse roles. Solid
lines show d_s relationships; dotted lines show is_a relationships.
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Figure 5 shows the seniority hierarchy of  the RBAC model  used in  this  section. This  model has  four role
hierarchies, for doctors (shown in red), nurses (blue), data managers (green) and administrators (yellow).  Figure 115
(Appendix VI, page 217) shows both the seniority and inclusion relationships for doctor and nurse type roles. Table 28
lists the roles in this RBAC model, and permissions assigned to them. The ERD of RBAC tables (relations that are used
to  store  RBAC meta-data)  is  shown in  Figure  116 (Appendix,  page  217)  shows both  the  seniority and  inclusion
relationships for  doctor and nurse type roles.  Table 28 (Appendix, page  217) lists  the roles  in the model,  and the
permissions assigned to them.In the following sections, Prolog code is depicted in a  light typewriter font,
while SQL and PL/SQL code is depicted in a heavy typewriter font.
3.2 Defining and Implementing Static RBAC in Relational 
Database
3.2.1 Representation of Static RBAC Model in Prolog
Table 2: Fact definitions used in RBAC design in Prolog.
Fact Formula Description Example
d_s(SeniorRole, 
JuniorRole).
defines a direct seniority 
relationship: SeniorRole is 
directly senior to JuniorRole
d_s(consultant,
specialist_registrar)
.
inherits_rpa_path(
SeniorRole, 
JuniorRole, 
Permission, 
Object).
Privileges represented by 
Permission for object Object 
are inherited up the role hierarchy 
from JuniorRole to 
SeniorRole, and no further.
inherits_rpa_path(sen
ior_data_manager,
junior_data_manager,
_,_).
In this example, Permission
and Object are set using the 
Prolog anonymous variable _, 
meaning that this inheritance 
path from 
senior_data_manager to 
junior_data_manager 
applies to all values of 
Permission and Object.
is_a(InnerRole, 
OuterRole).
Direct inclusion relationships. is_a(student_nurse_ni
ght,student_nurse).
user(Username, 
LastName, 
FirstName, 
Address, DOB).
Defines a user’s personal details. user(u0001,'Sugar',
'Ed','1 Montgomery 
Ave','12/06/1975').
password(Username,
Password).
User passwords. In the Prolog 
implementation, the passwords are 
unencrypted, but in a real 
implementation they would 
obviously encrypted.
password(u0001,'desk'
).
role(Role). Defines the role named Role role(consultant).
object(Object). Defines the object named Object, 
and includes its full data structure.
object(room(Room_ID,
Ward_ID,Type,Bed_
Capacity)).
rpa(Role, 
Permission, 
Object).
Role Permission Assignment: Role 
is assigned Permission on 
Object.
rpa(house_officer,
select,ward(Ward_ID,
Type,Ward_Capacity)).
ura(User,Role). User Role Assignment: User is 
assigned to Role.
ura(u0017,
senior_data_manager).
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Fact Formula Description Example
activate(User,
Role,Time,
Password).
User is activated as Role at Time
with Password.
activate(u0005,house_
officer_day,
date(2006, 8, 23, 12,
39, 0, -3600, 'BST', 
true),'mother')
This means that user u0005 
signed on as role 
house_officer_day at 
12:39:00 BST on 23 August 
2006 with password mother. 
Note that the date is expressed 
using a SWI-Prolog date 
constructor.
deactivate(User,
Role,Time)
User is deactivated as Role at 
Time.
deactivate(u0005,
house_officer_day,
date(2006, 8, 23, 12,
50, 0, -3600, 'BST', 
true))
Assignments of users to roles, and roles to permissions, are represented as Prolog facts and Prolog rules. Table 2
lists the syntax of the Prolog facts used in this static RBAC model. Notice that an assertion of fact in Prolog takes the
form relation(term1,term2,…,termk). An initial capital letter means that the term is a variable; otherwise, it is
a constant atom.Appendix IV (page 206) lists all facts defined in the Scenario used for testing this Prolog model.
Table 3: Rules in Prolog static RBAC design
Rule Name Description
permittable Privileges assigned to users.
authorizable Privileges assigned to users, filtered by denials.
permitted Privileges assigned to currently active users.
authorized Privileges assigned to currently active users, filtered by denials.
included_in All inclusion relationships.
senior_to All seniority relationships.
inherits_rpa All pairs of roles linked by an inheritance path.
rpa_full Explicit and implicit (by seniority) permissions given to roles.
d_rpa_full Explicit and implicit (by seniority) denials given to roles.
denied Denials assigned to users.
currently_active Users with current open sessions.
dsd_conflict All pairs of roles that produce a DSD conflict.
ssd_conflict All pairs of roles that produce an SSD conflict.
inconsistent_ssd Whether a role violates an SSD rule.
inconsistent_dsd Whether a role violates a DSD rule.                                                                                  
Prolog  rules  are  used  to  deduce  who  can  access  what. A  Prolog  rule  takes  the  form  result :-
condition, where the result is true if the condition is true.  Table 3 lists all rules used in the static RBAC Prolog
model. The complete Prolog code for the Prolog rules describing the full static RBAC meta-model is given in Appendix
II. These are discussed in detail here.
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% inclusion of equal-status roles
i. included_in(R1,R1).
ii. included_in(R1,R2) :- is_a(R1,R2).
iii. included_in(R1,R3) :- is_a(R1,R2),
                      included_in(R2,R3).
Code 6: included_in
Code 6 shows the included_in rules, for deducing role inclusions. Predicate i in Code 6 states that any role
is included in itself. Predicate ii states that R1 is included in R2 if R1 is directly defined as a type of R2 by an is_a
fact.
Predicate iii states that R1 is included in R3 if:–
a) R1 is directly defined as a type of R2, and
b) R2 is included in R3.
Note that the comma (,) signifies logical “AND” in Prolog. Predicate  iii is recursive, because the condition
clause also contains included_in.
Note that the three predicates are independent, so, for example variable R1 in i has no connection with R1 in ii.
i. senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(R1,_).
ii. senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(_,R1).
iii. senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R2).
iv. senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R3), senior_to(R3,R2).
Code 7: senior_to roles.
The rules for  senior_to are shown in Code 7. These are defined similarly to  included_in. However, a role is
automatically considered to be “senior to” itself. For it to be defined as such, it must be either directly senior to another
role (as in Predicate i) or have a role directly senior to it (Predicate ii). If a role participates in a seniority hierarchy, then
it is “senior to” itself. [This means that senior_to is really “senior to or equal”.] Predicates iii and iv are analogous to
Predicates ii and iii in Code 6 for included_in.
Code 8 shows the predicates for inherits_rpa, which determines how far along a seniority hierarchy access
privileges can be inherited.
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rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
                    senior_to(R2,R3),
                    rpa(R3,P,O),
                    inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O).
Code 9: rpa_full
inherits_rpa(R1,R1,_,_).
inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
                           senior_to(R3,R4),
                           inherits_rpa_path(R1,R4,P,O).
Code 8: inherits_rpa 
 Code 9 shows the rule,  rpa_full, which determines the entire set of permissions that a particular role has,
whether explicit or implicit. It states the R1 has permission P over object O if:–
a) R1 is a type of (included in) role R2;
b) R2 is senior to R3;
c) R3 has permission P over object O, and 
d) R2 and R3 are part of an inheritance path. 
permittable(U,P,O) :- permittable(U,P,O,R).
permittable(U,P,O,R) :- ura(U,R)
                            rpa_full(R,P,O).
Code 10: definition of permittable.
Code 10 shows the definition of the Prolog rule permittable, which determines whether a user would have
permission to access an object if they were active in their role.
permitted(U,P,O) :-    ura(U,R),
                       permitted(U,P,O,R).
permitted(U,P,O,R) :-  currently_active(U,R,_),
                       permittable(U,P,O,R).
Code 11: definition of permitted.
Code 11 shows the definition of the Prolog rule  permitted,  which determines whether a user does have
permission to access an object. permitted is true if permittable is true, and the user is currently_active
in the role.
d_rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
                      senior_to(R3,R2),
                      d_rpa(R3,P,O).
Code 12: d_rpa_full
Code 12 shows the definition of the Prolog rule d_rpa_full, which is analogous to rpa_full for denials.
Note the following differences from rpa_full.
a) The included_in term is the same, but in the arguments of the senior_to clause are reversed. All
access control rules, whether permissions or denials, are inherited from an outer (parent) role to an inner
role. However, whereas permissions are inherited up the seniority hierarchy, denials are inherited down
it.
b) the rule  for  d_rpa_full does  not  consider  inherits_rpa:  in  this  model,  denials  are  always
inherited all the way down a seniority hierarchy.
denied(U,P,O) :- ura(U,R),
                 d_rpa_full(R,P,O).
Code 13: denied
Code 13 shows the definition of the Prolog rule, which determines whether a user is denied access.  This is
defined  simply  as  a  user  being  a  member  of  a  role  that  it  part  of  a  d_rpa_full.  It  is  analogous  to  both
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permittable and permitted: there is no concept of being denied access depending on whether a user is active in
a role. Either the user is denied access to an object, or is not.
authorizable(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
                         authorizable(U,P,O,R).
authorizable(U,P,O,R) :- permittable(U,P,O,R),
                         not(denied(U,P,O)).
Code 14: authorizable
authorized(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
                       authorized(U,P,O,R).
authorized(U,P,O,R) :- permitted(U,P,O,R),
                       not(denied(U,P,O)).
Code 15: authorized
Code 14 shows the definition of the Prolog rule authorizable, which is defined as “permittable but not
denied”. Code 15 shows the definition of the Prolog rule authorized, which is defined as “permitted but not denied”.
3.2.2 Transformation of Static RBAC Model from Prolog to SQL 
Database
The Prolog representation described in Section 3.2.1 above, and in Appendix IV and Appendix III, was transformed
into a representation in an SQL database.  That  is,  a  relational  database model  was created for  holding data about
assignments of users to roles and roles to permissions, so that permissions and denials of particular users could be
inferred using SQL queries on this database model. This model was stored in a database schema separate from the main
data tables.
A Prolog fact can be transformed in one of three ways.
(1) Transformation into INSERT statements on database tables (most Prolog facts).
(2) Transformation into  CREATE TABLE statements to create tables in the main data schema (Prolog facts
object).
(3) Transformation into rows of  table  usr_session in the RBAC schema (Prolog facts  activate and
deactivate).
CREATE TABLE d_s (
  senior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  junior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    Primary Key (senior_role,junior_role),
    FOREIGN KEY (senior_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (junior_role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
Code 16: CREATE TABLE statement for d_s table in SQL.
In general, Prolog facts are transformed into INSERT statements on database tables (method (1)). The conversion
was generally straightforward. For example, Code 16 shows the table definition of the d_s table corresponding to the
d_s Prolog fact.
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) 
VALUES ( 'consultant','specialist_registrar' );
Code 17: INSERT statement for a d_s fact
Code 17 shows the  INSERT statement equivalent to  d_s(consultant,specialist_registrar).. Like
all d_s facts, this takes the form d_s(Senior_role, Junior_role) (Table 2, page 31).
In some cases, the transformation is more complex due to the different ways in which SWI-Prolog and Oracle
represent dates and times. Additionally, there are differences in structure between the Prolog facts and Oracle tables.
35
CREATE TABLE room
(
room_id      VARCHAR(10),
ward_id      VARCHAR(10),
type         VARCHAR(10),
bed_capacity VARCHAR(10),
primary key (room_id),
Foreign Key (ward_id) references ward(ward_id)
);
Code 18: CREATE TABLE statement for room.
CREATE TABLE usr_session(
  usr VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
  role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  start_time TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
  end_time TIMESTAMP,
    FOREIGN KEY (usr) REFERENCES usr(user_id),
    FOREIGN KEY (role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
Code 19: CREATE TABLE statement for 
usr_session table.
The object facts (e.g. object(room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).) are represented
as CREATE TABLE statements in the database schema for the main data (not in the RBAC schema) (method (2)). This
is because they define the object types existing in the data model of the data being accessed by RBAC, and thus
represent database tables to which the RBAC model grants access. Therefore, they. For example, this object fact is
represented by the CREATE TABLE statement in Code 18.
Prolog facts activate and deactivate are transformed into rows of table usr_session (method (3)).
This table does not store the password. Code 19 shows the structure of the usr_session table.
Unlike  in  Prolog,  where  logging  on  (activation)  and  logging  off  (deactivation)  are  represented  by  separate
activate and deactivate Prolog facts, the SQL table represents an activation and corresponding deactivation by
an entry in  usr_session. The absence of a value for  end_time in  usr_session corresponds to the lack of a
deactivate fact  corresponding to  an  activate fact,  i.e.  a  currently active  session.  Unlike  Prolog,  SQL can
validate a data record before entering it, and can modify and delete records. Therefore, there is no need to store sessions
with incorrect passwords, only for them to be rejected by the currently_active rule. Instead, attempts to INSERT
rows from logins with incorrect passwords can be rejected using a database trigger. Similarly, rather than representing
the end of a session by asserting a  deactivate fact, it can be represented by  UPDATEing the row in the RBAC
database table usr_session with the end_date.
usr    role                   start_time              end_time
------ ---------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
u0005  house_officer_day      2006-08-23 12:23:39     NULL
Text 2: Row in usr_session corresponding to activate(u0005,house_officer_day,date(2006, 8,
23, 12, 39, 0, -3600, 'BST', true),'mother'). with no corresponding deactivate fact.
For example, the fact
activate(u0005,house_officer_day,date(2006, 8, 23, 12, 39, 0, -3600, 'BST', true),'mother').
is represented in the SQL model as a row in usr_session, given in Text 2.
usr    role                   start_time              end_time
------ ---------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
u0005  house_officer_day      2006-08-23 12:23:39     2006-08-23 12:23:50
Text 3: Row in usr_session corresponding to activate(u0005,house_officer_day,date(2006, 8,
23, 12, 39, 0, -3600, 'BST', true),'mother'). with 
deactivate(u0005,house_officer_day,date(2006, 8, 23, 12, 55, 0, -3600, 'BST', 
true).
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If a deactivate fact
deactivate(u0005,house_officer_day,date(2006, 8, 23, 12, 55, 0, -3600, 'BST', true).
is added, then the equivalent in the SQL model is to update the row in Text 2 with a value for end_time, giving
the row in Text 3.
Text 57 (page 219) shows the RBAC schema. Figure 116 (page 217) shows the ERD of the RBAC schema. 
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( '_' );
Code 20: INSERT statement for Dummy role.
After creating the table role, a dummy record is added to the table, with value _ (Code 20). This is needed as an
equivalent of the Prolog anonymous variable _, as used in some Prolog rules.
Prolog rules were transformed in either of two ways:
(1) Non-recursive Prolog rules were transformed into SQL views. However, currently_active is a special
case.
(2) Recursive Prolog rules were transformed into SQL tables populated by triggers and stored procedures.
CREATE VIEW permittable AS 
-- permittable(U,P,O) :- ura(U,R),
--                           permittable(U,P,O,R).
-- permittable(U,P,O,R) :- rpa_full(R,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, object, action, ura.role AS role FROM ura, 
rpa_full
    WHERE ura.role = rpa_full.role;
Code 21: SQL view for permittable (including the Prolog code on which it is 
based as a comment).
Most Prolog rules were converted into SQL views (method (1)). Code 21 shows an example for inherits_
rpa, including the original code for the Prolog rule as SQL comments.
CREATE VIEW rpa_full AS -- all permissions to all roles, both explicit and implicit (by inheritance)
-- rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
--                     senior_to(R2,R3),
--                    rpa(R3,P,O),
--                    inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT included_in.inner_role AS role, action, object, senior_role, junior_role FROM rpa,
included_in, senior_to
    WHERE included_in.outer_role = senior_to.senior_role
    AND senior_to.junior_role = rpa.role
    AND (
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role FROM inherits_rpa WHERE action = '_' AND object = '_')
      OR
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role,action) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role,action FROM inherits_rpa WHERE object = '_')
      OR
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role,object) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role,object FROM inherits_rpa WHERE action = '_')
      OR
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role,action,object) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role,action,object FROM inherits_rpa)
    )
;
Code 22: SQL view for rpa_full.
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Querying permittable involves querying ura and rpa_full. This is represented in SQL by a view joining
the  tables  ura and  rpa_full.  However,  some  transformations  are  more  complex,  as  shown  in  Code  22 for
rpa_full.
The view for  rpa_full is  created by joining  rpa,  included_in,  senior_to and  inherits_rpa,
which  is  itself  based  on  inherits_rpa_path as  well  as  senior_to.  The  inherits_rpa_path facts  in
Prolog contain anonymous variables,  represented by the underscore,  which match any value.  These were imported
directly into the equivalent SQL table inherits_rpa as columns with the value '_'. However, this has no special
meaning in SQL, which has no equivalent concept. Therefore, the meaning of the underscores as ‘match-all’ values has
to be explicitly defined for the columns where they might appear. This technique is also employed in ssd_conflict
and dsd_conflict. Due to the use of foreign key references to role in the relevant tables, the dummy record in
role, shown in Code 20, is needed.
currently_active(U,R1,D1) :- activate(U,R1,D1,Password),
                   password(U,Password),
                   ura(U,R1),
                   (
                     not(deactivate(U,R1,_));
                     deactivate(U,R1,D2),
                     date_time_stamp(D1,T1),
                     date_time_stamp(D2,T2),
                     T2 < T1
                   ).
Code 23: Prolog rule for currently_active.
The SQL view currently_active is defined entirely differently from the equivalent Prolog rule, due to the
different representation of the Prolog facts on which it is based (activate and deactivate). Code 23 shows the
currently_active Prolog rule.
This rule tests whether a user U is currently active in a role R1 at a given date/time D1, in the following steps:
1. Check whether an activate fact activate(U,R1,D1,Password) exists.
2. Verify that user U has password Password.
3. Verify that user U is assigned to role R1.
4. Check that U has not been deactivated before D1 (no corresponding deactivate fact exists for U in role
R1).
CREATE VIEW currently_active AS
-- currently_active(U,R1,D1)
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, role, start_time FROM usr_session 
  WHERE usr_session.start_time < SYSTIMESTAMP
  AND (usr_session.end_time > SYSTIMESTAMP or usr_session.end_time is null);
Code 24: SQL view for rpa_full.
The SQL view  currently_active (Code 24) is based only on  usr_session, and checks whether the
current  time  is  between  start_time and  end_time.  The  password,  role  assignment  and  DSD  checking  are
performed by triggers on usr_session. 
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Some rules in the RBAC model are recursive. These cannot be handled by SQL views, since SQL is not Turing-
complete, so cannot handle recursion or iteration. Instead, they are handled by triggers on the underlying tables, which
populate a table with the rows that would be produced by the rule.
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER is_a_after_all_sl
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON is_a
BEGIN
    insert_included_in();
END;
Code 25: row-level post-action trigger on table is_a
The  two  recursive  rules  in  this  RBAC  model  are  included_in and  senior_to,  which  use  classic
parent/ancestor recursion. The following text uses  included_in as an example of transforming a recursive Prolog
rule to SQL. The transformation of senior_to is similar, and is not shown. The Prolog rule included_in is shown
in  Code  12 (page  34).  included_in is  deduced  by  querying  on  is_a,  and  if  required  by  recoursing  to
included_in. In the database RBAC model, included_in is a table, populated by a row-level post-action trigger
on is_a as in Code 25.
INSERT INTO included_in(
    SELECT DISTINCT is_a.inner_role,is_a.outer_role 
        FROM is_a WHERE (inner_role,outer_role) NOT IN
        (SELECT inner_role,outer_role from included_in)
);
Code 26: SQL statement run by insert_included_in
This trigger runs a stored procedure  insert_included_in,  which procedure runs the SQL statement in
Code 26 to insert values into included_in.
DELETE FROM included_in_staging;
-- included_in(R1,R3) :- is_a(R1,R2), included_in(R2,R3).
INSERT INTO included_in_staging(
  (SELECT DISTINCT included_in.inner_role, is_a.outer_role
  FROM is_a JOIN included_in
  ON is_a.inner_role = included_in.outer_role)
  MINUS
  (SELECT inner_role,outer_role from included_in)
);
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_rows FROM included_in_staging;
IF (v_rows > 0 ) THEN
  INSERT INTO included_in (SELECT * FROM included_in_staging);
END IF;
Code 27: statements run by recourse_included_in
Only  records  that  are  not  already  in  included_in are  inserted.  A  row-level  post-action  trigger  on
included_in is  thus  run,  for  each  row  entered  into  included_in.  This  runs  the  procedure  recourse_
included_in in Code 27.
The table  included_in_staging is used to temporarily store records for inclusion in  included_in.
included_in_staging is cleared, and then populated with records that are to be added to included_in in this
recursive call, and are not already in included_in. These rows are then inserted into included_in, recursively
triggering the running of the same procedure.
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  INSERT INTO included_in(
    (SELECT DISTINCT included_in.inner_role, is_a.outer_role
    FROM is_a JOIN included_in
    ON is_a.inner_role = included_in.outer_role)
    MINUS
    (SELECT inner_role,outer_role from included_in)
  );
Code 28: This does not work.
It would look as if the code in Code 28 would accomplish the objective much more simply, dispensing with the
intermediate  table.  However,  this  leads  to  infinite  recursion,  apparently because  the  clause  following the  MINUS
operator  uses  an  out-of-date  copy of  included_in.  Therefore,  the  same insertions,  and  consequently the  same
recursions, are run over and over. Integrity constraints would theoretically solve this problem, by preventing duplicate
records from being inserted,  but  their  violation causes  a  program error, preventing the procedure from running to
completion.
The use of a  table for  temporary storage is  certainly not the most  elegant  or  efficient  way of  solving this
problem. A PL/SQL or equivalent data structure within the procedure could probably be used instead, but this solution
would be more programmatically complex to implement, as well as being DBMS-specific.
The  table  senior_to is  populated  by  triggers  on  d_s and  senior_to itself  in  a  similar  way  to
included_in with is_a.
A pre-action row-level  trigger  on  usr_session performs validity checking in  relation to  the  user’s role
assignment and dynamic separation of duties. Therefore, no records can be inserted into usr_session that activate a
user for an incorrect role.
A pre-action  row-level  trigger  on  ura checks  that  a  role  to  be  assigned  to  a  user  does  not  violate  static
separation of duties rules defined in the table ssd, rejecting any record that would violate such conditions. In contrast,
while the Prolog implementation defines ssd facts, it cannot enforce them, because it cannot check facts to be inserted
for validity against a schema or set of rules.
Table 30 (page  221) summarizes the triggers necessary to create the RBAC data (data about users, roles and
assignments of access rights to data tables).
Some tables have integrity constraints to prevent duplicate records from being inserted. Although senior_to
and included_in are intended to have unique records, they do not have integrity constraints because these would
interfere with the running of the triggers that populate them, as explained above.
Data diagrams for the RBAC data model are in Appendix VI (from page 217). Figure 116 (page 217) shows the
ERD of the RBAC data model, showing tables only. Figure 117 (page 218) shows the ERD, showing tables and views.
Figure 118, on page 218, graphically illustrates the CREATE VIEW relationships, linking each view with the objects
involved in creating it. The schema diagrams for the RBAC data model are in Appendix VII (from page 219). Text 57
(page 219) and Text 58 (page 220) show the tables and views in the schema.
3.2.3 Enforcement of Static RBAC in DBMS Meta-data
After modelling the RBAC in a DBMS schema, it was set up in the meta-data of an Oracle DBMS. That is, the
RBAC was set up so that it would be enforced by the built-in access control system of Oracle.
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Oracle implements hierarchical RBAC in its meta-data. A role is created using CREATE ROLE role_name.
The GRANT ROLE command is used to assign a user to a role, or a role to a role, as: GRANT role1 TO role2|
user. In this case, role2 would inherit privileges assigned to role1.
Triggers on RBAC tables run the CREATE, GRANT and REVOKE statements necessary to create an enforceable
RBAC model.  Table 30 (Appendix VII, page 221) summarizes these triggers. Note that the users are GRANTed roles
through  usr_session, not through  ura. This is because merely being assigned to a role is not enough to obtain
privileges: the user needs to be active in the role. Some actions on RBAC tables, particularly  UPDATE actions, are
prevented, mainly because allowing them would require programmatically complex triggers to ensure that the correct
CREATE,  GRANT and  REVOKE commands were run following the action. For example, updating a record in  ura is
prevented. To change a role assigned to a user, the RBAC administrator is prevented from running an update query such
as UPDATE ura SET role = "house_officer_n" WHERE usr = "u0001" AND role = "house_
officer_n"; instead, the RBAC administrator must  DELETE the record in  ura and  INSERT a new record to
replace it.
d_s(senior_role, junior_role): GRANT junior_role TO senior_role
is_a(inner_role, outer_role): GRANT outer_role TO inner_role
Code 29: GRANTs performed through d_s and is_a
As Table 30 shows, this enforcement mechanism does not handle denials. This is due to the contradictory ways
in  which  permissions  and  denials  are  inherited  in  the  two  hierarchies.  As  far  as  the  enforcement  mechanism is
concerned, inheritance of a permission is the same whether it is performed through an  is_a relationship or a  d_s
relationship: both lead to GRANT role1 TO role2 statements being executed. Permissions filter up the seniority
hierarchy, and inside the inclusion hierarchy, as in Code 29.
Denials filter  down the seniority hierarchy: a junior role inherits denials from a senior role. However, denials
filter inside the inclusion hierarchy, in the same way as permissions. Since permissions inherited either way look and act
the same in meta-data, and denials are supposed to over-ride permissions, using REVOKE to enforce denials would be
complex. Therefore, denials are ignored here.
Denials  are  handled by the RBAC mechanism, in  the same way as  context  constraints.  This  makes sense,
because denials filter in the same direction as context constraints for both hierarchies.
Inheritance paths are not handled in this implementation, but could be partially handled by appropriate use of
NOINHERIT in GRANT commands.
3.3 Dynamic RBAC
After  modelling the static RBAC model  described in Sections  2.2.1 and  2.2.2 in Oracle SQL, the dynamic
RBAC model described in Section 2.3 was then modelled.
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3.3.1 Representation of Dynamic RBAC Model in Prolog
Table 4: Fact definition used in dynamic RBAC design in Prolog
Fact Formula Description
associated_cc(Role,Permission,
Object,ContextConstraint).
The context condition ContextConstraint applies when a user 
with role Role accesses object Object using Permission.
ssd(Role1,Role2). A static separation of duties relationship exists between Role1 and 
Role2 (i.e. no user can be assigned to both roles using ura).
dsd(Role1,Role2). A dynamic separation of duties relationship exists between Role1 and 
Role2 (i.e. no user can be active in both roles simultaneously using 
activate).
Table 5: Rules in Prolog dynamic RBAC design
Rule Name Description
applied_cc Whether a context constraint applies to a user performing an action.
fail_context_constraint Whether an action fails a context constraint, considering its applicability.
violated Whether an action would fail a context constraint, irrespective of its applicability.
context_condition Defines the circumstances in which a user can perform an action on an object.
Table 4 and Table 5 list the Prolog facts and rules used for dynamic RBAC.
In dynamic RBAC, permissions assigned to users and roles vary dynamically according to “context conditions”.
These  are  internal  (determined  by database  values)  or  external  (determined  by the  environment)  rules  that  affect
permissions. A context condition may affect all roles defined in the RBAC model, or only specific rules. It may affect
access to all columns in all tables in the database, or only some of these. When context conditions are applied to the
RBAC model, they become “context constraints”. The rules are defined in context_condition predicates.
context_condition(
  patient_treated_by_doctor, Doctor_ID, P,
  patient(
    Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID
  )
) ← ae_consultation(_,_,_,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID).
Code 30: Example of context_condition definition.
Code 30 gives an example of a context_condition predicate called patient_treated_by_doctor.
This  defines  a  condition  that  is  true  only  if  both  Doctor_ID and  Patient_ID appear  in  the  same  ae_
consultation fact. patient_treated_by_doctor is thus a simple row-level internal context condition. The
implementation of context constraints for dynamic RBAC is based on the model of Strembeck & Neumann [2004] [21].
The following paragraphs describe the Prolog rules that are used to apply the context conditions to the RBAC
model, thus making it a dynamic model. These Prolog rules are listed in full in Appendix III.
Code 31 shows Prolog rule applied_cc, which determines whether a particular context condition CC applies
to role  R1,  based on seniority and inclusion rules.  In  this  implementation,  Context  Constraints  filter  down a role
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applied_cc(R1,P,O,CC) ← associated_cc(R3,P,O,CC),
                        senior_to(R3,R2),
                        included_in(R1,R2).
Code 31: Context constraint testing with applied_cc.
hierarchy, and inside an inclusion hierarchy. That is, a junior role inherits the context constraints of a senior role, and an
included role inherits context constraints of a role to which it belongs.
Code  32 shows  Prolog  rule  violated(CC,U,P,O),  from  tests  whether  user  U would  violate  context
condition CC when trying to perform action P on object O, without considering whether the context constraint applies to
the particular user. violated simply negates context_condition for CC.
fail_context_constraint(U,R,P,O) ← applied_cc(R,P,O,CC),
                                   violated(CC,U,P,O).
Code 33: Test for access attempt failing context constraint with fail_context_constraint.
Code 33 shows Prolog rule fail_context_constraint, which determines whether an access P by user U
logged in as role R on object O that violates some context constraint CC that applies to role R. This applies violated
to test whether CC would be violated, and applied_cc to determine whether CC is applicable to user U.
Finally, permitted is modified from the rule in Code 11 (page 34, Section 3.2.1) to take account of context
constraints. The new Prolog rule  permitted is shown in  Code 34. For  permitted(U,P,O,R) to be true, the
following must be true:
1. User U must be currently active in role R.
2. The combination of U, R, action P and object O must not fail any context constraint.
3. U must have the relevant static potential permission as determined by permittable.
Appendix V lists all the context constraints in the RBAC model used in testing.
3.3.2 Transformation of Dynamic RBAC Model from Prolog to SQL 
Database
CREATE TABLE tbl_rows (
  row_id VARCHAR(256), 
  object VARCHAR(64) -- table name
);
Code 35: CREATE TABLE for tbl_rows.
The dynamic RBAC model was implemented in SQL in a similar way to the implementation of static RBAC,
transforming the Prolog rules described in Section  3.3.1 into SQL views and PL/SQL triggers. Additionally, a table
tbl_rows is defined (Code 35), storing all primary keys of all data tables. Triggers are defined on each table to
modify the rows table whenever a data table is modified.
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violated(CC,U,P,O) ← not(context_condition(CC,U,P,O)).
Code 32: Context constraint violation with violated.
permitted(U,P,O,R) ← currently_active(U,R,_),
                     not(fail_context_constraint(U,R,P,O)),
                     permittable(U,P,O,R).
Code 34: Prolog rule permitted in the dynamic RBAC model.
row_id is the primary key for a table row (in composite keys, the columns are separated by tildes), while
object is the name of the table in which the key in row_id appears.
This table is necessary to uniquely identify each row of each object that may be accessed, and store them in the
same place. Without it, the views discussed below would need to perform Cartesian products on tables affected by a
context constraint.
Each context constraint has three (for temporal constraints) or four (for row-level constraints) associated views:
• <CC_name>, defining the constraint itself, equivalent to the context_condition predicates in Prolog.
• applies_<CC_name>,  which  specifies  the  roles,  actions  and  objects  to  which  the  context  condition
applies;equivalent to the associated_cc predicates in Prolog.
• fails_<CC_name>,  which  determines  whether  a  context  constraint  is  violated;  equivalent  to  the
violated predicate in Prolog.  It  returns  users,  actions,  objects and rows that  would violate the context
constraint, determined by the user, action, object and (if applicable) row not appearing in <CC_name>, and
the role and object appearing in applies_<CC_name>. This view uses permittable to obtain the list of
permissions  that  would  apply without  the  context  constraints,  and  joins  it  with  rows  in  the  rows table
corresponding to the appropriate table object. For example, if the object to which the constraint applies is the
patient table, then each row of rows in rows where object=patient is joined with each row of the
relevant subset of permittable.
CREATE VIEW permittable_by_row AS
  SELECT usr, permittable.object as object, action, role, row_id
    FROM permittable, tbl_rows
    WHERE permittable.object = tbl_rows.object;
Code 36: Definition of permittable_by_row.
The view permittable_by_row, shown in Code 36, shows all rows that each user in each role would be
permitted to access before context constraints are applied. It is a join of permittable and tbl_rows.
permitted_by_row,  authorizable_by_row and  authorized_by_row are defined analogously to
permittable_by_row.
The view fails_context_constraints (not shown) is a UNION of all fails_<CC_name> views, and
thus retrieves all potential attempts by a user to perform an action on a row in an object that would fail a context
constraint.
The view permittable_cc, shown in Code 37, retrieves all rows that do not fail any context constraints. It
selects  all  rows  from  permittable_by_row that  do  not  appear  in  fails_context_constraints,  using
MINUS to filter out the unwanted rows.
CREATE VIEW permittable_cc AS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM permittable_by_row
    MINUS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_context_constraints
;
Code 37: Definition of permittable_cc.
44
permitted_cc,  authorizable_cc and  authorized_cc are  defined  analogously  to
permittable_cc.
3.3.3 Enforcement of Dynamic RBAC in DBMS Meta-data
A feature in Oracle known variously as Row-Level Access Control,  Fine-Grained Access Control  and VPD
(Virtual Private Databases)  [65] was used to implement both row-level and temporal context constraints at the meta-
data  level.  This  means  that  Oracle's  own  permission-granting  mechanism  can  be  used  to  allow  or  deny  access
dynamically, rather than using ordinary database tables.
Because denials are inherited in the same way as context constraints (and indeed can be regarded as a type of
context constraint), they are also handled using this feature.
The method for implementing this system is a four-step method described by Finnigan [58]. These four steps are
listed below and each described in turn.
1. Create a security context to manage application sessions.
2. Create a procedure or function to manage setting of the security context for users.
3. Write a package to generate the dynamic access predicates for access to each table.
4. Register the policy function / package with Oracle using the DBMS_RLS package.
Step 1: Create a security context to manage application sessions.
A security context is  a set of name/value pairs that  can be used to bind a particular user to named context
constraints. It must be set through a PL/SQL package. Code 38 shows the command for setting the security context for
the hosp database. This command is run from the script that prepares the database for setup.
Step 2: Create a procedure or function to manage setting of the security 
context for users.
PROCEDURE set_day_duty
  IS
  BEGIN
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'day_duty', 'y');
  END;
Code 39: An example of a context-setting function
Code 39 shows the code for the set_day_duty procedure the function for setting the day_duty context. The
built-in  procedure  dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'day_duty', 'y') sets  the session context
variable 'day_duty' of the current user in the context hosp to the value 'y'. Of course, this context variable was
previously not set.
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CREATE OR REPLACE CONTEXT hosp USING set_context;
Code 38: Setting security context for hosp database. 
PROCEDURE set_cc( p_role VARCHAR )
  IS
  BEGIN
    IF( is_part_of(p_role,'day_duty' )) THEN
      set_day_duty;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role,'night_duty' )) THEN
      set_night_duty;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role,'sister')) THEN
      set_nurse_ward;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role, 'snr_house_officer')) THEN
      set_patient_doctor;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role, 'jnr_data_manager')
    OR is_part_of(p_role, 'receptionist')) THEN
      set_office_hours;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role, 'student_nurse' )) THEN
      set_staff_sister_active_2_h;
    END IF;
  END;
Code 40: set_cc procedure to manage setting of the security context for users
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION is_part_of( p_inner_role VARCHAR, p_outer_role VARCHAR )
RETURN BOOLEAN
IS
  v_num_rows1 INT;
  v_num_rows2 INT;
BEGIN
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_num_rows1 FROM included_in, senior_to WHERE
  p_inner_role = included_in.inner_role AND
  included_in.outer_role = senior_to.junior_role AND
  senior_to.senior_role = p_outer_role;
SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_num_rows2 FROM included_in WHERE
  p_inner_role = included_in.inner_role AND
  included_in.outer_role = p_outer_role;
RETURN (v_num_rows1 + v_num_rows2 > 0);
Code 41: is_part_of procedure to determine inheritance of context constraints by roles
  PROCEDURE set_denials( p_role VARCHAR )
  IS
    v_action VARCHAR(64);
    v_object VARCHAR(64);
  CURSOR c_get_denials IS
    SELECT action, object FROM d_rpa_full WHERE role = p_role;
  BEGIN
    OPEN c_get_denials;
   
    LOOP
      FETCH c_get_denials INTO v_action, v_object;
      EXIT WHEN c_get_denials%NOTFOUND;
  
      -- set context constraints
      dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'denied_' || v_object || '_' || v_action, 'y');
    END LOOP;
    CLOSE c_get_denials;
  END;
Code 42: set_denials procedure
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Code 40 shows the procedure to manage setting the security context of users,  which is called  set_cc and is
contained  in  the  PL/SQL  package  through  which  the  security  context  is  manipulated.  The  package  is  called
set_context in this implementation. set_cc sets the appropriate context constraints for a user depending on his
roles. It calls any (none, one or more than one) of a series of procedures to set context constraints depending on the
user’s role. Denials are then set using the set_denials procedure.
The function is_part_of(role1, role2), shown in Code 41, uses the seniority and inclusion hierarchies
(as given by senior_to and included_in) to determine whether role1 inherits constraints from role2.
The procedure set_denials, shown in Code 42, checks whether a denial is applicable to the role, action and
object  by  querying  d_rpa_full.  If  a  row  is  found  in  d_rpa_full,  then  the  session  context  variable
'denied_<object>_<action>' is set.
Step 3: Write a package to generate the dynamic access predicates for 
access to each table.
if sys_context('hosp', 'denied_' || object_name || '_select') = 'y' then
    return '0 <> 0'; -- return always-false condition and bail out
else
    return (cc(schema_name, object_name));
end if;
Code 43: code for cc_select
if object_name = 'PATIENT' AND sys_context('hosp','nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient') = 'y' then
      if( has_cc ) THEN
        lv_predicate:=lv_predicate || ' AND ';
      END IF;
      lv_predicate:=lv_predicate || ' Patient_id IN (SELECT Patient_id FROM patient_bed, Bed, Room, 
Ward, nurse_ward 
      where get_usr = nurse_ward.usr
      AND nurse_ward.Ward = Room.Ward_id
      AND Room.Room_id = Bed.Room_id
      AND Bed.Bed_id = patient_bed.Bed_id)';   
Code 44:  Code for context nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient
SELECT * FROM patient WHERE Patient_id IN (SELECT Patient_id FROM patient_bed, Bed, Room, Ward, 
nurse_ward 
      where get_usr = nurse_ward.usr
      AND nurse_ward.Ward = Room.Ward_id
      AND Room.Room_id = Bed.Room_id
      AND Bed.Bed_id = patient_bed.Bed_id;
Code 45: Actual SQL run as a result of nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient
In this implementation, the package is called  policy.  It  has a series of functions,  cc_<action>,  where
<action> is SELECT, INSERT etc. These functions test each session context variable to see if it is set, and adds an
appropriate predicate to restrict the rows accessible. In this model, all context constraints apply to all actions in the same
way. Therefore, each cc_<action> function first calls the appropriate denial session context variable. If there are no
denials, then the function cc is called which applies the context constraint. Code 43 shows the code for cc_select.
cc tests  each session context  variable (other  than those  related to  denials)  to  see if  it  is  set,  and adds an
appropriate  predicate  to  restrict  the  rows  accessible.  For  example,  Code  44 shows  the  code  for  the  context
nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient.
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This applies the restrictive SQL in lv_predicate if the object being accessed is the patient table, and the
session context variable nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient is set to y. The restrictive SQL acts like a WHERE
clause, turning SELECT * FROM patient into the SELECT statement in Code 45.
One  might  expect  the  last  line  of  the  SQL  clause  in  Code  45 to  read  AND  Bed.Bed_id  =
patient.Bed_id, since the information about patient beds is stored in the  patient table. However, this would
produce an error, since the restrictive predicate is trying to access the very table to which it  is being applied, thus
causing infinite recursion. To solve this problem, triggers were defined on any modification of data in the patient
table, to add/modify/delete as appropriate the values for patient_no and bed_id to a table patient_bed, which
can be read by the predicate without causing errors.
elsif sys_context('hosp','office_hours') = 'y' then
      lv_predicate:='TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, ''HH24'') >= 9 AND TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, ''HH24'') < 17 AND 
TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, ''D'') >= 2  AND TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, ''D'') <= 6';
Code 46: Conditional clause testing for the office_hours context
Code  46 shows  the  conditional  clause  testing  for  the  office_hours context.  Note  that  Oracle’s  date
formatting scheme treats the days of the week as 1–7, Sunday–Saturday, so Monday is 2 and Friday is 6. 
Step 4: Register the policy function / package with Oracle using the 
DBMS_RLS package.
begin
  dbms_rls.add_policy(
    object_schema => 'HOSP',
    object_name => 'PATIENT',
    policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT',
    function_schema => 'HOSP',
    policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
    statement_types => 'select',
    update_check => TRUE,
    enable => TRUE,
    static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
Code 47: Procedural code for registering policy function
-- security context
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER cc_logon_trigger
AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
DECLARE
 ... 
  CURSOR c_get_roles IS
    SELECT role FROM currently_active WHERE
        usr = (SELECT get_usr FROM DUAL);
BEGIN
  -- get user
  OPEN c_get_roles;
  LOOP
    FETCH c_get_roles INTO v_role;
    EXIT WHEN c_get_roles%NOTFOUND;
--     -- set context constraints
    set_context.set_cc(v_role);
  END LOOP;
  CLOSE c_get_roles;
END;
Code 48: Setting a user’s security context when he logs on
The policy function needs to be registered for each table to which it applies, using procedural code such as that
in Code 47. Additionally, the security context must be set whenever a user logs on. This is achieved using a trigger run
when a user logs onto the database (AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE), as shown in Code 48. This trigger performs
determines the roles in which the user is active, using the user-defined function get_usr to obtain the user name as
stored in usr and password from the DBMS username. Then, for each role, it calls set_context.set_cc to set
appropriate context constraints, if any.
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3.4 Testing the Implementation of RBAC in Oracle
3.4.1 Overview: Parts and Conditions
The RBAC model described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 was tested in an Oracle 10i database system by running a
series of SQL batch files (Appendix XIV) on an Oracle database containing the RBAC model and sample data.
 Parts
The testing was performed on the RBAC model in the following order.
a) Representation of RBAC in database tables: output the results of querying RBAC views;
b) Enforcement of RBAC in meta-data: attempting to log in and access and manipulate data as different
users to test whether the access control assignments in meta-data gave the correct permissions;
c) Testing whether static and dynamic Separation of duties worked correctly.
 Conditions
Users are not supposed to be able to access any data unless they are ‘active’, which would mean that they are
logged in to and using some application that accesses the database. This is represented by the table usr_session in
the RBAC schema. To make sure that user authorizations were correctly applied and revoked when uses were activated
and deactivated, testing in parts a and b was run under four conditions:
1. No users activated: this was to confirm that no users were able to access any part of the database when they
were not activated.
2. Some (17 out of a total 29) users activated: to determine the effects of activating users on their access to data,
and confirming that only activated users could access data. The number of users activated was arbitrary.
3. All users activated: to confirm the system behaviour when all users had access to the system, and ensure that
Representation and Enforcement both produced the same results.
4. Some users deactivated: leaving 21 users active, to confirm that deactivating a user resulted in the withdrawal of
the user's access. The number of users deactivated was arbitrary.
3.4.2 Representation of RBAC
The tables and views were queries in the following order:
1. Role Permissions and Denials (rpa and d_rpa)
2. Static  User  Permissions  and  Authorizations  (permittable,  authorizable,  permitted and
authorized)
3. Dynamic  User  Permissions  and  Authorizations  (permittable_cc,  authorizable_cc,
permitted_cc and authorized_cc)
 1 Role Permissions and Denials (rpa and d_rpa)
For each of the four test runs, queries on rpa and d_rpa were first displayed, to identify permissions applied to
roles. Then, queries on static and dynamic RBAC views were displayed, identifying permissions assigned to users.
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select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa where 
role = 'role_name' order by role, action, object;
select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full 
where role = 'role_name' order by role, action, object;
Code 49: Displaying rpa table and rpa_full view
First, the rpa table and the rpa_full view were displayed for each role (Code 49). The rpa table stores all
permissions explicitly assigned to roles. The rpa_full view returns all permissions available to each role, whether
explicitly assigned or inferred from relationships with other roles.
Results  from  d_rpa and  d_rpa_full were  then  displayed.  These  correspond  to  rpa and  rpa_full,
respectively, for denials rather than permissions.
 2 Static User Permissions and Authorizations (permittable, authorizable, permitted 
and authorized)
Views showing individuals’ permissions and authorizations were displayed, for both static and dynamic RBAC.
select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from permittable where role = 
'role_name' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorizable where role = 
'role_name' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from permitted where role = 
'role_name' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorized where role = 
'role_name' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
Code 50: Displaying permittable, permitted, authorizable and authorized views for static RBAC.
The static permissions and authorizations were first displayed. These do not take account of dynamic context
constraints. The permittable,  authorizable,  permitted and authorized views were displayed for each
role in turn (Code 50). permittable and authorizable respectively display permissions and authorizations that
can  be  applied  to  each  user  and  role.  permitted and  authorized respectively  display  permissions  and
authorizations that currently apply, depending on whether users are logged in. In other words, permittable displays
the permission that a user would have if he had been logged in, while  permitted displays it  only if the user is
actually logged in. The permittable and permitted views are derived from permissions (rpa assignments) only.
The  authorizable and  authorized views  are  derived  from  permissions  filtered  by  denials  (d_rpa
assignments).
 3 Dynamic User Permissions and Authorizations (permittable_cc, authorizable_cc, 
permitted_cc and authorized_cc)
select distinct usr "User", role "Role", object "Object", action "Action", row_id "Row" from 
permittable_cc where role = 'day_duty' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
select distinct usr "User", role "Role", object "Object", action "Action", row_id "Row" from 
authorizable_cc where role = 'day_duty' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
select distinct usr "User", role "Role", object "Object", action "Action", row_id "Row" from 
permitted_cc where role = 'day_duty' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
select distinct usr "User", role "Role", object "Object", action "Action", row_id "Row" from 
authorized_cc where role = 'day_duty' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
Code 51: Displaying dynamic permissions and authorizations for day_duty and night_duty roles.
The  dynamic  permissions  and  authorizations  were  displayed  from  the  permittable_cc,
authorizable_cc, permitted_cc and authorized_cc views were displayed for each role in turn (Code 51,
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for  day_duty and  night_duty roles). These show permissions and authorizations by row rather than by object,
because some dynamic constraints mean that only some rows in tables are visible.
 Running
DELETE FROM ae_consultation WHERE 0 <> 0;
Code 52: A sanitized DELETE statement.
The script in  Appendix XIV was run logged in as each database user in turn to determine whether the RBAC
model translated correctly into user permissions in the meta-data. Data manipulation commands were run for all data,
including RBAC data. However, to ensure that no damage was done to the data, DELETE statements were suffixed with
WHERE 0<>0, as in Code 52.
In this case, the DELETE statement is run, as long as the user has the appropriate permission, thus an appropriate
error results if the user does not have the appropriate permission. However, nothing is actually deleted, because the
WHERE clause always evaluates to FALSE.
Finally, a test was also run to test the enforcement of static and dynamic separation of duties in the ssd and dsd
tables of the RBAC schema. Various users were assigned or activated to various combinations of roles, to discover
whether the static and dynamic separation of duties constraints worked correctly.
3.5 Results
This section summarises the results of testing according to the procedure in Section 3.4, in the following order.
a) Representation of RBAC in database tables: output the results of querying RBAC views;
b) Enforcement of RBAC in meta-data: attempting to log in and access and manipulate data as different
users to test whether the access control assignments in meta-data gave the correct permissions;
c) Testing whether static and dynamic Separation of duties worked correctly.
The detailed results are given in  Appendix XVII. The static and dynamic user permissions and authorisations
were then checked according to the Conditions in Section 3.4.1 relating to the numbers of users who were activated. To
recap, the four conditions were
1. No users activated
2. Some users activated
3. All users activated
4. Some users deactivated
First, the contents of rpa, rpa_full, d_rpa and d_rpa_full were output to ensure that they contained the
correct role permissions and denials. This was done only for part a. The permissions and denials associated with roles
did not change according to user activity, so were the same for all the above conditions. The output of rpa and d_rpa
is described by type of role, in the following order:
1. Temporal RBAC Roles: day_duty and night_duty
2. Job Roles: Data Managers
3. Job Roles: Doctors
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4. Job Roles: Nurses
5. Job Roles: Administrators
All role permission and denial assignments were found to be correct. The static and dynamic user permissions
and authorisations were then checked according to the Conditions in Section 3.4.1 for both parts a and b. The results of
these are summarised below.
No Users Activated: Queries on permittable and authorizable correctly retrieved all static permissions
and authorizations allocated to users. Queries on permitted and authorized correctly produced empty recordsets,
because for users to be actually permitted to perform any actions, they would need to be activated. No users were
activated in this test run. Queries on  permittable_cc and  authorizable_cc correctly retrieved all dynamic
permissions and authorizations allocated to users and applicable at the time of running. Queries on permitted and
authorized correctly produced empty recordsets, because for users to be actually permitted to perform any actions,
they would need to be activated. No users were activated in this test run. Attempts to log in as each user and manipulate
data were unsuccessful, because none of the users were activated. Therefore, the meta-data correctly recorded that no
users had any permission to change the data.
Some  Users  Activated: Queries  on  permittable and  authorizable correctly  retrieved  all  static
permissions and authorizations allocated to users. Queries on permitted and authorized correctly produced the
static permissions and authorizations for active users only. Queries on permittable_cc and authorizable_cc
correctly retrieved all dynamic permissions and authorizations allocated to users and applicable at the time of running.
Queries on permitted and authorized correctly retrieved all dynamic permissions and authorizations of active
users  only.  When  users  were  logged  on,  active  users  were  able  to  manipulate  data  according  to  their  dynamic
authorizations. Non-active users were unable to manipulate data. Thus, the meta-data correctly reflected authorizations
of active users.
All Users Activated: Queries on permittable and authorizable correctly retrieved all static permissions
and  authorizations  allocated  to  users.  Queries  on  permitted and  authorized retrieved  the  same  results  as
permittable and authorizable, since all users were active on this test run. Queries on permittable_cc and
authorizable_cc correctly retrieved all dynamic permissions and authorizations allocated to users and applicable
at  the  time  of  running.  Queries  on  permitted and  authorized also  retrieved  the  same  results  as
permittable_cc and authorizable_cc, since all users were active on this test run. Since all users were active,
they were all able to log on and manipulate data according to their dynamic authorizations. However, the manager
user  u0021 was  incorrectly  given  the  authorizations  of  snr_data_manager,  specialist_nurse and
consultant. This is because the VPD cannot handle path inheritance, which the RBAC Model uses to prevent users
of role manager from having these authorizations despite being senior_to these roles. Apart from this problem, the
meta-data correctly reflected authorizations of all users.
Some  Users  Deactivated: Queries  on  permittable and  authorizable correctly  retrieved  all  static
permissions and authorizations allocated to users. Queries on permitted and authorized correctly produced the
static permissions and authorizations for active users only, i.e. only those users who had not been deactivated for this
test run. Queries on  permittable_cc and  authorizable_cc correctly retrieved all dynamic permissions and
authorizations allocated to users and applicable at the time of running. Queries on  permitted and  authorized
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correctly retrieved all dynamic permissions and authorizations of active users only. When users were logged on, active
users  were  able  to  manipulate  data  according  to  their  dynamic  authorizations.  Non-active  users  were  unable  to
manipulate data. Thus, the meta-data correctly reflected authorizations of active users.
Finally, for Separation of Duties, both static and dynamic separation of duty constraints were successful. Users
could not be assigned to roles such as to cause static SSD conflicts, and could not be activated in roles such as to cause
DSD conflicts.
3.6 Conclusion
The dynamic RBAC model was implemented in Oracle,  first by transforming the original Prolog rules into
RBAC data tables, then by encoding it in Oracle meta-data using VPD. With various sets of users activated, the RBAC
data tables were queried, and VPD implementation was tested by logging users in and attempting to manipulate data
while logged in. Finally, SSD and DSD constraints were tested.
With one exception, all tests produced the expected results. Querying RBAC data tables and views retrieved the
correct static and dynamic permissions for roles and for both active and inactive users in all cases. When attempting to
manipulate data as logged-in users, inactive users were unable to manipulate data in all cases. Active users were able to
perform data manipulation operations that they were authorized to perform according to the dynamic RBAC rules, and
(with one exception) were unable to perform operations that they were not authorized to perform. The exception relates
to the inability to program selective path inheritance in Oracle VPD: senior roles cannot be prevented from inheriting
permissions from junior roles. Therefore, any user in role manager (u0021 here), being senior to all other roles, was
able to perform all actions, although the  inherits_rpa_path rules intended that a manager would only inherit
from receptionist.  The permissions and authorizations of user  u0021 were correctly displayed when querying the
RBAC data, but were not reflected correctly in the meta-data enforcement.
Thus,  Oracle’s  VPD  feature  can  implement  most  features  of  the  RBAC  model  discussed  in  this  section.
Specifically,  it  can  implement  Seniority,  Denials,  Activity,  Separation  of  Duties  and  Context  Constraints,  but  not
selective Role Inclusion or Path Inheritance.
The free-software DBMS, PostgreSQL, has an add-on called Veil that provides row-level access control  [66].
This feature might allow dynamic RBAC to be implemented in PostgreSQL. Implementing dynamic RBAC in MySQL
would be tricky, because MySQL does not natively support RBAC.
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4 The Problem
4.1 Problems with Current RBAC
RBAC has been a much exploited model of access control in database communities for more than a decade. It
has been deployed in numerous applications, and has already been chosen as a mandatory authorization mechanism in
many healthcare systems across the world, including the National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom. From
that perspective, current RBAC models and their implementations in database management systems need improvement.
A currently unresolved issue is the automatic extraction of semantics from a given relational database schema, which
are  essential  for  creating RBAC models.  That  is,  no automated  mechanisms are  available  to  help  understand  the
semantics stored in database schemas. Therefore, systems are needed to automatically ‘read’ and ‘understand’ metadata
before generating RBAC models. There are no commercially available solutions that allow automatic creation of RBAC
models and their implementation, by reading metadata and using semantic web tools to deal with RBAC semantics.
In the experiments in Chapter  3, two different approaches were compared for implementing an RBAC model
based on Prolog facts in a relational database: (1) storing the RBAC-related Prolog facts as records in database tables,
and (2) storing them in the meta-data of the DBMS.
When using method (1), the tables holding RBAC data were stored in the same database as the data over which
the RBAC was run, but (as would be typical for this approach) in a different schema. Using this method, all aspects of
the RBAC models can be implemented, and the RBAC can be determined by issuing standard SQL queries on RBAC
schema tables. This approach can be used to provide access control at the application level. At the database level, the
application always  accesses  the data  using one  user  ID,  which  is  likely to  be locked  to  accessing  data  from the
application interfaces. The application would pass the user ID of the person who is logged into it as a parameter to the
database  when the user  attempts  to  access  data,  and this  would form part  of  the query to  determine whether  the
application-level user gains the access.  Furthermore, we can easily program both static and dynamic RBAC at the
application level because the rules for both can easily be translated into either SQL views or PL/SQL (or equivalent)
procedures.
Method (2), of implementing RBAC on a relational database provides access control at the  database level by
using the meta-data (or data dictionary) of the RDBMS. In this method, we have to distinguish between static and
dynamic RBAC, which are implemented in different ways. The static RBAC was mostly implemented using standard
SQL  CREATE  ROLE,  CREATE  USER and  GRANT commands.  However,  while  RBAC  permissions  can  be
implemented this way, denials cannot be so implemented because  GRANT is only a positive granting of permission:
there is no negative authorisation in SQL access control syntax. The dynamic RBAC was then implemented using
Oracle's Virtual Private Databases (also called Row-Level Access Control) feature. [58] We found that most, but not all,
of  the features  of  the RBAC model  could be implemented.  We could not implement  path inheritance restrictions.
However, denials can be implemented using this feature, because a rule can be set up such that a role is denied access to
data in a table even if given access to it via a  GRANT command. The implementation of dynamic RBAC is product-
specific, as it is not part of the SQL standard. Postgres has a feature called VEIL [66] that also implements dynamic
RBAC, but its syntax is different from that of Oracle VPD. By contrast, the static RBAC implementation uses standard
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SQL commands, and is likely to be very similar across RDBMSs, although some, such as MySQL, do not support
RBAC in their data dictionary.
Prolog and relational database systems cannot naturally represent hierarchical data, which is the backbone of any
semantic representation of RBAC models. A role being a type of another role is represented as a predicate, such as
is_a(role1, role2). A user’s membership of a role is also represented as a predicate, such as  ura(user,
role). These predicates are represented in an RDBMS as either rows in database tables (method (1)) or metadata
(method (2)). This way of representing hierarchical data means that implementation of RBAC in Prolog can be complex
and rigid, due to the need to chain many joins to represent traversing an RBAC hierarchy. This makes predicate logic
and relational database systems especially cumbersome when trying to model dynamic RBAC, in which permissions
may change according to context. An RBAC model should be able to infer user authorisations from a hierarchy of both
roles and data types, that is, determine permission or denial from not just the type of role (which may include sub-
roles), but also the type of data (which may include sub-types).
However, OWL reasoner-enabled ontologies could resolve both these problems by allowing us to describe and
manipulate the semantics of RBAC differently. OWL naturally represents data and concepts in a hierarchical fashion,
and its implementation is not vendor-specific. Therefore,  this thesis considers the possibilities offered by OWL for
developing models and reasoning processes for RBAC, which are domain and implementation independent, and can be
run from any distributed computing environment.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 RBAC and XML
XACL (XML Access Control Language), also known as XACML  (XML Access Control Markup Language)
[67][68] is  the  standard  representation  of  access  control  using XML,  and  has  provision  for  RBAC.  MOSQUITO
(Mobile Workers’ Secure Business Applications in Ubiquitous Environments) [69] is an example of a system based on
XACML for providing dynamic RBAC in a ubiquitous computing environment.
Chandramouli  [70] devised an XML/DTD model for  determining access  control  in  an XML-based banking
database, in which the record and field types are written in a DTD (Document Type Definition), and the access control
rules and data in XML documents bound by the DTD.
Vuong et al. [71] presented a Java-based system for assigning and applying RBAC permissions to data in XML
documents. Bertino & Ferrari proposed Author-X [72], a Java-based system for securing XML documents on a network.
The access permissions are stored in XML documents, and determine access to parts of documents according to its
DTD or security information held in the document itself. The documents protected by the system are stored in encrypted
form. Bertino et al. also [73] devised an infrastructure for managing secure updates to XML documents.
Bhatti et al. presented X-RBAC [74], an XML-based model for applying RBAC in Web Services. This was then
extended for context-aware RBAC [75] and multi-domain environments  [76], thus providing dynamic X-RBAC. The
same  authors  also  proposed  X-FEDERATE  [77] an  XML-based  model  for  managing  access  control  in  federated
distributed environments, in which each node has a direct connection to all other nodes in the network.
XML-based RBAC models have also been proposed by He & Wong (RBXAC) [78] and Stoupa & Vakali [79].
Yang & Zhang [80] proposed a similar model for securing web-based applications.
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GTRBAC  [50], from Chapter  2.3, has been implemented in XML as X-GTRBAC  [81],and an administration
module, X-GTRBAC Admin, has been built for this [82].
Yang et al. [83] and Warner et al. [84] proposed XML-based dynamic RBAC models that use semantic matching
in  heterogeneous  databases  to  dynamically  determine  access  permissions  by  linking  semantically  equivalent  but
differently named entities in each of them.
Finance et al. [85] proposed a model for access control in XML documents in which access rules can be set on
any node anywhere in the relational hierarchy of the document (not only leaf nodes), and can be used control access to
ancestor  and sibling relationships.  This  allows the creation of  different  “authorized views” of an XML document,
depending on the access right of a user.
Bouna et al. [86] proposed an XML-based RBAC model for determining access to multimedia objects based on
the low-level data in these objects. This allows the same access to be given to, for example, any object described as
relating to Charles de Gaulle in the 2nd World War. 
Another  XML-based  access  control  model  is  PERMIS  (PrivilEge  and  Role  Management  Infrastructure
Standards) [87], which uses X.509 attribute certificates  [88] to hold user roles. This makes it more than just a policy
language, like XACML, but also an authorization system. The authorization tool is beyond the scope of this thesis,
which is concerned with the access control policy, rather than the methods of authorizing users based on the policy.
PERMIS policies are written in XML, but the syntax is briefer than that of XACML. A Java-based PERMIS policy-
writing tool has also been developed [89].
4.2.2 RBAC and the Semantic Web
Semantic web technologies have been used to represent access control models, thus facilitating the incorporation
of access control systems into software applications using the semantic web. Many RBAC implementations that address
interoperability, or allow automatic creation of RBAC models by reading meta-data using the Semantic Web (OWL
[90], RDF [91] and XML), have been proposed. 
Several previous works on designing ontologies for RBAC have addressed aspects of static and dynamic RBAC.
Pan  et  al. [92] proposed  Semantic  Access  Control  (SAC),  an  RBAC-based  model  for  access  control  in
heterogeneous systems, and developed a middleware application, called Semantic Access Control Enabler (SACE), to
implement it on the Web.
Wu et al. [93] modelled RBAC using OWL, with separation of duty and prerequisite constraints, but without
considering constraints typical for dynamic RBAC. Furthermore, their use of ‘constraints’ is not the same as ours,
because we follow the work of [21], where ‘context constraints’ refer to dynamic constraints applied to RBAC rules.
Additionally, they do not use Prolog facts or rules in order to specify the semantics stored within the RBAC. Wu et al.
[94] extends [93] with their OBAC (Ontology-Based Access Control), an RBAC specification for distributed systems
using OWL  [90] and SWRL [95]. Roles are modelled using classes in OWL, as in  [93], while role constraints are
modelled in SWRL. Their model maps roles, users and objects among different domains. However, while they address
static role constraints of prerequisite (to be assigned to role B, a user must also be assigned to role A) and conflicting
(separation of duties) roles, but they do not consider dynamic RBAC.
Priebe et al. [96] extended XACML to specify ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control) models, in which user
access rights are determined dynamically from user attributes. They implemented their model using OWL, SWRL and
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SPARQL  [97].  This  model  considers  both static  (e.g.  name)  and  dynamic  (e.g.  age,  user  location) attributes,  and
therefore  goes  some way towards  supporting  dynamic  access  control  using  Semantic  Web.  However,  it  does  not
consider  attributes  other  than  those  of  users  (thus  it  neglects,  for  example,  object  attributes  and  environmental
conditions), or the application of dynamic attributes to RBAC models.
Finin et al. [98][99][100] used OWL to model a static RBAC hierarchy with static and dynamic separation of
duties, and positive and negative authorizations (permissions and denials). They also discussed static RBAC constraints
of coupling (where a user must be in both role A and role B, or in neither) and exclusive assignment (where each user
can only be assigned to one role), and used N3Logic to enforce these rules, as well as for enforcing sessions. They
discussed  the  pros  and  cons  of  different  approaches  to  modelling  RBAC roles,  namely  as  classes  or  as  values.
Modelling roles as classes means that inheritance is expressed naturally, and reasoning is easy, but the specification is
complex. When modelling roles as values, inheritance is expressed using rules. This makes reasoning difficult, but
simplifies specification. Their work provides an extensive discussion of modelling static RBAC in OWL, and also
considers dynamic access control, discussed as ABAC. Their model is called ROWLBAC. However, they do not discuss
reasoning.
Helili et al. [101] presented an RBAC meta-model with negative authorization (called RBAC(N)), formalized it
in  OWL-DL (with roles  as  classes),  and discussed  various cases  where  conflicts  can  occur  between positive  and
negative authorization in a hierarchical RBAC model. However, again, they did not consider dynamic RBAC rules.
Cirio et al. [102] developed a context-aware (dynamic) RBAC model using OWL-DL, queried using SPARQL;
their model is combines RBAC with ABAC, so that users are assigned roles at access time according to their attributes.
This  approach  contrasts  with  our  favoured  approach,  which  is  to  assign  roles  statically to  users  and  dynamically
determine access given to roles according to object attributes and the environment. SPARQL has one major benefit
when reasoning in access control modelling, in that it uses a closed-world assumption, and so can be used to query an
ontology in a similar manner to predicate logic. The authors also provided a proof-of-concept implementation of their
model written in Java. He et al. [103] also described a dynamic RBAC model, like [102] using a combination of RBAC
and ABAC, and written in OWL-DL, but their model uses SWRL rather than SPARQL as the reasoning language. They
adopted  Protégé and Jess rule engine as the ontology processing tool and reasoning system, respectively.  They also
wrote a proof-of-concept implementation of their model in Java.
Calero et al. [104] describe the development of an RBAC model from the CIM (Common Information Model)
[105], an open standard for representing managed elements of an IT environment, into OWL-DL for use in distributed
computing systems. They first wrote a representation of CIM in RDF/OWL, then developed an RBAC authorisation
model in OWL and SWRL to be used with it. Their RBAC model supports dynamic RBAC and separation of duties.
Cadenhead et al. [106] proposed a scalable TRBAC model for distributed computing systems, written in OWL-
DL and using SWRL and SPARQL for reasoning. They achieve scalability by partitioning the DL knowledge base a set
of smaller knowledge bases, which have the same TBox (Terminology Box: statements that define terms that model a
domain in  an ontology)  but  a  subset  of  the original  ABox (Assertion Box:  statements  that  define instances  in  an
ontology). This allows reasoning on subsets of the ontology, because in an OWL-DL model, the number of instances
grows in a model while the terms in the ontology largely remain the same. This approach might work for our SO-RBAC
model, which is modelled in OWL-DL, but might not work so well for ESO-RBAC, which is modelled in OWL-FULL,
and which defines roles as classes, and therefore has to define the relationships between roles in TBox statements.
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Coma et al. [107] modelled OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) [108] using OWL-DL. OrBAC differs
from RBAC in that it not only abstracts  subjects (users) into  roles (sets of subjects), but also abstracts actions into
activities (sets of actions) and objects into views (sets of objects). This abstraction is hierarchical, so that roles, views
and activities can all be sub-classed. The hierarchy of roles in OrBAC is an ‘is-a’ hierarchy, rather than a seniority
hierarchy, describing types of roles rather than superordinate and subordinate relationships. OrBAC natively supports
context-aware access control, with a hierarchy of contexts. The hierarchical nature of OrBAC seems to make it naturally
suited to modelling in OWL. The authors of [107] demonstrated their OrBAC model in the peer-to-peer collaboration
environment.
Toninelli  et al. [109] developed a dynamic access control model that combines OWL-DL with predicate logic
The DL reasoning is used in static RBAC, with dynamic constraints being programmed using predicate logic. This is an
attempt to combine the best of both worlds, with OWL being used to classify objects and contexts, and predicate logic
being used to determine the results of dynamic querying.
We have already mentioned that  traditional  static  RBAC is difficult  to apply in context-aware applications,
which appear in pervasive computing spaces, since it fixes a user’s access privileges when the user logs on.
4.3 Conclusion
The power of OWL reasoner-enabled ontologies allows us to describe and manipulate the semantics of RBAC
differently, and consequently address the previous two problems efficiently. Other works have attempted to use OWL to
model RBAC, but they do not exploit the ability of the OWL hierarchy to model hierarchical relationships that are
naturally part of an RBAC model. This may be due to the inherent limitations of OWL-DL, which those works use for
their models. However, it means that they do not fully exploit the semantics of OWL when modelling RBAC, and retain
some of the drawbacks of RBAC models based on predicate logic.
An approach is needed that uses the natural hierarchy of OWL to model hierarchical relationships in both RBAC
rules and the data on which these rules operate. The proposed SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC aim to do this. SO-RAC is an
OWL-based RBAC model,  written in OWL-DL for ease of translation from Prolog to OWL. As such, it  does not
represent a major breakthrough in approach to modelling RBAC, but is done as a stepping stone to prove the feasibility
of modelling RBAC in OWL. ESO-RBAC represents a complete rewrite of the model in OWL-Full. It uses the class-
individual duality of OWL-Full to define RBAC role inclusion using OWL sub-classes, rather than having to define it in
object properties and preform reasoning on them. This represents a novel way of exploiting OWL and its reasoners for
the  purpose  of  defining  and  manipulating  the  semantics  of  RBAC.  The semantic  ontological  reasoning  processes
defined in ESO-RBAC, which are domain and implementation independent, can be run from any distributed computing
environment. These can then be developed through integrated development environments such NetBeans and using
OWL APIs.
The following Chapters (5 and 6) describe SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC, respectively.
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5 The Proposal: Semantic and Ontology-based Role-
Based Access Control (SO-RBAC)
5.1 Introduction
This chapter  describes the proposed  Semantic and  Ontology-based  Role-Based  Access  Control  (SO-RBAC)
process for creating permissions and denials based upon a user’s roles and the activities that the user may perform on a
selection of  objects.  In  other words,  the process uses the semantics  stored in the SO-RBAC ontology in terms of
manipulating its ontological concepts and their individuals for the purpose of determining if a particular user, who holds
a particular “role” is allowed to access an “object” and perform a particular “activity” upon it and therefore would be
granted permission for the activity denied access to the object.
SO-RBAC is the first step in modelling RBAC using Semantic Web technology, as suggested in Section 4.2.2.
The model is essentially a direct translation of the Prolog rules for static RBAC in Section 3.2.1 into OWL. Permissions
and denials are given similar to traditional RBAC supported by Prolog facts and rules and functionalities of database
management systems in controlling access control in databases. This use of Prolog rules as a basis means that it cannot
address the complexity of traditional RBAC models. In some respects, the differences between ontologies and predicate
logic introduce additional complexity. For this reason, we chose not to model context-aware or dynamic RBAC using
SO-RBAC, although it would be possible to do so.
The purpose of SO-RBAC was not to create a pure ontological RBAC model, but to demonstrate the feasibility
of mapping an RBAC model based on Prolog facts and rules into an ontology. Therefore, the proposed SO-RBAC is not
designed from ‘scratch’. It is instead based on a set of existing Prolog facts and rules, which are translated into an
ontological schema. Prolog facts are modelled as instances within OWL classes, or as properties of these classes. RBAC
rules are modelled through domain and range constraints, is-a relationships and inheritance, or using SWRL [17][95]
rules.
Although SO-RBAC model has its roots in predicate logic, it models RBAC using OWL ontological concepts,
and reasons upon these to strengthen the semantics stored in an ontology, and to manipulate individuals of ontological
concepts for making decisions on denials and permissions. Consequently, the SO-RBAC process and ontological model
are suitable for any repository where a user may have roles and may not necessarily be involved with the manipulation
of  database  elements.  However,  the  SO-RBAC  ontological  model  is  also  generic  enough  to  accommodate  data
structures from any domain, and our mechanism of reasoning allows successful manipulation of ontological individuals
which characterise a particular instance of SO-RBAC and its process.
Section  5.2 demonstrates the SO-RBAC ontological  model and reasoning. The section is divided into three
subsections.
Section 5.2.1 defines the SO-RBAC ontological model through three distinctive steps:
(a) Definition of OWL classes and their hierarchies
(b) Definition of Necessary & Sufficient conditions and
(c) Definitions of object properties.
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Section  5.2.2 describes the way of populating SO-RBAC classes with individuals by assertion. That section
explains exactly which classes must be populated before the reasoning process starts and why. Consequently, a portion
of SO-RBAC ontological classes will remain ‘empty’ until a reasoning process determines which individuals from the
asserted classes will be ‘moved’ (or copied) into SO-RBAC classes which were empty on SO-RBAC initialisation.
Section  5.2.3 explains the purpose and the outcome of the reasoning process upon SO-RBAC concepts using
SWRL. SO-RBAC has two types of reasoning. The first reasoning step, described in 5.2.3.1, uses SWRL for creating a
set of new object properties which use existing object properties defined in step  (c). All of the object properties for
which  this  is  done have  ROLE class  as  both domain  and  range,  as  the  purpose  of  this  step  is  to  set  up  all  the
relationships between roles in the RBAC model. The second step, described in Section 5.2.3.2, performs reasoning to
move individuals across SO-RBAC in order to determine permission or denials in particular request imposed by a user,
who has a ‘role’ and would like to perform an ‘activity’ upon set of ‘objects’.
% inclusion of equal-status roles
included_in(R,R) :- role(R).
included_in(R1,R2) :- is_a(R1,R2).
included_in(R1,R3) :- is_a(R1,R2),
                      included_in(R2,R3).
% Role hierarchies
senior_to(R,R) :- directly_senior_to(R,_).
senior_to(R,R) :- directly_senior_to(_,R).
senior_to(R1,R2) :- directly_senior_to(R1,R2).
senior_to(R1,R3) :- directly_senior_to(R1,R2), senior_to(R2,R3).
% Inheritance paths
inherits_pra(R,R) :- role(R).
inherits_pra(R2,R3) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
                       senior_to(R3,R4),
                       inherits_pra_path(R1,R4).
% Access control rules structure
pra_full(R1,P,O) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
                    pra(R2,P,O),
                    inherits_pra(R1,R2).
permittable(U,P,O_instance) :- ura(U,R1),
                       included_in(R1,R2)
                       instance_of(O_instance,O),
                       pra_full(R2,P,O).
permitted(U,P,O) :-    active_user_session(U),
                       permittable(U,P,O).
dra_full(R2,P,O) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
                    dra(R1,P,O).
denied(U,P,O_instance) :- ura(U,R1),
                          included_in(R1,R2),
                          instance_of(O_instance,O),
                          dra_full(R2,P,O).
authorizable(U,P,O) :- permittable(U,P,O),
                       not(denied(U,P,O)).
authorized(U,P,O) :- permitted(U,P,O),
                     not(denied(U,P,O)).
Code 53: Prolog rules on which the SO-RBAC model is based
Section 5.3 describes the SO-RBAC process and explains its steps, which are based on the model and reasoning
introduced in Section 5.2.
Section 5.4 contrasts the proposed SO-RBAC solution with the traditional RBAC defined in Prolog (Code 53). 
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Section 5.5 gives a particular scenario of RBAC in terms of defining which individuals may populate one of SO-
RBAC instances. The healthcare domain and a medical database is used to demonstrate the implementation of SO-
RBAC. 
Section 5.6 describes the implementation of SO-RBAC reasoning and the deployment of the SO-RBAC process.
The SO-RBAC ontology is  modelled in OWL-DL. Although OWL-DL is much less flexible than OWL-FULL in
ontological modelling, it has a much wider range of available reasoners. SO-RBAC was modelled using Protégé [24],
with SWRL rules defined using the Protégé SWRLTab [110]. The model was initialized using a Perl script to create the
initial instances.
Section 5.7 shows screen shots from Protégé of the implementation and testing of SO-RBAC.
Section 5.8 draws conclusions.
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5.2 Ontological Model and Reasoning
This section describes the SO-RBAC in terms of OWL and SWRL. 
5.2.1 Definition of SO-RBAC Ontological Model
5.2.1.1 OWL classes and their hierarchies
Figure 6: Graphical illustration of a SO-RBAC model for a hospital domain.
Figure  6 shows  a  graphical  illustration  of  SO-RBAC.  There  are  two  main  super-classes  in  SO-RBAC:
OBJECT_INSTANCE and RBAC.
The super-class OBJECT_INSTANCE defines objects that may be accessed by users in SO-RBAC; examples
of these include database tables, files and equipment. The RBAC administrator is free to define the sub-classes of
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OBJECT_INSTANCE according to the domain. We have sub-classed it  based on a simplified model of  data and
systems in a hospital, which is further explained in the scenario and implementation of SO-RBAC, as mentioned in
Introduction (Section 1).
The super class RBAC defines concepts that are relevant to RBAC, which should be stored in a separate super-class
from  OBJECT_INSTANCE because  it  is  conceptually  different  from  other  information,  and  is  typically  stored
separately in other systems. For example, a relational DBMS would store the RBAC information as meta-data, which is
not usually queried directly by users.
Sub-classes of the OBJECT_INSTANCE class are:
• EQUIPMENT: represents all machines, both computers and medical equipment (and possibly others) to which
a user might be logged in. There are various sub-classes of EQUIPMENT, and multiple inheritance is used.
• INTERNET_CONNECTION: represents  Internet  settings  of  computers.  This  class  is  sub-classed  into
HOME_INTERNET_CONNECTION and HOSPITAL_INTERNET_CONNECTION.
• OS_SESSION represents operating system login settings of computers.
• PERSON represents all  individuals with information stored about them. This includes users,  so the class
USER is  a  sub-class  of  this  as  well  as  of  RBAC.  The  other  sub-class  of  PERSON in  this  example  is
PATIENT.
• ROOM represents all rooms in a hospital, and is sub-classed into OPERATING_ROOM and WARD.
• VITAL_SIGNS represents vital signs recorded for patients.
Sub-classes of the RBAC class are:
• The USER sub-class defines the set of users of the system. However,  USER also inherits from PERSON,
which is a subclass of the OBJECT_INSTANCE class. On a superficial level, this is because user information
might be stored both as ordinary data and as meta-data in a relational database. On a practical level, it is
because the  USER class, describing a user, contains information about users that is used in either ordinary
information-retrieval situations or in RBAC processing, or both. 
• ROLE sub-class contains a complex hierarchy of sub-classes, defining roles to which users and permissions
may be assigned. The hierarchy of classes under  ROLE represents sub-divisions of roles by type (not by
seniority). The RBAC administrator is free to sub-class this class according to the domain. In this example, it is
sub-classed according to  roles  that  might  be found in a  hospital.  The  main sub-classes  of  ROLE in  this
example are  DOCTOR,  NURSE,  ADMIN,  TECHNICIAN,  DAY_DUTY and  NIGHT_DUTY.  These sub-
classes are further sub-classed, including multiple inheritance.
• USER_SESSION defines user login sessions. Its sub-class  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION defines user login
sessions that are active, and thus give permissions to users.
• OBJECT_TYPE defines the types of object that can be manipulated by SO-RBAC (as opposed to the objects
themselves, which are in OBJECT_INSTANCE).
• URA sub-class defines user-role assignments.
• ACTION class defines actions that can be performed on objects, such as read and write.
PERMISSION_ASSIGN is a sub-class consisting of all classes that relate to permission assignments. However,
it is also an abstract class in SO-RBAC,  i.e. it never contains any instances directly assigned to it. It  is defined to
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provide  the  role and  action properties  to  all  permission-assignment  classes  in  SO-RBAC. Its  subclasses  are
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.  They  define  permission
assignments between users and objects, and between roles and objects. ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE defines
permissions  and  denials  assigned  to  roles,  either  explicitly  or  computationally  by  SO-RBAC.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE defines  permissions,  authorizations  and  denials  assigned  to  users  by  SO-
RBAC computations.
The sub-classes of  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are  DENIED,  NOT_DENIED,  PERMITTABLE,
AUTHORIZABLE, PERMITTED and AUTHORIZED. All these sub-classes, except NOT_DENIED, are equivalent to
the similarly-named Prolog predicates. NOT_DENIED is the complement of DENIED. PERMITTED is defined as a
sub-class of PERMITTABLE, because it can only contain individuals that are also in this.
The sub-classes of ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are DRA,  DRA_FULL,  PRA and PRA_FULL, all
of which are equivalent to the similarly-named Prolog predicates.  PRA defines explicit role-permission assignments.
PRA_FULL defines role-permission assignments that are inferred when the SO-RBAC model is run. Similarly, DRA
defines explicit role-denial assignments, and DRA_FULL defines inferred role-denial assignments.
URA sub-class defines user-role assignments, and has two properties,  user and  role. Since  URA is a binary
predicate, it could just as easily be defined as a property. It is defined as a class to maintain the analogy with PRA, in
the Prolog RBAC model. PRA is a ternary predicate, and therefore has to be defined as a class. Additionally, defining
URA as a class mean that user-role assignments can be seen more easily in the model than if it were defined as an
object property.
ACTION class defines actions that can be performed on objects, such as read and write.
5.2.1.2 Necessary & Sufficient conditions
Table 6: Necessary & Sufficient conditions imposed on SO-RBAC classes
Class Necessary & Sufficient condition
NOT_DENIED USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE ⊓ ¬DENIED
AUTHORIZABLE PERMITTABLE ⊓ ¬DENIED
AUTHORIZED PERMITTED ⊓ ¬DENIED
It is important to note that we had to impose a few Necessary & Sufficient conditions upon a selection of SO-RBAC
classes  in  order  to  guarantee  consistency of  SO-RBAC when populating classes  with  individuals.  In  other  words
Necessary & Sufficient conditions are imposed on NOT_DENIED, AUTHORIZABLE and AUTHORIZED (see Table
6). If a class has a Necessary & Sufficient condition imposed on it, then populating the class in a way that violates this
condition makes the ontology inconsistent. The SO-RBAC reasoning process populates these classes in a way that
would always be consistent with the conditions.
In Figure 6 (page 62), the graphical illustration of SO-RBAC, OWL classes are in yellow, except classes bound
by Necessary & Sufficient conditions, which are in amber.
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Figure 7: Necessary & Sufficient condition for NOT_DENIED.
Figure  7 shows  how  a  Necessary  &  Sufficient  condition  appears  in  Protégé.  As  this  figure  shows,  these
Necessary  &  Sufficient  conditions  cause  AUTHORIZABLE to  become  a  sub-class  of  PERMITTABLE,  and
AUTHORIZED to become a sub-class of PERMITTED.
5.2.1.3 Object property relationships
Object properties between SO-RBAC classes are defined according to two reasons. 
(a) Certain SO-RBAC classes rely on object properties to define semantically the individuals that they,
or their sub-classes, may contain.
(b) Certain  SO-RBAC classes  allow definition of  object  properties  between them to  strengthen  the
semantics of SO-RBAC, as determined by our OWL modelling principles.
The next three paragraphs cover examples of (a).
We have already mentioned above that PERMISSION_ASSIGN provides the role and action properties to all
permission-assignment  classes  in SO-RBAC. Therefore its  full  description must include object  properties it  holds.
Naturally, PERMISSION_ASSIGN has object properties role and action. Just as all permission assignment predicates
in the Prolog RBAC model described in  3.2.1 have role and action as arguments, so do all analogous classes in SO-
RBAC. However, the hierarchical nature of ontologies makes it much easier to define a series of related classes with the
same properties in an ontology than it is to define predicates with similar arguments in Prolog. In OWL, property
inheritance can be used to define a super-class with certain properties,  and define sub-classes representing related
predicates  that  inherit  its  object  properties.  Accordingly,  PERMISSION_ASSIGN sub-classes  ROLE_
PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, both inherit properties role and action,
as well as defining other object properties. ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE has the additional property object_
type. Since DRA, DRA_FULL, PRA and PRA_FULL are sub-classes of ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, all
have the object properties role, action and object_type. role and action are inherited from PERMISSION_ASSIGN
(their grandparent super-class), while object_type is inherited directly from ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE defines permissions, authorizations and denials assigned to users by
SO-RBAC computations. As well as inheriting role and action from PERMISSION_ASSIGN, it also has the object
properties user and object_instance.
URA sub-class has two properties,  user and  role. Since  URA is a binary predicate, it could just as easily be
defined as a property. It is defined as a class to maintain the analogy with PRA, in the Prolog RBAC model. PRA is a
ternary predicate, and therefore has to be defined as a class. Additionally, defining URA as a class mean that user-role
assignments can be seen more easily in the model than if it were defined as an object property.
We have introduced a few object properties in the previous section in order to explain the purpose and existence
of some sub-classes of the RBAC super-class. However, in order to perform and guarantee successful  outcome of
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reasoning, we have strengthened the semantics of SO-RBAC with additional set of object properties imposed on SO-
RBAC classes as highlighted in (b) above.
Table 7: Object properties in SO-RBAC
Domain Property Description Range
rbac:PERMISSION_ASSIGN (sub-classes: 
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and
sub-classes, rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and sub-classes)
rbac:action Actions involved in role and 
user permission assignments.
rbac:ACTION
rbac:PERMISSION_ASSIGN and sub-classes rbac:role Roles involved in role and user 
permission assignments.
rbac:ROLE and sub-
classes
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE 
(sub-classes: rbac:DENIED, rbac:NOT_
DENIED, rbac:PERMITTABLE, rbac:
AUTHORIZABLE, rbac:PERMITTED, rbac:
AUTHORIZED)
rbac:object_
instance
Object instance to which a user 
is permitted, authorized or 
denied access.
OBJECT_INSTANCE 
and sub-classes
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and
sub-classes
rbac:user Users involved in user 
permission/denial/authorization
assignments.
rbac:USER
rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE 
(sub-classes: rbac:DRA_FULL, rbac:DRA, 
rbac:PRA_FULL, rbac:PRA)
rbac:object_type Object types associated with 
PRA and DRA relationships.
rbac:OBJECT_TYPE
rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and 
sub-classes
rbac:role Roles associated with PRA and 
DRA relationships.
rbac:ROLE and sub-
classes
OBJECT_INSTANCE and sub-classes rbac:instance_of An instance of a type of object, 
as defined by a sub-class of 
rbac:OBJECT_TYPE.
rbac:OBJECT_TYPE
rbac:URA rbac:role A role in a URA assignment. rbac:ROLE
rbac:URA rbac:user A user in a URA assignment. rbac:USER
rbac:USER_SESSION rbac:user A user attached to a session. rbac:USER
rbac:ROLE rbac:directly_
junior_to
Inverse of directly_senior_to. 
Sub-property of junior_to.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:directly_
senior_to
Assertions of direct seniority 
relationships. Sub-property of 
senior_to.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:included_in Direct and indirect inclusion 
relationships, inferred from 
is_a relationships.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:inherits_pra Roles that participate in 
inheritance paths, inferred from
inherits_pra_path.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:inherits_
pra_path
Assertions of ends of 
inheritance paths.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:is_a Assertions of direct inclusion 
relationships. Sub-property of 
senior_to.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:junior_to Inverse of senior_to. rbac:ROLE
rbac:ROLE rbac:senior_to Direct and indirect seniority 
relationships, inferred from 
senior_to.
rbac:ROLE
Table 7 lists ALL object properties with their Domains and Ranges, and includes both asserted and inherited object
properties.
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Most object properties are named after their Ranges. These properties may have different functions depending on the
Domain: each function of a property is listed separately in the table.
Object properties not named after their Ranges are  instance_of and the properties that have  ROLE as both
Domain  and  Range  (directly_junior_to,  directly  senior_to,  included_in,  inherits_pra,  inherits_pra_path,  is_a,
junior_to, senior_to).
instance_of,  which  links  object  types  to  instances,  is  separate  from  the  object_type property  of
PERMISSION_ASSIGN and its sub-classes, which is involved in role-permission assignments. This is because SO-
RBAC could be used to manage access to classes relating to RBAC. If this is done, then the object type to which
PERMISSION_ASSIGN and its sub-classes belong must be defined; to do so using the same property as is used in
assignment relations would cause confusion.
It is important to note that some object properties from Table 7 are asserted and some of them are inferred. For
example, the object properties action, user, role and object_instance are asserted between USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and OBJECT_INSTANCE,  ACTION,  USER and ROLE (and its sub-classes), but  inferred between
all subclasses of USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and these classes.
Similarly, the object  properties  action,  object_type and  role are  asserted between  ROLE_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and  ACTION,  OBJECT_TYPE and  ROLE (with its  subclasses)  classes,  but  inferred between all
subclasses of ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and these classes.
+ OBJECT_INSTANCE
 RBAC−
   ACTION−
   OBJECT_TYPE−
  + ROLE {directly_junior_to ROLE, directly_senior_to ROLE, junior_to ROLE, senior_to ROLE, 
included_in ROLE, inherits_pra ROLE, inherits_pra_path ROLE, is_a ROLE}
   PERMISSION_ASSIGN − {action ACTION, role ROLE}
     ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE − {object_type OBJECT_TYPE}
       DRA−
      = DRA_FULL
       PRA−
      = PRA_FULL
     USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE − {object_instance OBJECT_INSTANCE, user USER}
       DENIED−
       NOT_DENIED ≡ {USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE  ¬DENIED}⊓
      = PERMITTABLE
         AUTHORIZABLE ≡ {PERMITTABLE  ¬DENIED}⊓
        = PERMITTED
           AUTHORIZED ≡ {PERMITTED  ¬DENIED}⊓
   URA − {role ROLE, user USER}
   USER−
   USER_SESSION − {user USER}
     ACTIVE_USER_SESSION−
Text 4: SO-RBAC Ontology (some classes are collapsed).
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+ COLLAPSED_CLASS
 CLASS−
   SUB-CLASS − {object_property_1 CLASS, object_property_2 CLASS}
   ABSTRACT_CLASS−
= SWRL-INFERRED_CLASS
   N&S_BOUND_CLASS ≡ {N&S CONDITION ( : and; ¬: not}⊓
Text 5:  Legend for SO-RBAC Ontology.
Text 4 illustrates a collapsed version of the ontology from  Figure 6, and highlights main SO-RBAC classes
involved in ontological reasoning. It is important to note that Text 4 should be read in conjunction with Text 5. Object
properties are listed, with their ranges, in grey text in curly brackets after the classes that have them as their domains.
Classes that contain inferred individuals as the result of our ontological reasoning are listed in blue and preceded by the
= symbol. Classes on which Necessary & Sufficient conditions are imposed are in green and preceded by the ≡ symbol.
The key to the colours and symbols is shown in Text 5.
Figure 8: Property map of all SO-RBAC properties except those that have ROLE as both domain and range.
Figure 8 graphically illustrates all object properties defined in  Table 7 except those that have  ROLE as both
domain and range. The label ‘isa’ in  Figure 8 refers to the sub-class–super-class relationship: a sub-class ‘isa’ super-
class. It has nothing to do with the is_a property used in SO-RBAC. In this diagram, each property is distinguished by
colour: where the same property appears several times, it is shown in the same colour. However, these colours are not
used anywhere else.
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There are several  ways in which  ROLE individuals can be related affecting user-permission assignment  in
RBAC. These need separate attention.
rbac:ROLE
rbac:directly_junior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:junior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:directly_senior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:senior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:is_a Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:included_in Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:inherits_pra_path Instance* rbac:ROLE
rbac:inherits_pra Instance* rbac:ROLE
Figure 9: Property map of all SO-RBAC properties with ROLE as both domain and range.
Figure 9 depicts all object properties in SO-RBAC that have ROLE as both domain and range. These properties
are  directly_junior_to,  directly_senior_to,  included_in,  inherits_pra,  inherits_pra_path,  is_a,  junior_to and
senior_to. These separate properties represent different relationships between ROLE instances, as described in Table 7.
Each object property relating instances of the same class is indicated by an arrow from the node representing the ROLE
class and pointing back to this box. For clarity, these object properties are also listed in the node. The box in Figure 9
signifies that a ROLE class instance (represented by the ROLE at the top of the box) has can be linked to any instances
of ROLE via any of the properties listed.
Note that all object properties in  Figure 9 apply to the same  ROLE class. Therefore, they appear in  Figure 9
twice: in the first column of the figure and as coloured labels of arcs which graphically illustrate these object properties
defined upon class ROLE.
5.2.2 Populating SO-RBAC classes by assertion
Classes populated in this stage are classified into two types. Note that ROLE and PERMISSION_ASSIGN are
abstract classes, which contain no asserted individuals.
i. Auto-populated  on  initialization:  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE are populated on initialization with individuals representing possible role and user permission
assignments. Individuals asserted under these classes are not active: they have to be moved to sub-classes of
these classes to be active in SO-RBAC.
ii. Populated according to RBAC model on initialization:  URA,  USER,  ACTION,  ROLE,  OBJECT_TYPE,
USER_SESSION,  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION,  DRA,  PRA and all classes under  ROLE and  OBJECT_
INSTANCE are populated, by the RBAC administrator and application, with individuals that define the RBAC
rules and environment.
Individuals  in  the  OBJECT_TYPE class  specify  types  of  object,  linked  to  the  appropriate  individuals  in
OBJECT_INSTANCE as the range of the property instance_of.
Individuals  in  ROLE specify  RBAC roles.  In  the  example  RBAC,  ROLE is  an  abstract  class,  and  has  a
hierarchy below this indicating types of role such as  DOCTOR and  NURSE, but this hierarchy is not used by the
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senior_to
directly_senior_to
directly_junior_to
junior_to
is_a
included_in
inherits_pra_path
inherits_pra
present implementation of SO-RBAC, because OWL-DL cannot address classes directly. Instead the properties  is_a
and included_in represent role inclusion. In the example R BAC, each class has a single individual representing a role;
however, this is not necessary in SO-RBAC. The RBAC roles are defined by the individuals in  ROLE and its sub-
classes, not by the classes themselves. The ROLE class hierarchy is defined for illustration only, as it has no semantic
significance in SO-RBAC.
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is populated on initialization with individuals representing all possible
relationships between roles, actions and object types. These are then moved in the reasoning step into any of the sub-
classes.
The sub-classes  of  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are  DRA,  DRA_FULL,  PRA and  PRA_FULL.
DRA and PRA are populated on initialization with explicit denial and permission assertions, respectively, copied from
the super-class. They are exactly equivalent to dra and pra assertions in the Prolog model. 
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is populated on initialization with individuals representing all possible
combinations of user assignments of access to perform actions on object instances. 
URA is populated with individuals describing user-role assignments.
The USER class is populated by individuals representing users who may be assigned roles.
The  USER_SESSION class  is  populated  with  user  login  sessions.  It  contains  sub-class
ACTIVE_USER_SESSION, which represents active user sessions.
5.2.3 Reasoning in SO-RBAC using SWRL
Figure 10: Steps and Stages in reasoning SO-RBAC
Figure 10 shows the five steps of reasoning. Step 1 significantly differs from the others because it uses SWRL
for inferring more object properties. In other words, Step 1 modifies object properties in individuals in ROLE and its
sub-classes for the purpose of determining all the relationships between roles within RBAC.
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Steps 2–5 of the reasoning process infer individuals in SO-RBAC classes according to strictly defined matching
of SO-RBAC sub-classes. The final result of our reasoning through SWRL and ontological matching will be shown in
Stage 5, when certain individuals will be moved into SO-RBAC classes AUTHORIZABLE and AUTHORIZED.
Step 1 is shown in Sub-section 5.2.3.1, and Steps 2–5 are shown in Sub-section 5.2.3.2.
The steps are designed such that each stage populated the ontology with all axioms that may be required for the
immediately following stage (except that Step 1 creates all object property relationships).
The reader should be aware that if more than one rule affects the same class or property, then the relationship
between the rules is a logical OR (this cannot be represented any other way in SRWL). 
The SWRL rules were named according to the following conventions:
• The rules are numbered according to the step in which they are executed when rule chaining. There are five
steps, 1–5 (Figure 10).
• The SWRL rules are named according to the convention s_relation[_n], where s is the step number, relation is
the class or property affected by the rule, and n is a sequence number (if there is more than one rule relating to
the same relation in the same stage).
Figure 11: Key to symbols used in SWRL reasoning diagrams.
Figure 11 shows the key to the symbols in the  diagrams in Figs.  12–29 showing the inference processes for
object properties. The shapes used for OWL individuals and classes are intentionally similar to those used for equivalent
entities in Protégé. In SWRL syntax, variables always begin with a  ? symbol, and this convention is followed in the
diagrams.
SQWRL (Semantic Query-enhanced Web Rule Language) [111][112][113] is a SWRL-based query language that
can be used to query OWL ontologies. It is used in Step 4 to provide semantics needed in this step that are not available
in SWRL itself. OWL object properties and SQWRL functions are represented as arrows from the Domain to the Range,
with the name of the property or function (in the legend, is_a and sqwrl:notElement) is used as an example) appearing
over the arrow.
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5.2.3.1 Defining new object properties
We define new object properties in Step 1, from Figure 10. These definitions are based on previously defined
object  properties,  where the  ROLE class  is  the  Range and Domain.  Step 1 consists  of  7  SWRL rules,  named as
1_senior_to_1,  1_senior_to_2,  1_senior_to_4,  1_included_in_1,  1_included_in_3,  1_inherits_pra_1 and
1_inherits_pra_3.
rbac:ROLE(?r) ∧ rbac:directly_senior_to(?_, ?r) →  rbac:senior_to(?r, ?r)
Text 6: SWRL for rule 1_senior_to_1.
Figure 12: Rule 1_senior_to_1.
The first rule in Step 1, given in Figure 12, is called 1_senior_to_1. It defines a role as is senior to itself if it has
at least one role directly senior to it. Figure 12 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 6 above.
rbac:ROLE(?r) ∧ rbac:directly_senior_to(?r, ?_) →  rbac:senior_to(?r, ?r)
Text 7: SWRL for rule 1_senior_to_2.
Figure 13: Rule 1_senior_to_2.
The second rule in Step 1, given in Figure 13, is called 1_senior_to_2. It defines a role as senior to itself if it is
directly senior to at least one role. Figure 13 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 7 above.
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rbac:directly_senior_to(?r1, ?r2) ∧ rbac:senior_to(?r2, ?r3)
→  rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r3)
Text 8: SWRL for rule 1_senior_to_4.
Figure 14: Rule 
1_senior_to_4.
The third rule in Step 1, given in  Figure 14, is called  1_senior_to_4. It defines a seniority of roles as being
transitive. In other words, Role  ?r1 is senior to  ?r3 if it is directly senior to another role (?r2) that is senior to  ?r3.
Figure 14 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 8 above. 
rbac:ROLE(?r) → rbac:included_in(?r, ?r)
Text 9: SWRL for rule 1_included_in_1.
Figure 15: Rule  
1_included_in_1.
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The fourth rule in Step 1, given in  Figure 15, is called  1_included_in_1.  It  defines a role as always being
included in itself. Figure 15 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 9 above.
rbac:is_a(?r1, ?r2) ∧ rbac:included_in(?r2, ?r3)
 → rbac:included_in(?r1, ?r3)
Text 10: SWRL for rule 1_included_in_3.
Figure 16: Rule  1_included_in_3.
The fifth  rule  in  Step 1,  given  in  Figure  16,  is  called  1_included_in_3.  It  defines  role inclusion as  being
transitive. In other words, Role  ?r1 is included in  ?r3 if it  is directly included in (is_a) another role (?r2) that is
included in ?r3. Figure 16 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 10 above.
rbac:ROLE(?r) → rbac:inherits_pra(?r, ?r)
Text 11: SWRL for rule 1_inherits_pra_1.
Figure 17: Rule 1_inherits_pra_1.
The sixth rule in Step 1, given in  Figure 17, is called  1_inherits_pra_1. It defines a role as being part of an
inheritance path involving itself. An inheritance path is a path along which permissions can be inherited. This rule is
necessary to set up recursion when defining inheritance paths.  Figure 17 is converted into SWRL syntax in  Text 11
above.
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rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r2)  ∧ rbac:senior_to(?r3, ?r4) ∧ 
rbac:senior_to(?r3, ?r4) ∧  rbac:inherits_pra_path(?r1, ?r4)
→ rbac:inherits_pra(?r2, ?r3)
Text 12: SWRL for rule 1_inherits_pra_3.
Figure 18: Rule 1_inherits_pra_3.
The seventh rule in Step 1, given in Figure 18, is called 1_inherits_pra_3. It defines that Roles ?r2 and ?r3 are
in an inheritance path, where ?r3 is the senior role, if:
i) ?r2 has a senior role ?r1 that is at the senior end of an inheritance path, and
ii) ?r3 is senior to role ?r4 that is at the junior end of an inheritance path.
Figure 18 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 12 above.
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5.2.3.2 Assigning individuals to SO-RBAC classes
Individuals are assigned to SO-RBAC classes by the reasoning rules in Steps 2–5. All rules in Steps 2 and 3, and
rule 2 of Step 4, match individuals according to object properties. Rule 1 of Step 4, and both rules in Step 5, match
individuals by a simple set operation (set difference or intersection).
Figure 19: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 2 of reasoning only.
Step 2 is shown in Figure 19. It takes class ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and matches its individuals
with individuals of  classes  PRA and  DRA.  If  individuals from  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE satisfy the
rules  for  their  matching,  then  they are  moved to  PRA_FULL and  DRA_FULL.  It  is  important  to  note  that  only
individuals  from  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are  being  moved  into  PRA_FULL and  DRA_FULL,
according to the object properties of these and of the individuals in PRA and DRA.
These two matchings are performed though two different SWRL rules 2_dra_full and 2_pra_full. Both of these
rules are explained separately through written explanations and diagrams which show object properties responsible for
ontological matching and the way we populate classes with inferred individuals.
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rbac:DRA(?x) ∧ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ∧ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ∧
rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ∧ rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r2) ∧ 
rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ∧ 
rbac:role(?z, ?r2) ∧ rbac:action(?z, ?a) ∧ rbac:object_type(?z, ?o) 
→ 
rbac:DRA_FULL(?z)
Text 13: SWRL for rule 2_dra_full.
Figure 20: Rule 2_dra_full
The  first  rule  in  Step  2,  given  in  Figure  20,  is  called  2_dra_full.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  from
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE to DRA_FULL if there exists an individual in DRA that has the same action
and  object_type properties  as  that  in  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE,  and  if  the  role  property  of  the
individual in DRA is senior to that of the individual in ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
A formal  description  of  the  matching  in  rule  2_dra_full is  below.  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
instance ?z represents a potential user-role assignment with the following properties:
• rbac:action ?a;
• rbac:role ?r2, and
• rbac:object_type ?o.
?z is moved to DRA_FULL if:
i) ?z is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r2;
ii) ?r1 is senior to ?r2 (is linked to ?r1 via object property rbac:senior_to);
iii)DRA instance ?x is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r1, and
iv)both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a and rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 20 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 13 above.
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rbac:PRA(?x) ∧ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ∧ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ∧ 
rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ∧ rbac:senior_to(?r2, ?r1) ∧ 
rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ∧ 
rbac:role(?z, ?r2) ∧ rbac:action(?z, ?a) ∧ 
rbac:object_type(?z, ?o) ∧ rbac:inherits_pra(?r2, ?r1) → 
rbac:PRA_FULL(?z)
Text 14: SWRL for rule 2_pra_full
Figure 21: Rule 2_pra_full
The  second  rule  in  Step  2,  given  in  Figure  21,  is  called  2_pra_full.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  from
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE to PRA_FULL if there exists an individual in PRA that has the same action
and object_type properties as that in ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, and if the role property of the individual
in PRA is junior to that of the individual in ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
A formal description of the matching in rule in  2_dra_full is below. ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
instance ?z represents a potential user-role assignment with the following properties:
• rbac:action ?a;
• rbac:role ?r2, and
• rbac:object_type ?o.
?z is moved to PRA_FULL if:
i) ?z is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r2;
ii) ?r2 is senior to ?r1 (is linked to ?r1 via object property rbac:senior_to);
iii)?r2 and ?r1 are in an inheritance path (linked via object property rbac:inherits_pra);
iv)PRA instance ?x is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r1, and
v) both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a and rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 21 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 14 above.
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Figure 22: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 3 of reasoning only.
Figure 22 shows the movement of individuals in Step 3, in which PERMITTABLE and DENIED are populated
from individuals in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, as determined by individuals in  URA,  PRA_FULL and
DRA_FULL, as well as relationships between roles defined by included_in axioms.
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rbac:PRA_FULL(?x) ∧ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ∧ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ∧  
rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ∧ rbac:included_in(?r2, ?r1) ∧  
rbac:instance_of(?oi, ?o) ∧ 
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ∧  rbac:action(?
z, ?a) ∧ rbac:object_instance(?z, ?oi) ∧ rbac:user(?z, ?u) ∧  
rbac:URA(?y) ∧ rbac:role(?y, ?r2) ∧ rbac:user(?y, ?u) →  
rbac:PERMITTABLE(?z)
Text 15: SWRL for rule 3_permittable
Figure 23: Rule 3_permittable
The first  rule  in  Step  3,  given  in  Figure  23,  is  called  3_permittable.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  from
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE to  PERMITTABLE if that  individual is  found to represent an actual  user-
permission assignment in the RBAC model. That is, if an individual in USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE has the
same  action  as  an  individual  in  PRA_FULL;  has  object  instance  that  is  linked  to  an  object  type  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual,  and  has  a  user  that  is  assigned  to  a  role  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual,  or  a  role  that  is  included  in  this  role,  then  it  is  moved  to
PERMITTABLE.
A  formal  description  of  the  matching  in  rule  in  3_permittable is  below.  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE instance ?z represents a potential user-permission assignment. It has the following properties:
• rbac:action linked to ?a, representing an action performed by a user;
• rbac:user ?u, and
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• rbac:object_instance ?oi, representing a specific data object that may be accessed by user ?u. 
?x is an instance in PRA_FULL with the following properties:
• rbac:action linked to ?a;
• rbac:role ?r1, and
• rbac:object_type ?o, representing a type of object that may be accessed by users in role ?r1.
?z is moved to PERMITTABLE if it is found to be an actual user-permission assignment in the RBAC model,
according to the following rules:
i) ?z has user ?u;
ii) ?u is assigned to role ?r2 by URA instance ?y;
iii)?r2 is included in role ?r1 (?r2 is linked to ?r1 via property rbac:included_in);
iv)PRA_FULL instance ?x has role ?r1;
v) Both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a;
vi)?z has rbac:object_instance ?oi;
vii)?oi is a data object of type ?o (?oi is linked to ?o via rbac:instance_of property), and
viii)?x has object_type ?o.
Figure 23 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 15 above.
rbac:DRA_FULL(?x) ∧ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ∧ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ∧  rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ∧ rbac:included_in(?r2, ?
r1) ∧  rbac:instance_of(?oi, ?o) ∧ rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ∧  rbac:action(?z, ?a) ∧ 
rbac:object_instance(?z, ?oi) ∧ rbac:user(?z, ?u) ∧  rbac:URA(?y) ∧ rbac:role(?y, ?r2) ∧ rbac:user(?y, ?u) →  
rbac:DENIED(?z)
Text 16: SWRL for rule 3_denied
Figure 24: Rule 3_denied
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The  second  rule  in  Step  3,  given  in  Figure  24,  is  called  3_denied.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  from
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is  moved  to  DENIED if  it  is  found  to  represent  an  actual  user-denial
assignment in the RBAC model.  That is,  if an individual in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE has the same
action  as  an  individual  in  DRA_FULL;  has  object  instance  that  is  linked  to  an  object  type  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual,  and  has  a  user  that  is  assigned  to  a  role  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual, or a role that is included in this role, then it is moved to DENIED.
A formal description of the matching in rule in 3_denied is below.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE instance ?z is moved to DENIED if:
i) ?z has rbac:user ?u;
ii) ?u is assigned to rbac:role ?r2 by URA instance ?y;
iii)?r2 is included in ?r1;
iv)DRA_FULL instance ?x has rbac:role ?r1;
v) Both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a;
vi)?z has rbac:object_instance ?oi;
vii)?oi is  a  data  object  of  type  ?o (?oi is  linked  to  ?o via  property  rbac:instance_of),  and  ?x has
rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 24 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 16 above.
Figure 25: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 4 of reasoning only.
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Figure  25 shows  the  movement  of  individuals  in  Step  4,  in  which  PERMITTED is  populated  from
PERMITTABLE and  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION,  and  NOT_DENIED from  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and DENIED.
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?x) ∧ rbac:DENIED(?y) ˚  
sqwrl:makeSet(?d, ?y) ˚  sqwrl:notElement(?x, ?d) →  
rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x)
Text 17: SWRL for rule 4_not_denied
Figure 26: Rule 4_not_denied
The first rule in Step 4, given in Figure 26, is called 4_not_denied. This rule populates NOT_DENIED as all
individuals in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE that are not in  DENIED. Mathematically,  NOT_DENIED is
defined as the set difference of USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and DENIED (Formula 2).
A  formal  description  of  the  matching  in  rule  in  4_not_denied is  below.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE instance  ?x is moved to  NOT_DENIED if  ?x is not in  DENIED.  This is
determined as follows:
i) ?d is a set of all instances ?y in DENIED, and
ii) ?x is not in ?d.
Mathematically, this can be represented as in Formula 3.
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NOT_DENIED = USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE ─ DENIED
Formula 2: Definition of NOT_DENIED.
∀y, ∀x, y  ∈ DENIED, x  ∈ USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, x ≠ y
 ⇒ x  ∈ NOT_DENIED
Formula 3: Matching NOT_DENIED.
Or, more simply, as in Formula 4.
The implementation of this negation formula is quite complex in SWRL, due to the way that OWL handles
negation, which is different from that of languages such as Prolog which are based on predicate logic. Prolog uses
classical negation, also called “negation as failure”. [30] This means that if the truth of a query cannot be inferred, then
the query is assumed to be false (if a query fails, then its negation succeeds). This is also called the ‘closed world
assumption’. In contrast, OWL implements an ‘open world’ assumption: a fact that cannot be inferred is not necessarily
false. Since SWRL is a tool for querying ontologies, it does not have a negation operation. However, it is possible to
simulate classical negation in SWRL using functions in SQWRL, which is discussed at the start of Section 5.2.3. The
SQWRL function makeSet makes a set consisting of a list of previously defined individuals. The SQWRL functions
element and  notElement check whether a given individual is a member of a set.  notElement enables negation-as-
failure to be used with OWL and SWRL.
Figure 26 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 17 above.
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∀x, x  ∉ DENIED, x  ∈ USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
 ⇒ x  ∈ NOT_DENIED
Formula 4: Simplified matching NOT_DENIED.
rbac:PERMITTABLE(?x) ∧ rbac:user(?x, ?u) ∧ 
rbac:ACTIVE_USER_SESSION(?s) ∧  rbac:user(?
s, ?u) 
→  rbac:PERMITTED(?x)
Text 18: SWRL for rule 4_permitted
Figure 27: Rule 4_permitted
The  second  rule  in  Step  4,  given  in  Figure  27,  is  called  4_permitted.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  in
PERMITTABLE to PERMITTED if the individual has a user that is also a user in an active user session, as given by an
individual in the class  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION. The difference between  PERMITTABLE and  PERMITTED is
that  PERMITTABLE represents  potential  permissions,  while  PERMITTED represents  actual  permissions,  as
determined by active user sessions.
A formal description of the matching in rule in 4_permitted is below. PERMITTABLE instance ?x is moved to
PERMITTED if:
i) ?x has rbac:user ?u, and
ii) ACTIVE_USER_SESSION user ?s has rbac:user ?u.
Figure 27 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 18 above.
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Figure 28: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 5 of reasoning only.
Figure  28 shows  the  movement  of  individuals  in  Step  5,  in  which  AUTHORIZED is  populated  from
PERMITTED and NOT_DENIED. AUTHORIZABLE is populated from PERMITTABLE and NOT_DENIED.
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Figure 29: Rule 5_authorizable
rbac:PERMITTABLE(?x)  rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x) → rbac:AUTHORIZABLE(?x)∧
Text 19: SWRL for rule 5_authorizable
The first rule in Step 5, given in  Figure 29, is called  5_authorizable.  AUTHORIZABLE is defined as the
intersection  of  PERMITTABLE and  NOT_DENIED:  an  individual  is  in  AUTHORIZABLE if  it  is  in  both
PERMITTABLE and NOT_DENIED (Formula 5).
PERMITTABLE instance  ?x is moved to  AUTHORIZABLE if  ?x is also in  NOT_DENIED.  Note that this
means that the same actual instance ?x has to be in both PERMITTABLE and NOT_DENIED (not different instances
with the same object properties).
Figure 29 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 19 above.
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AUTHORIZABLE = PERMITTABLE ∩ NOT_DENIED
Formula 5: Definition of AUTHORIZABLE.
rbac:PERMITTED(?x) ∧ rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x) → rbac:AUTHORIZED(?x)
Text 20: SWRL for rule 5_authorized
Figure 30: Rule 5_authorized
The second rule in Step 5, given in  Figure 30, is called  5_authorized.  This defines  AUTHORIZED as the
intersection of PERMITTED and NOT_DENIED: an individual is in AUTHORIZED if it is in both PERMITTED and
NOT_DENIED (Formula 6).
PERMITTED instance ?x is moved to AUTHORIZABLE if ?x is also in NOT_DENIED.
Figure 30 is converted into SWRL syntax in Text 20 above.
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AUTHORIZED = PERMITTED ∩ NOT_DENIED
Formula 6: Definition of AUTHORIZED.
5.3 SO-RBAC Process
Figure 31: RBAC process using the SO-RBAC ontology.
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domain := "rbac";
domain_uri := "http://www.cgce.net/Ontology/RBAC";
class: = "ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE";
for each role
  for each action
    for each object_type
      id := "role_action_object_type"
      print "  <domain:class rdf:ID=\"id\">";
      print "    <domain:action rdf:resource=\"#action\"/>";
      print "    <domain:role rdf:resource=\"#r_role\"/>";
      print "    <domain:object_type rdf:resource=\"#o_$object_type\"/>";
      print "  </$domain:$class>";
    next
  next
next
class := "USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE";
for each action
  for each object_instance
    for each user
      id = user_action_object_instance";
      print "  <domain:class rdf:ID=\"id\">";
      print "    <domain:action rdf:resource=\"#action\"/>";
      print "    <domain:object_instance rdf:resource=\"#object_instance\"/>";
      print "    <domain:user rdf:resource=\"#user\"/>";
      print "  </domain:class>";
    next
  next
next
Text 21: Pseudocode for step C
rbac:ROLE(?r) ⋀ rbac:directly_senior_to(?_, ?r) → rbac:senior_to(?r, ?r)
rbac:ROLE(?r) ⋀  rbac:directly_senior_to(?r, ?_) → rbac:senior_to(?r, ?r)
rbac:directly_senior_to(?r1, ?r2) ⋀ rbac:senior_to(?r2, ?r3) → rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r3)
rbac:ROLE(?r) → rbac:included_in(?r, ?r)
rbac:is_a(?r1, ?r2) ⋀ rbac:included_in(?r2, ?r3) → rbac:included_in(?r1, ?r3)
rbac:ROLE(?r) → rbac:inherits_pra(?r, ?r)
rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r2) ⋀ rbac:senior_to(?r3, ?r4) ⋀ rbac:senior_to(?r3, ?r4)  ⋀ rbac:inherits_pra_path(?r1, ?
r4) → rbac:inherits_pra(?r2, ?r3)
Code 54: SWRL Rules for Step E.
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rbac:DRA(?x) ⋀ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ⋀ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ⋀ rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ⋀ rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r2) 
⋀ rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ⋀ rbac:role(?z, ?r2) ⋀ rbac:action(?z, ?a) ⋀ 
rbac:object_type(?z, ?o) → rbac:DRA_FULL(?z)
rbac:PRA(?x) ⋀ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ⋀ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ⋀ rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ⋀ rbac:senior_to(?r2, ?r1) 
⋀ rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ⋀ rbac:role(?z, ?r2) ⋀ rbac:action(?z, ?a) ⋀ 
rbac:object_type(?z, ?o) ⋀ rbac:inherits_pra(?r2, ?r1) → rbac:PRA_FULL(?z)
Code 55: SWRL Rules for Step G.
Figure 31 (page 89) shows a flowchart of the process for setting up a SO-RBAC and populating it with all the
user permissions and denials on objects on that apply at a point in time.
Each potential role permission or denial to perform an action on an object is represented by an individual in the
SO-RBAC class ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE. The process moves individuals representing role permissions
and denials to the class PRA_FULL (indicating a permission) or DRA_FULL (indicating a denial).
Each potential user permission or denial to perform an action on an object is represented by an individual in the
SO-RBAC class USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE. The process moves individuals representing role permissions
and  denials  to  the  classes  PERMITTABLE or  PERMITTED (indicating  a  permission)  or  DENIED (indicating  a
denial). Finally, an individual representing a user permission that is not also a denial is moved to AUTHORIZABLE or
AUTHORIZED. All this is done according to rules in the SO-RBAC process.
The first step, step A, is to set up the class hierarchy in the SO-RBAC ontology. This includes setting up the data
classes under  OBJECT_INSTANCE,  to which the data that  the SO-RBAC model governs access,  and the classes
relevant to the SO-RBAC model itself, under RBAC class.  OBJECT_INSTANCE hierarchies are always domains
specific, but RBAC sub-hierarchies are likely to remain the same across domains.
Step B populates the ontology with the base information. It  has two parts, B1 and B2, which can be run in
parallel. This is because they are independent of each other.
In step B1, the individuals representing types of data (class  OBJECT_TYPE), users (class  USER) and roles
(sub-classes  of class  ROLE) are initialised by populating the classes,  USER and  ROLE (and their  sub-classes  as
appropriate). 
In B2, the data classes (sub-classes of OBJECT_INSTANCE) are populated with individuals representing data
for which access is to be granted by the SO-RBAC model.
In step C, the classes ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are
populated,  with  all  possible  combinations  of  hypothetical  role  and  user  permission  assignments.  Due  to  the
exponentially increasing number of combinations with increasing size of ontology, this is most likely to be done using a
program or script, according to the pseudocode in Text 21.
In step D, the asserted relationships between ROLE individuals (directly_senior_to, is_a, inherits_pra_path)
are set up, to define the relationships between roles in the RBAC role hierarchy.
In step E, the SWRL rules are run to infer the object properties that depend on the properties asserted in step D,
namely senior_to, included_in and inherits_pra, which are respectively dependent on directly_senior_to, is_a and
inherits_pra_path. The seven SWRL rules are described in Section 5.2.3.1, and are summarised in Code 54.
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In step F, the PRA and DRA classes are populated to set up role permissions and denials, because the individuals
in these classes are base information for reasoning in the RBAC model. This can be done after step E because the
information about role permissions and denials is not needed for inferring relationships between roles.
In Step G, we populate the PRA_FULL and DRA_FULL classes with individuals through inference by running
the following two SWRL rules in Code 55 (cf. Section 5.2.3.2).
In step H, the user-role relationships are set up, i.e. URA is populated with individuals. Again, this is essential
information needed for reasoning in the RBAC model, but it is not needed for inferring either relationships between
roles or assignment of permissions or denials to roles.
rbac:PRA_FULL(?x) ⋀ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ⋀ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ⋀ rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ⋀ 
rbac:included_in(?r2, ?r1) ⋀ rbac:instance_of(?oi, ?o) ⋀ rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ⋀ 
rbac:action(?z, ?a) V rbac:object_instance(?z, ?oi) ⋀ rbac:user(?z, ?u) ⋀ rbac:URA(?y) ⋀ rbac:role(?y, ?r2) ⋀
rbac:user(?y, ?u)
→ rbac:PERMITTABLE(?z)
rbac:DRA_FULL(?x) ⋀ rbac:role(?x, ?r1) ⋀ rbac:action(?x, ?a) ⋀ rbac:object_type(?x, ?o) ⋀ 
rbac:included_in(?r2, ?r1) ⋀ rbac:instance_of(?oi, ?o) ⋀ rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ⋀ 
rbac:action(?z, ?a) ⋀ rbac:object_instance(?z, ?oi) ⋀ rbac:user(?z, ?u) ⋀ rbac:URA(?y) ⋀ rbac:role(?y, ?r2) ⋀ 
rbac:user(?y, ?u) → rbac:DENIED(?z)
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?x) ⋀rbac:DENIED(?y) ° sqwrl:makeSet(?d, ?y) ° 
sqwrl:notElement(?x, ?d) → rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x)
rbac:PERMITTABLE(?x) ⋀ rbac:user(?x, ?u) ⋀ rbac:ACTIVE_USER_SESSION(?s) ⋀ rbac:user(?s, ?u)
→ rbac:PERMITTED(?x)
rbac:PERMITTABLE(?x) ⋀ rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x) → rbac:AUTHORIZABLE(?x)
rbac:PERMITTED(?x) ⋀ rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x) → rbac:AUTHORIZED(?x)
Code 56: SWRL Rules for Step J.
Finally, in step J, the remaining reasoning steps (3–5) are performed. We run 6 SWRL rules (Code 56) which
ultimately populated DENIED or AUTHORIZED classes (cf. Section 5.2.3.2).
At  each stage  the  SO-RBAC ontology is  in  a  state  where the process  can be  run from the  following step
onwards. In other words, it is not necessary to always re-run the SO-RBAC process from the beginning.
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5.4 Contrasting SO-RBAC with Prolog
Most SWRL rules in SO-RBAC are directly translated from the Prolog rules in  Code 53 (page  60). However,
there are two ways in which some SWRL definitions differ from those in Prolog.
5.4.1 Property inheritance
As noted above, some properties are super-properties of others, and so inherit the relationships defined with
them. This reduces the number of rules that need to be defined in SWRL.
1 senior_to(R,R) :- directly_senior_to(R,_).
2 senior_to(R,R) :- directly_senior_to(_,R).
3 senior_to(R1,R2) :- directly_senior_to(R1,R2).
4 senior_to(R1,R3) :- directly_senior_to(R1,R2), senior_to(R2,R3).
Code 57: senior_to in Prolog.
For example, senior_to is defined in Prolog using the following 4 rules (Code 57).
Rules 1 and 2 define a role as being senior to itself, but only if it participates in a  directly_senior_to
relationship.  Rule  3  states  that  role  R1 is  senior  to  R2 if  it  is  directly_senior_to R2.  Rule  4  creates  the
recursion.
In SO-RBAC, Rule 3 is achieved by making directly_senior_to a sub-property of senior_to.
In OWL, if property  is a sub-property of property , then all axioms asserted for  are inferred for . Thisℙ ℚ ℚ ℙ
means that, given individuals a and b, and properties  and , ℙ ℚ Formula 7 applies.
Therefore,  any  directly_senior_to relationship between any two individuals  infers  a  senior_to relationship
between the same pair of individuals. This eliminates the need for a SWRL for Rule 3. Rules 1, 2 and 4 are defined as in
Text 22.
Note that in Prolog, the consequent appears at the start of a clause, while in SWRL, it appears at the end.
Similarly,  making  is_a a  sub-property of  included_in implements  the  2nd included_in definition  from
Prolog.
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rbac:ROLE(?r) ∧ rbac:directly_senior_to(?_, ?r) →  rbac:senior_to(?r, ?r)
rbac:ROLE(?r) ∧ rbac:directly_senior_to(?r, ?_) →  rbac:senior_to(?
rbac:directly_senior_to(?r1, ?r2) ∧ rbac:senior_to(?r2, ?r3) →  
rbac:senior_to(?r1, ?r3)
Text 22: senior_to in SWRL.
 ∀ a, b; a  ℚ b;  is sub-property of  ℚ ℙ
 ⇒ a  ℙ b
Formula 7: Inferences from sub-
properties.
In Step 1, object properties senior_to,  included_in and inherits_pra are inferred from other object properties
and membership of the class ROLE.
i) senior_to is  inferred  from  membership  of  ROLE and  from  directly_senior_to.  (Rules:  1_senior_to_1,
1_senior_to_2 and 1_senior_to_4)
ii) included_in is inferred from membership of ROLE and is_a. (Rules: 1_included_in _1, 1_included_in_3)
iii)inherits_pra is  inferred  from  membership  of  ROLE,  inherits_pra_path and  senior_to.  (Rules:
1_inherits_pra_1, 1_inherits_pra_3)
1_senior_to_3, 1_included_in_2 and 1_inherits_pra_2 do not exist.
5.4.2 Negation and Transitivity
authorized (authorizable) are defined as being  permitted (permittable) and  not denied.
This is simple to express, and quick to run, in Prolog (Code 58).
However, the implementation in SO-RBAC is more complex, because OWL handles negation differently from
Prolog. Prolog uses classical negation, also called “negation as failure”. This means that if the truth of a query cannot be
inferred, then the query is assumed to be false (if a query fails, then its negation succeeds). This is also called the
‘closed wo .lnbrld assumption’. In contrast, OWL implements an ‘open world’ assumption: a fact that cannot be inferred
is not necessarily false. Since SWRL is a tool for querying ontologies, it does not have a negation operation. However,
it is possible to simulate classical negation in SWRL using SQWRL operators.
As  noted  earlier,  SO-RBAC  defines  a  class  NOT_DENIED,  for  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
individuals that do not appear in DENIED. To populate this class, the SQWRL operators makeSet and notElement are
used.  makeSet makes a set consisting of a list of previously defined individuals.  element and  notElement check
whether a given individual is a member of a set.  notElement enables negation-as-failure to be used with OWL and
SWRL. Text 23 defines NOT_DENIED.
[In the SWRL syntax used in Protégé, both  and ˚ mean logical AND.] For this to work, there has to be at least∧
one  individual  in  DENIED.  Therefore,  DENIED must  be  initialized  with  a  dummy individual,  with  none  of  its
properties defined.
NOT_DENIED is defined as a class because the above rule takes a long time to run, and its result set is used
more than once. It is much quicker to run this rule once and store its results, than to run it each time it is needed.
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authorized(U,A,O) :- permitted(U,A,O),
                     not(denied(U,A,O)).
Code 58: authorized in Prolog.
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?x) ∧ rbac:DENIED(?y) ˚ 
sqwrl:makeSet(?d, ?y) ˚ sqwrl:notElement(?x, ?d) → rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x)
Text 23: NOT_DENIED in SWRL.
rbac:PERMITTABLE(?x) ∧ rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x) → rbac:AUTHORIZABLE(?x)
rbac:PERMITTED(?x) ∧ rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x) → rbac:AUTHORIZED(?x)
Text 24: AUTHORIZABLE and AUTHORIZED in SWRL.
AUTHORIZABLE and AUTHORIZED are then defined as in Text 24.
These rules look similar to the equivalent Prolog rules, but they use the class  NOT_DENIED rather than a
negation of the DENIED class.
In  theory,  some  of  the  relationships  that  are  defined  using  recursive  SWRL rules  could  be  defined  using
transitivity. senior_to,  junior_to and is_a are defined as transitive; however, Protégé does not infer any relationships
from transitivity, so defining it has no effect. Therefore, the recursive rules that are defined in Prolog also have to be
defined  in  SWRL,  despite  the  transitivity.  However,  Protégé  does  infer  from  inversity:  each  asserted  senior_to
relationship thus has a corresponding junior_to relationship.
5.5 Implementing SO-RBAC based on a hospital environment
The  SO-RBAC implementation  is  illustrated  through  a  scenario  with  roles,  permissions,  denials,  seniority
relationships, inclusion relationships and inheritance paths.
The following individuals were defined in class ROLE, reflecting a simplified hospital scenario.
• r_admin, r_clerk, r_manager
• r_doctor, r_specialist_doctor, r_consultant, r_junior_staff_doctor, r_junior_staff_doctor_day, 
r_junior_staff_doctor_night, r_senior_staff_doctor, r_senior_staff_doctor_day, 
r_senior_staff_doctor_night
• r_technician, r_junior_technician, r_senior_technician
• r_nurse, r_senior_nurse, r_specialist_nurse, r_staff_nurse, r_staff_nurse_day, r_staff_nurse_night, 
r_student_nurse, r_student_nurse_day, r_student_nurse_night
• r_day_duty, r_night_duty
The following individuals representing permission and denial assertions were created.
• PRA: junior_staff_doctor_read_patient, junior_staff_doctor_read_room, 
junior_staff_doctor_read_vital_sign, junior_staff_doctor_read_ward, 
senior_staff_doctor_write_patient, senior_staff_doctor_write_room, 
senior_staff_doctor_write_vital_sign, consultant_write_vital_sign, consultant_read_computer, 
specialist_doctor_write_computer, student_nurse_read_patient, staff_nurse_read_room, 
staff_nurse_read_ward, staff_nurse_write_patient, senior_nurse_read_vital_sign, 
senior_nurse_write_ward, specialist_nurse_read_computer, specialist_nurse_write_room, 
specialist_nurse_write_vital_sign, specialist_nurse_write_computer
• DRA: consultant_read_room, consultant_write_ward, senior_nurse_read_ward, 
senior_staff_doctor_read_computer, staff_nurse_write_patient
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Seniority relationships were defined using directly_senior_to axioms to indicate the following hierarchies:
1. r_doctor: r_junior_staff_doctor → r_senior_staff_doctor → r_consultant → r_specialist_doctor
2. r_nurse: r_student_nurse → r_staff_nurse → r_senior_nurse → r_specialist_nurse
3. r_technician: r_junior_technician → r_senior_technician
4. r_admin: r_clerk → r_manager
5. r_junior_staff_doctor: r_junior_staff_doctor_day, r_junior_staff_doctor_night
6. r_senior_staff_doctor: r_senior_staff_doctor_day, r_senior_staff_doctor_night
7. r_student_nurse: r_student_nurse_day, r_student_nurse_night
8. r_staff_nurse: r_staff_nurse_day, r_staff_nurse_night
The following path inheritance axioms were defined.
inherits_pra_path(r_specialist_doctor, r_junior_staff_doctor)
inherits_pra_path(r_specialist_nurse, r_student_nurse)
Table 8: Numbers of users of each role defined in ontologies.
Role Small Large
clerk 1 2
manager 1 1
junior_staff_doctor 3 4
senior_staff_doctor 3 4
consultant 1 2
specialist_doctor 1 1
student_nurse 3 4
staff_nurse 3 4
senior_nurse 1 2
specialist_nurse 1 1
junior_technician 1 2
senior_technician 1 1
Two ontologies were defined, small and large, varying by the numbers of users and data items defined.  Table 8
shows the numbers of users in the small and large ontologies.
One or more USER individuals for each ROLE was created (Table 8), except for the roles r_admin, r_doctor,
r_technician and r_nurse, as these are intended as super-class roles to allow permissions to be defined for a particular
type of user generically.
User individuals are named simply as <role>_<n>, where <n> is a number. The roles with day and night sub-
roles defined each had 3 or 4 users defined, named for the main role. For example, junior_staff_doctor_1 was assigned
directly to  r_junior_staff_doctor;  junior_staff_doctor_2 to  r_junior_staff_doctor_day, and  junior_staff_doctor_3
to  r_junior_staff_doctor_night. No  personalized  data  were  defined  for  any of  these  users,  because  they are  not
relevant in this static RBAC model.
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The users were linked to roles using URA individuals, with one URA individual defined for each role in which a
user could be defined.
Instances  were  created  for  object  types  o_computer,  o_patient,  o_room,  o_vital_sign and  o_ward.  One
instance of each type was created for the small scenario, and three of each type for the large scenario. The instances
were named <object_name>_n, e.g. patient_1.
Figure 32: RBAC Model used to demonstrate SO-RBAC, excluding night and day duties.  Solid (black) lines 
represent seniority (d_s) relationships. Dashed (purple) lines represent is_a relationships. Arrows show direction 
of inheritance of positive authorizations (permissions).
Figure 32 shows the full RBAC hierarchy.
5.6 Results of Implementation
The ontological model was implemented using the Protégé Ontology Editor, using the Protégé-OWL plugin. The
Pellet Reasoner Inspector [114] was used to test the consistency of the ontology’s classes, properties and instances, and
to compute inferred class memberships. The SWRL rules were implemented through the SWRLTab plugin in Protégé
[110], and executed using the Jess Rule Engine [115]. Jess is also built into Protégé via the SWRLJessTab, [116] which
is a plug-in to the SWRLTab. 
The  classes  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE were
populated with individuals representing all possible permutations of roles, users and permissions using a Perl script,
which also added to PRA and DRA the individuals listed above.
The SWRL rules were run using Jess in the SWRLJessTab. The resulting ontology was then saved in a new file.
The output from the SWRL tabs was copied and pasted into plain text files. The same rules and model were run in both
Prolog and OWL+SWRL, and both produced the same results.
The numbers of unique axioms were obtained by copying and pasting the axioms from the SWRLJessTab into plain
text files, and analyzing these using the Unix shell tools sort and uniq.
The number of SWRL rules exported is simply the number of SWRL rules that are run (i.e. are ticked in the
SWRL tab).  All  OWL classes  in the ontology are exported when a set  of SWRL rules  is  run.  However, only the
individuals in classes and properties mentioned in the exported SWRL rules are exported, along with the axioms that
relate them. The axioms inferred are the results of running the SWRL rules. The same relationship may be inferred
97
many times,  resulting in  some non-unique axioms,  as  found in Steps 2 and  4 in  this  experiment.  In  Step 2,  two
individuals  were  inferred  twice  as  members  of  PRA_FULL (consultant_write_vital_sign and
specialist_nurse_read_computer),  resulting in  two non-unique  inferences.  This  is  the  same for  both ontologies,
which differ in the numbers of users and user-role assignments, and not in the number of roles or role-permission
assignments. Step 4 produces a very large number of non-unique axioms. This is because sqwrl:notElement compares
each individual ?x with each individual ?y in the set ?d, to check for non-membership of ?x in ?d, resulting in each
NOT_DENIED(?x) axiom being inferred as many times are there are ?y individuals in DENIED.
Table 9: Numbers of rules, classes, individuals and axioms reported by SWRL for the small ontology.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
SWRL rules exported to Jess 7 2 2 2 2
OWL classes exported to Jess 75 75 75 75 75
OWL individuals exported to Jess 24 731 388 232 160
OWL axioms exported to Jess 41 935 937 211 0
OWL axioms inferred 127 64 131 5,350 98
Unique triples created 127 62 131 166 98
Table 10: Numbers of rules, classes, individuals and axioms reported by SWRL for the large ontology.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
SWRL rules exported to Jess 7 2 2 2 2
OWL classes exported to Jess 75 75 75 75 75
OWL individuals exported to Jess 24 731 820 654 528
OWL axioms exported to Jess 31 935 2,210 633 0
OWL axioms inferred 127 64 423 59,214 306
Unique triples created 127 62 423 - 30
Table 9 shows the results of running SWRL for the small ontology. The 5,350 axioms inferred in Step 4 include
5,328  NOT_DENIED axioms. As described above,  sqwrl:notElement makes 180×37=6,660 comparisons between
individuals  in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  DENIED,  resulting  in  144×37=5,328  inferred  NOT_
DENIED axioms. The other 22 inferred axioms were unique PERMITTED axioms.
Table 10 shows the results of running SWRL for the large ontology. In Step 4, it was not possible to paste the
59,214 axioms into a plain text file, due to memory limitations (and this step took an extremely long time to run to
completion).
The numbers of triples of affected classes and properties at each stage were determined by exporting the OWL
files as n-triple files, and analyzing these using the Unix shell tool grep.
These should correspond to the numbers of unique OWL axioms inferred in each step.
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Table 11: Numbers of triples at stage 1.
Property Small Large
senior_to 26 26
included_in 61 61
inherits_pra 40 40
Total 127 127
Table 12: Numbers of triples at stage 2.
Class Small Large
PRA_FULL 49 49
DRA_FULL 13 13
Total 62 62
Table 13: Numbers of triples at stage 3.
Class Small Large
PERMITTABLE 95 300
DENIED 37 124
Total 132 424
Table 14: Numbers of triples at stage 4.
Class Small Large
NOT_DENIED 144 477
PERMITTED 22 66
Total 166 543
Table 15: Numbers of triples at stage 5.
Class Small Large
AUTHORIZABLE 79 249
AUTHORIZED 19 57
Total 98 306
The same numbers of triples were found for both ontologies, because Step 1 only operates on roles, and both
have the same roles (Table 11). Note that OWL did not infer the 26 junior_to axioms, which were instead inferred in
Protégé as a result of junior_to being defined as inverse to senior_to.
Two  individuals  were  inferred  twice  as  members  of  PRA_FULL (consultant_write_vital_sign and
specialist_nurse_read_computer), resulting in two non-unique inferences (Table 12). The number of triples in the
affected classes is one more than the number of inferences made in Step 3, due to the dummy individual in DENIED on
initialization (Table 13).
Finding 543 triples and 477 NOT_DENIED triples in the large ontology (Table 14) is consistent with 59,214
axioms inferred by the SWRL rules, as this number is 124×477+66 (DENIED × NOT_DENIED + PERMITTED). The
AUTHORIZABLE and AUTHORIZED classes were populated (Table 15).
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5.7 Results of SO-RBAC Process in Protégé
This section displays screen shots (Figs. 33–56) captured using the Protégé OWLViz tab [117] at various stages
of reasoning. All screenshots are taken from the small ontology.
5.7.1 Classes and Individuals
5.7.1.1 General
Figure 33: The OBJECT_INSTANCE hierarchy in our example.
Figure 33 shows the hierarchy of object classes under the OWL class OBJECT_INSTANCE. The cursor is focused
on one class, HOME_EQUIPMENT, which contains one member, home_equipment_1, which is a member of class
and is related to OBJECT_TYPE individual o_home_equipment via property instance_of. This can be expressed as
the triple (home_equipment_1) (rbac:instance_of) (o_home_equipment).
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Figure 34: The OBJECT_TYPE class.
Figure 34 shows the OBJECT_TYPE class, which contains individuals representing types of objects. These are
not the same as the individuals for the objects themselves, which are in the OBJECT_INSTANCE class.
Figure 35: The URA class.
Figure 35 shows the URA class, focusing on the individual junior_technicians. junior_technicians is related to
r_junior_technician via role, and to junior_technician_1 and junior_technician_2 via user. This is expressed as the
following triples:
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junior_technicians rbac:role r_junior_technician
junior_technicians rbac:user junior_technician_1
junior_technicians rbac:user junior_technician_2
It expresses the following URA relationships:
ura(junior_technician_1, r_junior_technician)
ura(junior_technician_2, r_junior_technician)
Figure 36: The USER class.
Figure 36 shows the USER class, focusing on the individual senior_staff_doctor_1. Although various properties
that could be relevant to the personal characteristics of users been defined, they have been left empty in this model, as
they are not relevant to the running of this static RBAC model. However, the  USER individual represents an object
(USER is  also  a  sub-class  of  OBJECT_INSTANCE).  Therefore,  the  triple  (senior_staff_doctor_1)
(rbac:instance_of) (o_doctor) is defined. Note that this is not a role membership assertion (o_doctor is not a ROLE,
but an OBJECT_TYPE): that would be in the URA class, as described in Figure 35 above.
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Figure 37: The USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE class.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE (Figure  37)  is  the  class  containing  all  potential  assignments  of
permissions and denials to users.
Figure 38: The ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE class.
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE (Figure  38)  is  the  class  containing  all  potential  assignments  of
permissions and denials to roles.
103
5.7.1.2 Initialization
Figure 39: Role r_senior_staff_doctor before Step 1 is run.
Figure  39 shows  the  role  r_senior_staff_doctor in  the  hierarchy  under  ROLE before  Step  1  is  run.
r_senior_staff_doctor is a member of SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR, and can therefore be inferred to be a member of
ROLE through sub-classing when the SWRL rules in Step 1 are run.
Of  the  property  relationships  shown  in  Figure  39,  only  two  ((r_senior_staff_doctor)  (senior_to)
(r_senior_staff_doctor) and  (r_senior_staff_doctor)  (is_a)  (r_doctor))  are  explicitly  asserted  in  the  model.  The
remaining relationships are inferred through inversity and sub-properties, as explained earlier.
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5.7.2 Reasoning
5.7.2.1 Stage 1
Figure 40: Role r_senior_staff_doctor after Step 1 is run.
After  running Step 1,  additional  property relationships for individuals  in sub-classes of  ROLE are inferred,
based on the rules, and are added to the model, as shown in Figure 40).
Figure 41: DRA individuals at Stage 1.
Figure 41 shows DRA at Stage 1, containing the individuals with which it is initialized.
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Figure 42: DRA_FULL at Stage 1.
Figure 42 shows DRA_FULL at Stage 1. This class is empty because it has not yet been populated in Step 2.
Figure 43: PRA individuals at Stage 1.
Figure 43 shows PRA at Stage 1, containing the individuals with which it is initialized.
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Figure 44: PRA_FULL at Stage 1.
Figure 44 shows PRA_FULL at Stage 1. This class is empty because it has not yet been populated in Step 2.
5.7.2.2 Stage 2
Figure 45 shows DENIED at Stage 2. The only individual present is the dummy individual DENIED_1, which is
needed for 3_not_denied to work.
Figure 45: DENIED at Stage 2.
107
Figure 46: DRA_FULL at Stage 2, having been populated in Step 2.
Figure 46 shows DRA_FULL after it has been populated in Step 2. The individual  senior_nurse_read_ward is
highlighted.  Notice the entries  in Asserted Types,  which lists  all  the classes  of  which an individual  is  a  member.
Naturally,  DRA_FULL appears;  so does  DRA,  as this particular  DRA_FULL member is  directly inferred to be in
DRA_FULL as a result of being in  DRA (see  Figure 4). It  is also in  PRA_FULL:  Step 2 infers this individual as
representing a role permission as well as a denial. [This means that  USER individuals will be both PERMITTABLE
and  DENIED in later steps; this conflict is resolved in  AUTHORIZABLE by having denials over-ride permissions.]
Notice also that the individual is a member of ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE; membership of this is essential
for the rules in Step 2 to work.
Figure 47: PRA_FULL at Stage 2, having been populated in Step 2.
Figure 47 shows PRA_FULL after Step 2 has run. This class is analogous to DRA_FULL.
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5.7.2.3 Stage 3
Figure  48 shows  DENIED after  Step  3  has  run.  Note  that  the  individual  highlighted  also  belongs  to
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE (as it has to for this step to run) and PERMITTABLE. Thus we have:
PERMITTABLE(staff_nurse_3_read_ward_1)
DENIED(staff_nurse_3_read_ward_1)
Figure 48: DENIED at Stage 3.
Given the property relationships of this individual, this is like saying:
permittable( staff_nurse_3, read, ward_1).
denied( staff_nurse_3, read, ward_1)
In Step 5, this conflict will be resolved by the denial over-riding the permission.
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Figure 49: PERMITTABLE at Stage 3.
Figure  49 shows the  PERMITTABLE class  after  Step  3 is  run.  Again,  the  individual  is  also a member of
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, but is not a member of DENIED. Thus we only have
permittable(senior_nurse_1, read, room_1)
5.7.2.4 Stage 4
Figure 50: NOT_DENIED at Stage 4.
Figure 50 shows the results of populating NOT_DENIED in Step 4. Although each individual’s membership of
this class is defined many times due to the way the populating rule runs (as discussed earlier) each individual still
appears only once in the Protégé window.
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Figure 51: PERMITTED at Stage 4.
Figure 51 shows the results of populating PERMITTED in Step 4. As well as being a member of PERMITTABLE
and  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE (as  is  necessary  for  membership  of  PERMITTED),  the  highlighted
individual also belongs to  NOT_DENIED. At Stage 4, every individual in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE,
PERMITTABLE and PERMITTED will belong to either DENIED or NOT_DENIED.
5.7.2.5 Stage 5
Figure 52: AUTHORIZABLE at Stage 5.
Figure  52 shows  AUTHORIZABLE after  Step  5.  All  individuals  belonging  to  AUTHORIZABLE must  by
definition  belong  to  the  other  three  types  listed  for  this  individual  (PERMITTABLE,  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and NOT_DENIED).
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Figure 53: AUTHORIZED at Stage 5.
Figure 53 shows AUTHORIZED after Step 5. Again, any individual in AUTHORIZED must be a member of the
other 5 classes listed here.
5.7.3 SWRL Rules Tab
Figure 54: The SWRL Rules Tab with the Jess Plugin open.
Figure 54 shows the SWRL Rules Tab with the Jess Plugin open. Note that the seven Step 1 rules are ticked,
indicating that they will be fired when OWL+SWRL→Jess button is clicked.
112
Figure 55: A SWRL rule in editing mode.
Figure 55 shows a SWRL rule (in this case 2_dra_full) in edit mode.
Figure 56: SWRLJessTab in the Jess plugin after OWL+SWRL→Jess button has been clicked for running Step 1 
rules.
Figure 56 shows the SWRLJessTab in the Jess plugin after OWL+SWRL→Jess button has been clicked for
running Step 1 rules. This screen shows the numbers of SWRL rules and OWL classes, individuals and axioms exported
to Jess.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have created and tested SO-RBAC, which is an RBAC ontological model and process written
in OWL-DL and SWRL, based on earlier RBAC access models written in predicate logic. Although OWL-DL is easy to
understand and widely supported, it does not allow a full exploitation of the power of the Semantic Web. Therefore, SO-
RBAC closely follows the semantics of the original Prolog-based RBAC model, and therefore retains many of the
drawbacks and complexity of this model. In particular, it was not possible to make full use of the hierarchical nature of
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object classes in SO-RBAC, as doing this requires classes to be linked to each other via properties. This requires classes
to be treated as individuals, which is not possible in OWL-DL. Therefore, the predicates defining an is-a hierarchy of
roles  in  the  Prolog  implementation  were  directly  imported  into  SO-RBAC as  properties  linking  objects,  when  a
representation in terms of the OWL class hierarchy would be more naturally suited to this definition. Another apparent
failure of OWL was that defining a property as transitive did not work. Transitivity should eliminate the need to define
recursive rules in most cases. However, this appears to be a failure in Protégé, and a working environment would run
this properly.
The main differences between the Prolog/relational model and SO-RBAC follow from an important difference
between predicate logic and OWL, namely that OWL is monotonic. This has two major implications for modelling in
SO-RBAC.
The first is in the handling of negation. Predicate logic uses a ‘closed world’ assumption, in which a fact that is
not explicitly defined and cannot be inferred from other facts is  assumed to be false.  This makes negation a very
straightforward operation. However, OWL uses an ‘open world assumption’, in which a fact has to be explicitly defined
as false. Therefore, it was necessary to use a complex series of functions to simulate negation in SO-RBAC, and this
process was very time consuming due to the exponentially large number of individuals that have to be compared to each
other.
Additionally, predicate logic can run a rule on a dataset, and automatically returns all axioms that apply to it
based on the stored facts. In contrast, OWL can only move individuals that already exist. Where possible, facts are
defined in SO-RBAC using object properties, but this is only possible for binary relationships. Other relationships need
to  be  defined  using  individuals  held  in  classes,  and  it  is  necessary  to  define  an  individual  for  every  potential
relationship. This again results in a time-consuming reasoning process due to the need to compare large numbers of
individuals.
Although dynamic RBAC could be implemented using SO-RBAC, we have not attempted to do so. The purpose
of SO-RBAC is to prove the feasibility of the principle of building an RBAC model based on the Semantic Web. The
test results indicate that SO-RBAC successfully does this, producing results that are consistent with the equivalent
model written in predicate logic. The next chapter will consider a purely ontological RBAC model that uses OWL-Full,
and thus fully exploits the power of the Semantic Web in reasoning, giving many advantages over SO-RBAC.
114
6 The Proposal (Continued): Enhanced Semantic and
Ontology-based RBAC (ESO-RBAC)
6.1 Introduction
This  chapter  discusses  Enhanced  Semantic and  Ontology-based  Role-Based  Access  Control  (ESO-RBAC),
which models  roles as classes,  so that  RBAC role hierarchies can be represented naturally using ontological  class
hierarchies.
The ESO-RBAC ontology uses OWL-Full. Reasoning is performed using Jena [118], an open source Semantic
Web framework for Java  [119], which supports OWL. Jena is used because SWRL cannot handle certain aspects of
OWL-Full semantics used in ESO-RBAC, such as class-individual duality. [120]
Most previous ontologies for access control have used OWL-DL. Although this is widely supported and easy to
understand, it was found to be inflexible. ESO-RBAC uses OWL Full so that classes, as well as instances, can be used
as the Domain and Range of properties. This increases flexibility in defining properties, and allows the use of OWL’s
native class hierarchy in defining roles in an object-oriented fashion. Therefore, roles need to be defined as classes, not
as individuals. However, some properties in the ontology take roles as their domains and/or ranges. Unlike OWL-DL,
OWL Full permits the use of classes as property parameters, allowing properties to be defined this way.
The definition of “roles” as classes also allows users to be defined directly as instances of their roles. Since some
roles have role-specific properties (e.g. only subclasses of  DOCTOR would have a  consults property), this allows
users to be defined with precisely the properties they need (all users have  USER properties, but only doctors have
DOCTOR properties). Note also that the USER class is multiply inherited: it is a subclass not only of RBAC, but also
of PERSON (which is a subclass of data). Another subclass of PERSON is PATIENT. Some properties (those relating
to  personal  details)  apply  to  any  PERSON,  but  USER and  PATIENT classes  also  have  specific  properties.
Additionally, permissions may be defined at any level in the RBAC class hierarchy. That is, a permission or context
constraint  might  apply  to  any  DOCTOR or  SPECIALIST role,  or  it  might  apply  specifically  to
SPECIALIST_DOCTOR.
Section  6.2 demonstrates the ESO-RBAC ontological model and reasoning. The section is divided into three
subsections.
Section 6.2.1 defines the ESO-RBAC ontological model through three distinctive steps:
(a) Definition of OWL classes and their hierarchies
(b) Definition of Necessary & Sufficient conditions and
(c) Definitions of object properties.
Step (a) above is not sufficient to mirror the semantic of RBAC within OWL, i.e. the semantics stored in OWL
class hierarchies must be strengthen through object properties and necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve both,
successful reasoning upon OWL individuals and consistency of ESO-RBAC ontology. 
Section  6.2.2 describes the way of populating ESO-RBAC classes with individuals by assertion. That section
explains exactly which classes must be populated before the reasoning process starts and why. Consequently, a portion
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of ESO-RBAC ontological classes will remain ‘empty’ until a reasoning process determines which individuals from the
asserted classes will be ‘moved’ (or copied) into ESO-RBAC classes which were empty on ESO-RBAC initialisation.
Section 6.2.3 explains the purpose and the outcome of the reasoning process upon ESO-RBAC concepts using
Jena. ESO-RBAC has two types of reasoning. The first reasoning step, in described in 6.2.3.1, uses Jena for creating a
set of new object properties which use existing object properties defined in step  (c). All of the object properties for
which this is done have ROLE_SET meta-class as both domain and range, as the purpose of this step is to set up all the
relationships between roles in the RBAC model. The second step, described in Section 6.2.3.2, performs reasoning to
move individuals across ESO-RBAC in order to determine permission or denials in particular request imposed by a
user, who has a ‘role’ and would like to perform an ‘activity’ upon set of “objects”.
Section  6.3 describes  the  ESO-RBAC  process  and  explains  its  steps,  which  are  based  on  the  model  and
reasoning introduced in Section 6.2.
Section 6.4 describes the reasoning rules used for running dynamic RBAC in the ESO-RBAC model.
Section  6.5 contrasts the proposed ESO-RBAC solution with the SO-RBAC model described in the previous
chapter. 
Section  6.6 gives a particular scenario of RBAC in terms of defining which individuals may populate one of
ESO-RBAC instances. The healthcare domain and a medical database is used to demonstrate the implementation of
ESO-RBAC.
Section  6.7 describes the implementation of  ESO-RBAC reasoning and the deployment  of the ESO-RBAC
process. The ESO-RBAC ontology is modelled in OWL-Full using Protégé. The reasoning rules, written in Jena, were
run using a Java command-line tool. The model was initialized using a Perl script to create the initial instances.
Section 6.8 shows screen shots from Protégé of the implementation and testing of ESO-RBAC.
Section 6.9 draws conclusions.
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6.2 Ontological Model and Reasoning
This section describes the ESO-RBAC model in terms of OWL and Jena. 
6.2.1 Definition of ESO-RBAC Ontological Model
6.2.1.1 OWL classes and their hierarchies
Figure 57 shows a graphical illustration of ESO-RBAC. At the top level, the ontology is again divided into two
abstract super-classes called OBJECT_INSTANCE and RBAC.
Whereas SO-RBAC represents  is-a relationships using object properties, ESO-RBAC represents them directly
using  the  class  hierarchy.  For  instance,  the  information  represented  in  Prolog  by  the  fact
is_a(senior_doctor,doctor) is represented in ESO-RBAC by defining SENIOR_ DOCTOR as a subclass of
DOCTOR.  Similarly, user-role assignments are handled in ESO-RBAC by directly assigning instances of users to
subclasses of  ROLE.  For example,  ESO-RBAC would represent  the information corresponding to  the Prolog fact
ura(claire,senior_doctor) by assigning the user instance Claire to the role class SENIOR_DOCTOR.
In  this ESO-RBAC model, the subclasses in the  OBJECT_INSTANCE class are the same as those in SO-
RBAC.
The ontology for ESO-RBAC is given in  Text 2, with a graphical illustration in  Figure 57. Class  RBAC has
mostly the same sub-classes in ESO-RBAC as in SO-RBAC, but ESO-RBAC has the following differences:
• URA is missing, as its semantics are represented by assigning individuals to sub-classes of ROLE.
• ROLE is modelled as a sub-class of USER.
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Figure 57: Graphical illustration of ESO-RBAC, including meta-classes.
• OBJECT_TYPE is missing, as object types are represented by sub-classes of  OBJECT_INSTANCE. The
relationship between object instances and types is represented by assigning individuals representing object
instances to object classes.
ROLE identifies all  roles.  The  is_a (role inclusion) hierarchy is represented through the ontological  class
hierarchy. This is  because a role defined as an instance of another role is  defined as inheriting all  the super-role's
permissions and denials. This is the natural behaviour of inheritance in a class hierarchy, making it an intuitive way of
representing is_a relationships.
Thus, as stated earlier, the information represented in Prolog by the fact is_a(senior_doctor,doctor)
is represented in ESO-RBAC by defining SENIOR_DOCTOR as a subclass of DOCTOR. Inheritance in the seniority
hierarchy  is  different,  since  permissions  and  denials  are  inherited  in  opposite  directions.  Therefore,  d_s and
senior_to are still represented explicitly by the four object properties senior_to, junior_to, directly_senior_to and
directly_junior_to.
In an OWL-Full ontology, all classes belong, as individuals, to the meta-class owl:Class. To define a class as a
parameter of a property, the domain or range of the property needs to be set to this meta-class. However, ESO-RBAC
defines an additional meta-class ROLE_SET, containing ROLE and all of its sub-classes as individuals. This allows
properties to be defined that  can have only  ROLE sub-classes as  their  domains and ranges.  Note that  there is  no
hierarchy in ROLE_SET: all ROLE-class individuals are asserted directly under ROLE_SET.
The super class RBAC defines concepts that are relevant to RBAC, which should be stored in a separate super-
class from OBJECT_INSTANCE because it is conceptually different from other information, and is typically stored
separately in other systems. For example, a relational DBMS would store the RBAC information as meta-data, which is
not usually queried directly by users.
Sub-classes of the OBJECT_INSTANCE class are:
• EQUIPMENT: represents all machines, both computers and medical equipment (and possibly others) to which
a user might be logged in. There are various sub-classes of EQUIPMENT, and multiple inheritance is used.
• INTERNET_CONNECTION: represents  Internet  settings  of  computers.  This  class  is  sub-classed  into
HOME_INTERNET_CONNECTION and HOSPITAL_INTERNET_CONNECTION.
• OS_SESSION represents operating system login settings of computers.
• PERSON represents all  individuals with information stored about them. This includes users,  so the class
USER is  a  sub-class  of  this  as  well  as  of  RBAC.  The  other  sub-class  of  PERSON in  this  example  is
PATIENT.
• ROOM represents all rooms in a hospital, and is sub-classed into OPERATING_ROOM and WARD.
• VITAL_SIGNS represents vital signs recorded for patients.
Sub-classes of the RBAC class are as follows.
The  USER sub-class defines the set of users of the system. However,  USER also inherits from  PERSON,
which is a subclass of the OBJECT_INSTANCE class. On a superficial level, this is because user information might be
stored both as ordinary data and as meta-data in a relational database. On a practical level, it is because the USER class,
describing a user, contains information about users that is used in either ordinary information-retrieval situations or in
RBAC processing, or both.
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ROLE sub-class, as discussed above a sub-class of USER in ESO-RBAC, contains a complex hierarchy of sub-
classes,  defining  roles  to  which  users  and  permissions  may be  assigned.  The  hierarchy  of  classes  under  ROLE
represents sub-divisions of roles by type (not by seniority). The RBAC administrator is free to sub-class this class
according to the domain. In this example, it is sub-classed according to roles that might be found in a hospital. The main
sub-classes  of  ROLE in  this  example  are  DOCTOR,  NURSE,  ADMIN,  TECHNICIAN,  DAY_DUTY and
NIGHT_DUTY. These sub-classes are further sub-classed, including multiple inheritance.
USER_SESSION defines user login sessions. Its  sub-class  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION defines user login
sessions that are active, and thus give permissions to users.
ACTION class defines actions that can be performed on objects, such as read and write.
PERMISSION_ASSIGN is a sub-class consisting of all classes that relate to permission assignments. However,
it is also an abstract class in ESO-RBAC,  i.e. it never contains any instances directly assigned to it. It is defined to
provide the role and action properties to all permission-assignment classes in ESO-RBAC. Its sub-classes are ROLE_
PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.  They define  permission  assignments
between users and objects, and between roles and objects. ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE defines permissions
and  denials  assigned  to  roles,  either  explicitly  or  computationally  by  ESO-RBAC.  USER_
PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE defines  permissions,  authorizations  and  denials  assigned  to  users  by ESO-RBAC
computations.
The sub-classes of  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are  DENIED,  NOT_DENIED,  PERMITTABLE,
AUTHORIZABLE, PERMITTED and AUTHORIZED. All these sub-classes, except NOT_DENIED, are equivalent to
the similarly-named Prolog predicates. NOT_DENIED is the complement of DENIED. PERMITTED is defined as a
sub-class of PERMITTABLE, because it can only contain individuals that are also in this.
The sub-classes of ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are DRA,  DRA_FULL,  PRA and PRA_FULL, all
of which are equivalent to the similarly-named Prolog predicates.  PRA defines explicit role-permission assignments.
PRA_FULL defines role-permission assignments that are inferred when the ESO-RBAC model is run. Similarly, DRA
defines explicit role-denial assignments, and DRA_FULL defines inferred role-denial assignments.
6.2.1.2 Necessary & Sufficient conditions
Table 16: Necessary & Sufficient conditions imposed on ESO-RBAC classes
Class Necessary & Sufficient condition
NOT_DENIED USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE ⊓ ¬DENIED
AUTHORIZABLE PERMITTABLE ⊓ ¬DENIED
AUTHORIZED PERMITTED ⊓ ¬DENIED
As with SO-RBAC, a few Necessary & Sufficient conditions were imposed on some ESO-RBAC classes in
order to guarantee consistency of ESO-RBAC when populating classes with individuals. In other words Necessary &
Sufficient conditions are imposed on NOT_DENIED, AUTHORIZABLE and AUTHORIZED (see Table 16). If a class
has a Necessary & Sufficient condition imposed on it, then populating the class in a way that violates this condition
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makes the ontology inconsistent. The ESO-RBAC reasoning process populates these classes in a way that would always
be consistent with the conditions.
In  Figure 57 (page  117), the graphical illustration of ESO-RBAC, OWL classes are in yellow, except classes
bound by Necessary & Sufficient conditions, which are in amber.
Figure 58: Necessary & Sufficient condition for NOT_DENIED.
Figure  58 shows how a  Necessary & Sufficient  condition  appears  in  Protégé.  As  this  figure  shows,  these
Necessary  &  Sufficient  conditions  cause  AUTHORIZABLE to  become  a  sub-class  of  PERMITTABLE,  and
AUTHORIZED to become a sub-class of PERMITTED.
6.2.1.3 Object property relationships
We have already mentioned above that PERMISSION_ASSIGN provides the role and action properties to all
permission-assignment classes in ESO-RBAC. Therefore its full description must include object properties it holds.
Naturally,  PERMISSION_ASSIGN has object properties  role and  action. Just as all permission assignment
predicates in the Prolog RBAC model described in Section 3.2.1 have role and action as arguments, so do all analogous
classes in ESO-RBAC. However, the hierarchical nature of ontologies makes it much easier to define a series of related
classes with the same properties in an ontology than it is to define predicates with similar arguments in Prolog. In OWL,
property inheritance can be used to define a super-class with certain properties, and define sub-classes representing
related  predicates  that  inherit  its  object  properties.  Accordingly,  PERMISSION_ASSIGN sub-classes  ROLE_
PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, both inherit properties role and action,
as  well  as  defining  other  object  properties. ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE has  the  additional  property
object_type.  Since  DRA,  DRA_FULL,  PRA and  PRA_FULL are  sub-classes  of  ROLE_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE,  all  have  the object  properties  role,  action and  object_type.  role and  action,  are  inherited  from
PERMISSION_ASSIGN (their  grandparent  super-class),  while  object_type is  inherited  directly  from  ROLE_
PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE  defines  permissions,  authorizations  and  denials  assigned  to
users by ESO-RBAC computations. As well as inheriting role and action from PERMISSION_ASSIGN, it also
has the object properties user and object_instance.
Table 17: Object properties in ESO-RBAC.
Domain Property Description Range
rbac:PERMISSION_ASSIGN (sub-classes: 
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and
sub-classes, 
rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and
sub-classes)
rbac:action Actions involved in role 
and user permission 
assignments.
rbac:ACTION
rbac:PERMISSION_ASSIGN and sub-classes rbac:role Roles involved in role and
user permission 
assignments.
rbac:ROLE_SET
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Domain Property Description Range
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE 
(sub-classes: rbac:DENIED, 
rbac:NOT_DENIED, rbac:PERMITTABLE, 
rbac:AUTHORIZABLE, rbac:PERMITTED, 
rbac:AUTHORIZED)
rbac:object_instance Object instance to which a
user is permitted, 
authorized or denied 
access.
OBJECT_INSTANCE 
and sub-classes
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE 
(rbac:DENIED, rbac:NOT_DENIED, 
rbac:PERMITTABLE, rbac:AUTHORIZABLE, 
rbac:PERMITTED, rbac:AUTHORIZED)
rbac:user Users involved in user 
permission/denial/authoriz
ation assignments.
rbac:USER
rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE 
(rbac:DRA_FULL, rbac:DRA, 
rbac:PRA_FULL, rbac:PRA)
rbac:object_type Object types associated 
with PRA and DRA 
relationships.
rbac:OBJECT_TYPE
rbac:USER_SESSION rbac:user A user attached to a 
session.
rbac:USER
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:directly_junior_to Inverse of 
directly_senior_to. Sub-
property of junior_to.
rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:directly_senior_to Assertions of direct 
seniority relationships. 
Sub-property of 
senior_to.
rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:included_in Direct and indirect 
inclusion relationships, 
inferred from OBJECT 
sub-classing.
rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:inherits_pra Roles that participate in 
inheritance paths, inferred
from inherits_pra_path.
rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:inherits_pra_path Assertions of ends of 
inheritance paths.
rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:junior_to Inverse of senior_to. rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:ROLE_SET rbac:senior_to Direct and indirect 
seniority relationships, 
inferred from senior_to.
rbac:ROLE_SET
Table 17 lists ALL object properties with their Domains and Ranges, and includes both asserted and inherited
object properties. Most of the same object properties from SO-RBAC are used in ESO-RBAC. The following properties
are not used:  rbac:instance_of (represented by OBJECT_INSTANCE subclass membership) and  is_a (represented
by ROLE sub-classing). Additionally, the class  URA is not defined (as its semantics are represented by ROLE sub-
class membership). Properties that have  ROLE as the domain and range in SO-RBAC have  ROLE_SET in ESO-
RBAC.
Most object properties are named after their Ranges. These properties may have different functions depending on
the Domain: each function of a property is listed separately in the table.
Object properties not named after their Ranges are the properties that have  ROLE_SET as both Domain and
Range (directly_junior_to, directly senior_to, included_in, inherits_pra, inherits_pra_path, junior_to, senior_to).
It is important to note that some object properties from Table 17 are asserted and some of them are inferred. For
example, the object properties action, user, role and object_instance are asserted between USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and  OBJECT_INSTANCE,  ACTION,  USER and  ROLE_SET (and its  sub-classes),  but  inferred
between all subclasses of USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and these classes.
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Figure 59: Property map of all ESO-RBAC properties except those that have ROLE as both domain and range.
+ OBJECT_INSTANCE
 RBAC−
   ACTION−
   OBJECT_TYPE−
  + ROLE
  = PERMISSION_ASSIGN {action ACTION, role ROLE_SET}
     ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE − {object_type owl:Class}
       DRA−
      = DRA_FULL
       PRA−
      = PRA_FULL
    = USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE {object_instance OBJECT_INSTANCE, user USER}
       DENIED−
       NOT_DENIED ≡ {USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE  ¬DENIED}⊓
      = PERMITTABLE
         AUTHORIZABLE ≡ {PERMITTABLE  ¬DENIED}⊓
        = PERMITTED
    AUTHORIZED ≡ {PERMITTED  ¬DENIED} ⊓
   USER−
   USER_SESSION − {user USER}
     ACTIVE_USER_SESSION−
  + rdf:Property
   rdfs:Class−
     owl:Class−
       Class−
         ROLE_SET − {directly_junior_to ROLE_SET, directly_senior_to ROLE_SET, included_in 
ROLE_SET, inherits_pra ROLE_SET, inherits_pra_path ROLE_SET, is_a ROLE_SET}
Text 25: ESO-RBAC Ontology (some classes are collapsed).
Similarly, the object  properties  action,  object_type and  role are  asserted between  ROLE_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and  ACTION,  OBJECT_TYPE and  ROLE_SET classes,  but  inferred between  all  subclasses  of
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and these classes.
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+ COLLAPSED_CLASS
 CLASS−
   SUB-CLASS − {object_property_1 CLASS, object_property_2 CLASS}
   ABSTRACT_CLASS−
= SWRL-INFERRED_CLASS
   N&S_BOUND_CLASS ≡ {N&S CONDITION ( : and; ¬: not}⊓
Text 26: Legend for ESO-RBAC Ontology.
Text 25 (page  122) illustrates a collapsed version of the ontology from Figure 57, and highlights main ESO-
RBAC classes involved in ontological reasoning. It is important to note that Text 25 should be read in conjunction with
Text 26.
Object properties are listed, with their ranges, in grey text in curly brackets after the classes that have them as
their domains. Classes that contain inferred individuals as the result of our ontological reasoning are listed in blue and
preceded by the = symbol. Classes on which Necessary & Sufficient conditions are imposed are in green and preceded
by the ≡ symbol.
Figure 59 (page  122) graphically illustrates all object properties defined in  Table 17, except those that have
ROLE as both domain and range. The label ‘isa’ in  Figure 59 refers to the sub-class–super-class relationship: a sub-
class ‘isa’ super-class. It has nothing to do with the is_a property used in ESO-RBAC. The label ‘io’ (‘instance of’) is
used to denote a class that belongs, as an individual, to another class (e.g. from ROLE to ROLE_SET). In this diagram,
each property is distinguished by colour: where the same property appears several times, it is shown in the same colour.
However, these colours are not used anywhere else.
rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:directly_junior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:junior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:directly_senior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:senior_to Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:included_in Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:inherits_pra_path Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
rbac:inherits_pra Instance* rbac:ROLE_SET
Figure 60: Property map of all ESO-RBAC properties with the meta-class ROLE_SET as both domain and range.
There  are  several  ways  in  which  instances  of  the  meta-class  ROLE_SET can  be  related  affecting  user-
permission assignment in RBAC. These need separate attention.
Figure 60 depicts all object properties in ESO-RBAC that have the meta-class ROLE_SET as both domain and
range.  These  properties  are  directly_junior_to,  directly_senior_to,  inherits_pra,  inherits_pra_path,  junior_to,
senior_to and  included_in  (ESO-RBAC  does  not  have  is_a).  These  separate  properties  represent  different
relationships between  ROLE_SET instances (sub-classes of  ROLE), as described in  Table 20. Each object property
relating instances of the same class is indicated by an arrow from the node representing the ROLE class and pointing
back to this box. For clarity, these object properties are also listed in the node. The box in Figure 60 signifies that a
ROLE class (instance of meta-class ROLE_SET) (represented by the ROLE at the top of the box) has can be linked to
any instances of ROLE_SET via any of the properties listed.
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senior_to
directly_senior_to
directly_junior_to
junior_to
inherits_pra_path
inherits_pra
included_in
Note that all object properties in Figure 60 apply to the same ROLE_SET meta-class. Therefore, they appear in
Figure 60 twice: in the first column of the figure and as coloured labels of arcs which graphically illustrate these object
properties defined upon meta-class ROLE_SET.
6.2.2 Populating ESO-RBAC classes by assertion
Classes populated in this stage are classified into two types. Note that ROLE and PERMISSION_ASSIGN are
abstract classes, which contain no asserted individuals.
i. Auto-populated  on  initialization:  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE are populated on initialization with individuals representing possible role and user permission
assignments. Individuals asserted under these classes are not active: they have to be moved to sub-classes of
these classes to be active in ESO-RBAC.
ii. Populated  according  to  RBAC  model  on  initialization:  USER,  ACTION,  ROLE,  OBJECT_TYPE,
USER_SESSION,  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION,  DRA,  PRA and  all  classes  under  ROLE and
OBJECT_INSTANCE are populated, by the RBAC administrator and application, with individuals that define
the RBAC rules and environment.
ESO-RBAC lacks the  OBJECT_TYPE class  found in SO-RBAC, since it  identifies  the type  of  an object
instance by its class.
Classes in the meta-class ROLE_SET specify RBAC roles. 
On initialization, it is populated with individuals representing all possible relationships between roles, actions
and object types. These are then moved in the reasoning step into any of the sub-classes.
The sub-classes  of  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are  DRA,  DRA_FULL,  PRA and  PRA_FULL.
DRA and PRA are populated on initialization with explicit denial and permission assertions, respectively, copied from
the super-class. They are exactly equivalent to dra and pra assertions in the Prolog model. 
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is populated on initialization with individuals representing all possible
combinations of user assignments of access to perform actions on object instances. 
The sub-classes of ROLE are populated by individuals representing users who are assigned the roles that they
represent. In the example RBAC,  ROLE is an abstract class, and has a hierarchy below this indicating types of role
such as DOCTOR and NURSE. Unlike in SO-RBAC, ESO-RBAC directly uses the position of a sub-class of ROLE
in the class hierarchy to represent role inclusion, eliminating the need for the property is_a.
The  USER_SESSION class  is  populated  with  user  login  sessions.  It  contains  sub-class
ACTIVE_USER_SESSION, which represents active user sessions.
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6.2.3 Reasoning in ESO-RBAC using Jena
Figure 61: Steps and Stages in reasoning ESO-RBAC
Figure 61 shows the six steps of reasoning, which in terms of overview are the same as in SO-RBAC, except for
the addition of  Step 0.  Step 1 significantly differs  from the others  because it  uses  Jena for  inferring more object
properties. In other words, Step 1 modifies object properties in sub-classes of ROLE (as instances of ROLE_SET) for
the purpose of determining all the relationships between roles within RBAC.
A new step, Step 0, is added to the beginning of the reasoning process to run reasoning rules that infer indirect
sub-classes and class membership. This is because Jena does not infer these on its own. Step 0 would not be required
when using a fully-functioning OWL-Full reasoner.
Steps  2–5  of  the  reasoning  process  infer  individuals  in  ESO-RBAC  classes  according  to  strictly  defined
matching of SO-RBAC sub-classes. The final result of our reasoning through Jena and ontological matching will be
shown  in  Stage  5,  when  certain  individuals  will  be  moved  into  ESO-RBAC  classes  AUTHORIZABLE and
AUTHORIZED.
Steps 0 and 1 are shown in Sub-section 6.2.3.1, and Steps 2–5 are shown in Sub-section 6.2.3.2.
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The steps are designed such that each stage populated the ontology with all axioms that may be required for the
immediately following stage (except that Step 1 creates all object property relationships).
The reader should be aware that if more than one rule affects the same class or property, then the relationship
between the rules is a logical OR. Although the syntax of Jena (unlike that of SWRL) does allow representation of
logical OR relationships in a single rule, it was decided to use separate rules in ESO-RBAC, to maintain the link with
the SRWL rules used in SO-RBAC. 
The Jena rules were named according to the following conventions:
• The rules are numbered according to the step in which they are executed when rule chaining. There are six
steps, 0–5 (Figure 61).
The  Jena  rules  are  named  according  to  the  convention  s_relation[_n],  where  s is  the  step  number,
relation is the class or property affected by the rule, and  n is a sequence number (if there is more than one rule
relating to the same relation in the same stage).
Jena can be written either in the standard Prolog syntax, as below, with the consequent at the head (as in Prolog),
or with the consequent at the tail (as in SWRL). In ESO-RBAC, they are written with the consequent at the head.
Figure 62: Key to symbols used in Jena Process diagrams.
Figure 62 shows the key to the symbols used in the diagrams in Figures 63–93 showing the inference processes
for object properties.
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6.2.3.1 Defining new object properties
We define new object properties in Steps 0 and 1, from Figure 62. These definitions are based on previously
defined object properties, where the ROLE_SET meta-class is the Range and Domain. Step 0 consists of 4 Jena rules,
named  as  0_inferred_subClassOf_1,  0_inferred_subClassOf_2,  0_inferred_type_1 and
0_inferred_type_2.  Step  1  consists  of  8  Jena  rules,  named  as  1_senior_to_1,  1_senior_to_2,
1_senior_to_4,  1_junior_to_1,  1_junior_to_2,  1_junior_to_4,  1_inherits_pra_1 and
1_inherits_pra_3.  1_junior_to_1,  1_junior_to_2 and  1_junior_to_4,  are  the  inverse  rules  to
1_senior_to_1, 1_senior_to_2 and 1_senior_to_4, respectively.
[inferred_subClassOf_1: (?c1 
rdfs:inferred_subClassOf ?c2)
           <- 
           (?c1 rdfs:subClassOf ?c2)
]
Text 27: Jena for rule 0_inferred_subClassOf_1.
Figure 63: Rule 0_inferred_subClassOf_1.
The first rule in Step 0, given in  Figure 63, is called  0_inferred_subClassOf_1. It  defines a class as
being an inferred sub-class if it is a sub-class of that class. Figure 63 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 27 above.
[inferred_subClassOf_2: (?c1 
rdfs:inferred_subClassOf ?c3)
           <- 
           (?c1 rdfs:subClassOf ?c2)
           (?c2 rdf_ext:inferred_subClassOf ?c3)
]
Text 28: Jena for rule 0_inferred_subClassOf_2.
Figure 64: Rule 
0_inferred_subClassOf_2.
The second rule in Step 0, given in  Figure 64, is called  0_inferred_subClassOf_2. It defines inferred
sub-classing as transitive. In other words, class  ?c1 is an inferred sub-class of class  ?c3 if it is a direct sub-class of
another class (?c2) that is an inferred sub-class of class ?r3.
Figure 64 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 28 above.
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[inferred_type_1: (?i 
rdf_ext:inferred_type ?c)
           <- 
           (?i rdf:type ?c)
]
Text 29: Jena for rule 0_inferred_type_1.
Figure 65: Rule 0_inferred_type_1
The third rule in Step 0, given in  Figure 65, is called  0_inferred_type_1. It  an individual as being an
inferred type of a class if it is a type (member) of this class. Figure 65 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 29 above.
[inferred_type_2: (?i rdf_ext:inferred_type ?c)
           <- 
           (?c1 rdf_ext:inferred_subClassOf ?c)
           (?i rdf:type ?c1)
]
Text 30: Jena for rule 0_inferred_type_2.
Figure 66: Rule 0_inferred_type_2.
The fourth rule in Step 0, given in Figure 66, is called 0_inferred_type_2. It defines an individual as an
inferred type of a class if it is a member of an inferred sub-class of this class. In other words, individual ?i is an inferred
type of class ?c if it is a member of class ?c1, which is an inferred sub-class of class ?c.
Figure 66 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 30 above.
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[1_senior_to_1: (?r rbac:senior_to ?r) 
    <- 
   (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
   (?r rbac:directly_senior_to ?r1)
]
Text 31: Jena for rule 1_senior_to_1.
Figure 67: Rule 1_senior_to_1
The first rule in Step 1, given in Figure 67, is called 1_senior_to_1. It defines a role as is senior to itself if it
has at least one role directly senior to it. Figure 67 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 31 above.
[1_senior_to_2: (?r rbac:senior_to ?r) 
    <- 
   (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
   (?r1 rbac:directly_senior_to ?r)
]
Text 32: Jena for rule 1_senior_to_2.
Figure 68: Rule 1_senior_to_2.
The second rule in Step 1, given in Figure 68, is called 1_senior_to_2. It defines a role as senior to itself if
it is directly senior to at least one role. A role class is identified by its membership of the meta-class ROLE_SET. The
syntax ?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET in Jena is equivalent to rbac:ROLE_SET(?r) in SWRL. In other words,
class membership is queried in Jena by querying the RDF property rdf:type.
Figure 68 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 32 above.
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[1_senior_to_4: (?r1 rbac:senior_to ?r3) 
    <- 
   (?r1 rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
   (?r1 rbac:directly_senior_to ?r2)
   (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r3)
]
Text 33: Jena for rule 1_senior_to_4.
Figure 69: Rule 
1_senior_to_4
The third rule in Step 1, given in Figure 69, is called 1_senior_to_4. It defines a seniority of roles as being
transitive. In other words, Role  ?r1 is senior to  ?r3 if it is directly senior to another role (?r2) that is senior to  ?r3.
Figure 69 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 33 above.
[1_junior_to: (?r1 rbac:junior_to ?r2) 
           <- 
          (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
          (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r1)
]
Text 34: Jena for rule 1_junior_to.
Figure 70: Rule 1_junior_to.
The fourth rule in Step 1, given in Figure 70, is called 1_junior_to. It defines axioms for junior_to as the
inverses of senior_to axioms: if role ?r2 is senior to ?r1, then ?r1 is junior to ?r2. This rule is defined because Jena
cannot infer inverse axioms from the axioms that it has inferred, even where properties are defined in the ontology as
being inverses of each other.
Figure 70 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 34 above.
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The fifth rule in Step 1, given in Figure 71, is called 1_inherits_pra_1. It defines a role as being part of an
inheritance path involving itself. An inheritance path is a path along which permissions can be inherited. This rule is
necessary to set up recursion when defining inheritance paths. Figure 71 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 35 below. 
[1_inherits_pra_1: (?r 
rbac:inherits_pra ?r)
    <- 
    (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
    notEqual(?r, rbac:ROLE)
]
Text 35: Jena for rule 1_inherits_pra_1.
Figure 71: Rule 1_inherits_pra_1
[1_inherits_pra_3: (?r2 rbac:inherits_pra ?r3)
    <- 
     (?r1 rbac:senior_to ?r2)
     (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r3)
     (?r3 rbac:senior_to ?r4)
     (?r1 rbac:inherits_pra_path ?r4)
]
Text 36: Jena for rule 1_inherits_pra_3.
Figure 72: Rule 1_inherits_pra_3
The sixth rule in Step 1, given in Figure 72, is called 1_inherits_pra_3. It defines that Roles ?r2 and ?r3
are in an inheritance path, where ?r3 is the senior role, if:
iv)?r2 has a senior role ?r1 that is at the senior end of an inheritance path, and
v) ?r3 is senior to role ?r4 that is at the junior end of an inheritance path
Figure 72 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 36 above.
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6.2.3.2 Moving individuals across ESO-RBAC classes
Individuals are moved across ESO-RBAC classes according to the reasoning performed in Steps 2–5. All rules in
Steps 2 and 3, and rule 2 of Step 4, match individuals according to object properties. Rule 1 of Step 4, and both rules in
Step 5, match individuals by a simple set operation (set difference or intersection).
Step 2 is shown in Figure 73. It takes class ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and matches its individuals
with individuals of  classes  PRA and  DRA.  If  individuals from  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE satisfy the
rules  for  their  matching,  then  they are  moved to  PRA_FULL and  DRA_FULL.  It  is  important  to  note  that  only
individuals  from  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are  being  moved  into  PRA_FULL and  DRA_FULL,
according to the object properties of these and of the individuals in PRA and DRA.
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Figure 73: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 2 of reasoning only.
[2_dra_full: (?z rdf:type rbac:DRA_FULL )
    <- 
    (?z rdf:type rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    (?z rbac:role ?r2 )
    (?z rbac:action ?a )
    (?z rbac:object_type ?o )
    (?r1 rbac:senior_to ?r2 )
    (?x rdf:type rbac:DRA )
    (?x rbac:role ?r1 )
    (?x rbac:action ?a )
    (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
]
Text 37: Jena for rule 2_dra_full
Figure 74: Rule 2_dra_full
The first  rule  in  Step  2,  given  in  Figure  74,  is  called  2_dra_full.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  from
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE to DRA_FULL if there exists an individual in DRA that has the same action
and  object_type properties  as  that  in  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE,  and  if  the  role  property  of  the
individual in DRA is senior to that of the individual in ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
A formal description of the matching in rule 2_dra_full is below. ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
instance ?z represents a potential user role assignment with the following properties:
• rbac:action ?a;
• rbac:role ?r2, and
• rbac:object_type ?o.
?z is moved to DRA_FULL if:
i) ?z is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r2;
ii) ?r1 is senior to ?r2 (is linked to ?r1 via object property rbac:senior_to);
iii)DRA instance ?x is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r1, and
iv)both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a and rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 74 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 37 above.
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[2_pra_full: (?z rdf:type rbac:PRA_FULL )
    <- 
    (?z rdf:type rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    (?z rbac:role ?r2)
    (?z rbac:action ?a )
    (?z rbac:object_type ?o )
    (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r1 )
    (?r2 rbac:inherits_pra ?r1)
    (?x rdf:type rbac:PRA )
    (?x rbac:role ?r1 )
    (?x rbac:action ?a )
    (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
]
Text 38: Jena for rule 2_pra_full.
Figure 75: 2_pra_full
The second rule in Step 2, given in  Figure 75, is called  2_pra_full. This rule moves an individual from
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE to PRA_FULL if there exists an individual in PRA that has the same action
and  object_type properties  as  that  in  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE,  and  if  the  role property  of  the
individual in PRA is junior to that of the individual in ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
A  formal  description  of  the  matching  in  rule  in  2_dra_full is  given  below. ROLE_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE instance ?z represents a potential user-role assignment with the following properties:
• rbac:action ?a;
• rbac:role ?r2, and
• rbac:object_type ?o
?z is moved to PRA_FULL if:
i) ?z is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r2;
ii) ?r2 is senior to ?r1 (is linked to ?r1 via object property rbac:senior_to);
iii)?r2 and ?r1 are in an inheritance path (linked via object property rbac:inherits_pra);
iv)PRA instance ?x is linked by object property rbac:role to ?r1, and
v) both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a and rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 75 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 38 above.
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Figure 76: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 3 of reasoning only. 
Figure 76 shows the movement of individuals in Step 3, in which PERMITTABLE and DENIED are populated
from  individuals  in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE,  as  determined  by  individuals  in  PRA_FULL and
DRA_FULL, as well as relationships between roles defined by included_in axioms.
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[3_permittable: (?z rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
           <- 
           (?z rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:PRA_FULL )
           (?x rbac:role ?r )
           (?x rbac:action ?a )
           (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
           (?z rbac:user ?u )
           (?z rbac:role ?r )
           (?z rbac:action ?a )
           (?z rbac:object_instance ?oi )
           (?oi rdf:type ?o )
           (?u rdf_ext:inferred_type ?r )
]
Text 39: Jena for rule 3_permittable.
Figure 77: Rule 3_permittable.
The first rule in Step 3, given in  Figure 77, is called  3_permittable. This rule moves  an individual from
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE to  PERMITTABLE if that  individual is  found to represent an actual  user-
permission assignment in the RBAC model. That is, if an individual in USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE has the
same  action  as  an  individual  in  PRA_FULL;  has  object  instance  that  is  linked  to  an  object  type  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual,  and  has  a  user  that  is  assigned  to  a  role  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual,  or  a  role  that  is  included  in  this  role,  then  it  is  moved  to
PERMITTABLE.
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A  formal  description  of  the  matching  rule  in  3_permittable is  below.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE instance  ?z represents  a  potential  user-permission  assignment.  It  has  the
following properties:
• rbac:action linked to ?a, representing an action performed by a user;
• rbac:user ?u, and
• rbac:object_instance ?oi, representing a specific data object that may be accessed by user ?u. 
?x is an instance in PRA_FULL with the following properties:
• rbac:action linked to ?a;
• rbac:role ?r1, and
• rbac:object_type ?o, representing a type of object that may be accessed by users in role ?r1.
?z is moved to PERMITTABLE if it is found to be an actual user-permission assignment in the RBAC model,
according to the following rules:
i) ?z has user ?u;
ii) ?u belongs to role class ?r2;
iii)?r2 is a sub-class of ?r1 (?r2 is linked to ?r1 via property rdf_ext:inferredSubclassOf);
iv)PRA_FULL instance ?x has role ?r1;
v) Both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a;
vi)?z has rbac:object_instance ?oi;
vii)?oi is an individual representing a data object, belonging to class ?o representing an object type, and
viii)?x has rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 77 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 39 above.
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[3_denied: (?z rdf:type rbac:DENIED )
           <- 
           (?z rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:DRA_FULL )
           (?x rbac:role ?r )
           (?x rbac:action ?a )
           (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
           (?z rbac:user ?u )
           (?z rbac:role ?r )
           (?z rbac:action ?a )
           (?z rbac:object_instance ?oi )
           (?oi rdf:type ?o )
           (?u rdf_ext:inferred_type ?r )
]
Text 40: Jena for rule 3_denied.
Figure 78: 3_denied
The second rule  in  Step  3,  given  in  Figure  78,  is  called  3_denied.  This  rule  moves  an  individual  from
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is  moved  to  DENIED if  it  is  found  to  represent  an  actual  user-denial
assignment in the RBAC model.  That is,  if an individual in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE has the same
action  as  an  individual  in  DRA_FULL;  has  object  instance  that  is  linked  to  an  object  type  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual,  and  has  a  user  that  is  assigned  to  a  role  in  this
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individual, or a role that is included in this role, then it is moved to DENIED.
A formal description of the matching in rule in 3_denied is below.
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USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE instance ?z is moved to DENIED if:
i) ?z has rbac:user ?u;
ii) ?u is an inferred member of role class ?r (?u is linked to ?r via property rdf_ext:inferred_type);
iii)DRA_FULL instance ?x has rbac:role ?r1;
iv)both ?z and ?x have rbac:action ?a;
v) ?z has rbac:object_instance ?oi;
vi)?oi is a data object of type ?o (?oi is linked to?oi is an individual representing a data object, belonging to
class ?o representing an object type, and
vii)?x has rbac:object_type ?o.
Figure 78 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 40 above.
Figure 79: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 4 of reasoning only.
Figure  79 shows  the  movement  of  individuals  in  Step  4,  in  which  PERMITTED is  populated  from
PERMITTABLE and  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION,  and  NOT_DENIED from  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and DENIED.
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[4_not_denied: (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    noValue(?x rdf:type rbac:DENIED )
]
Text 41: Jena for rule 4_not_denied.
Figure 80: Rule 4_not_denied.
The first rule in Step 4, given in Figure 80, is called 4_not_denied. This rule populates NOT_DENIED as all
individuals in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE that are not in  DENIED. Mathematically,  NOT_DENIED is
defined as the set difference of USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and DENIED:
NOT_DENIED = USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE ─ DENIED
A  formal  description  of  the  matching  in  rule  in  4_not_denied is  below.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE instance  ?x is moved to  NOT_DENIED if  ?x is not in  DENIED.  This is
determined as follows:
i) ?d is a set of all instances ?y in DENIED, and
ii) ?x is not in ?d.
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∀y, ∀x, y  ∈ DENIED, x  ∈ USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE, x ≠ y
 ⇒ x  ∈ NOT_DENIED
Formula 8: Matching NOT_DENIED.
Mathematically, this can be represented as in Formula 8.
∀x, x  ∉ DENIED, x  ∈ USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
 ⇒ x  ∈ NOT_DENIED
Formula 9: Simplified matching NOT_DENIED.
Or, more simply, as in Formula 9.
The implementation of this negation formula is much simpler in Jena than in SWRL. Instead of using SQWRL,
Jena implements classical negation using the function noValue, which returns true if an RDF triple is not valid for any
individuals in a set. Unlike in SO-RBAC using SWRL, the negation test does not need  DENIED to have a dummy
individual.
Figure 80 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 41 above.
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[4_permitted: (?z rdf:type 
rbac:PERMITTED )
    <- 
    (?z rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
    (?z rbac:user ?u )
    (?z rbac:role ?r )
    (?s rbac:user ?u )
    (?s rbac:role ?r )
    (?s rdf:type 
rbac:ACTIVE_USER_SESSION )
]
Text 42: Jena for rule 4_permitted.
Figure 81: Rule 4_permitted.
The second rule in Step 4, given in  Figure 81, is  called  4_permitted.  This rule moves an individual in
PERMITTABLE to PERMITTED if the individual has a user that is also a user in an active user session, as given by an
individual in the class  ACTIVE_USER_SESSION. The difference between  PERMITTABLE and  PERMITTED is
that  PERMITTABLE represents  potential  permissions,  while  PERMITTED represents  actual  permissions,  as
determined by active user sessions.
A formal description of the matching in rule in 4_permitted is below. PERMITTABLE instance ?x is moved
to PERMITTED if:
i) ?x has rbac:user ?u, and
ii) ACTIVE_USER_SESSION user ?s has rbac:user ?u.
Figure 81 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 42 above.
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Figure 82: Diagram showing movement of individuals in Step 5 of reasoning only.
Figure  82 shows  the  movement  of  individuals  in  Step  5,  in  which  AUTHORIZED is  populated  from
PERMITTED and NOT_DENIED. AUTHORIZABLE is populated from PERMITTABLE and NOT_DENIED.
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[5_authorizable: (?x rdf:type rbac:AUTHORIZABLE )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
    (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
]
Text 43: Jena for rule 5_authorizable.
Figure 83: Rule 5_authorizable.
The first rule in Step 5, given in Figure 83, is called 5_authorizable. AUTHORIZABLE is defined as the
intersection  of  PERMITTABLE and  NOT_DENIED:  an  individual  is  in  AUTHORIZABLE if  it  is  in  both
PERMITTABLE and NOT_DENIED (Formula 10).
PERMITTABLE instance  ?x is moved to  AUTHORIZABLE if  ?x is also in  NOT_DENIED.  Note that this
means that the same actual instance ?x has to be in both PERMITTABLE and NOT_DENIED (not different instances
with the same object properties).
AUTHORIZABLE = PERMITTABLE ∩ NOT_DENIED
Formula 10: Definition of AUTHORIZABLE.
Figure 83 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 43 above.
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[5_authorized: (?x rdf:type rbac:AUTHORIZED )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:PERMITTED )
    (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
]
Text 44: Jena for rule 5_authorized.
Figure 84: Rule 5_authorized.
The second rule in Step 5, given in Figure 84, is called 5_authorized. This defines AUTHORIZED as the
intersection of PERMITTED and NOT_DENIED: an individual is in AUTHORIZED if it is in both PERMITTED and
NOT_DENIED.
PERMITTED instance ?x is moved to AUTHORIZABLE if ?x is also in NOT_DENIED.
AUTHORIZED = PERMITTED ∩ NOT_DENIED
Formula 11: Definition of AUTHORIZED.
Figure 84 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 44 above.
6.3 ESO-RBAC Process
Figure 85 (on page 150) shows a flowchart of the process in which ESO-RBAC is run. This is very similar to the
process for SO-RBAC.
Each potential role permission or denial to perform an action on an object is represented by an individual in the
ESO-RBAC  class  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.  The  process  moves  individuals  representing  role
permissions and denials to the class PRA_FULL (indicating a permission) or DRA_FULL (indicating a denial).
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Each potential user permission or denial to perform an action on an object is represented by an individual in the
SO-RBAC class USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE. The process moves individuals representing role permissions
and  denials  to  the  classes  PERMITTABLE or  PERMITTED (indicating  a  permission)  or  DENIED (indicating  a
denial). Finally, an individual representing a user permission that is not also a denial is moved to AUTHORIZABLE or
AUTHORIZED. All this is done according to rules in the ESO-RBAC process.
The first step, step A, is to set up the ontology class hierarchy. This includes setting up the data classes under
OBJECT_INSTANCE, to which the data that the ESO-RBAC model governs access, and the classes relevant to the
ESO-RBAC model  itself,  under RBAC class.  OBJECT_INSTANCE hierarchies  are always  domains specific,  but
RBAC sub-hierarchies are likely to remain the same across domains.
Step B populates the ontology with the base information. It  has two parts, B1 and B2, which can be run in
parallel. This is because they are independent of each other.
domain := "rbac";
domain_uri := "http://www.cgce.net/Ontology/RBAC";
class: = "ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE";
for each role
  for each action
    for each object_type
      id := "role_action_object_type"
      print "  <domain:class rdf:ID=\"id\">";
      print "    <domain:action rdf:resource=\"#action\"/>";
      print "    <domain:role rdf:resource=\"#role\"/>";
      print "    <domain:object_type rdf:resource=\"#$object_type\"/>";
      print "  </$domain:$class>";
    next
  next
next
class := "USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE";
for each action
  for each object_instance
    for each user
      id = user_action_object_instance";
      print "  <domain:class rdf:ID=\"id\">";
      print "    <domain:action rdf:resource=\"#action\"/>";
      print "    <domain:object_instance rdf:resource=\"#object_instance\"/>";
      print "    <domain:user rdf:resource=\"#user\"/>";
      print "  </domain:class>";
    next
  next
next
Text 45: Pseudocode for step C
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[inferred_subClassOf_1: (?c1 rdfs:inferred_subClassOf ?c2)
           <- 
           (?c1 rdfs:subClassOf ?c2)
]
[inferred_subClassOf_2: (?c1 rdfs:inferred_subClassOf ?c3)
           <- 
           (?c1 rdfs:subClassOf ?c2)
           (?c2 rdf_ext:inferred_subClassOf ?c3)
]
[inferred_type_1: (?i rdf_ext:inferred_type ?c)
           <- 
           (?i rdf:type ?c)
]
[inferred_type_2: (?i rdf_ext:inferred_type ?c)
           <- 
           (?c1 rdf_ext:inferred_subClassOf ?c)
           (?i rdf:type ?c1)
]
[1_senior_to_1: (?r rbac:senior_to ?r) 
    <- 
   (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
   (?r rbac:directly_senior_to ?r1)
]
[1_senior_to_2: (?r rbac:senior_to ?r) 
    <- 
   (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
   (?r1 rbac:directly_senior_to ?r)
]
[1_senior_to_4: (?r1 rbac:senior_to ?r3) 
    <- 
   (?r1 rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
   (?r1 rbac:directly_senior_to ?r2)
   (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r3)
]
[1_junior_to: (?r1 rbac:junior_to ?r2) 
           <- 
          (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
          (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r1)
]
[1_inherits_pra_1: (?r rbac:inherits_pra ?r)
    <- 
    (?r rdf:type rbac:ROLE_SET)
    notEqual(?r, rbac:ROLE)
]
[1_inherits_pra_3: (?r2 rbac:inherits_pra ?r3)
    <- 
     (?r1 rbac:senior_to ?r2)
     (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r3)
     (?r3 rbac:senior_to ?r4)
     (?r1 rbac:inherits_pra_path ?r4)
]
Code 59: Jena Rules for Step E.
In step B1, the classes OBJECT_TYPE and ROLE_SET (and thus creating the class hierarchy under ROLE),
representing the RBAC object types and roles, are populated. Note that unlike in SO-RBAC, users are not set up until
step H, due to the different way in which the relationship between users and roles is represented. In B2, the data classes
(sub-classes of  OBJECT_INSTANCE) are populated. In step C, the classes  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
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and  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE are populated, with all possible combinations of hypothetical  role and
user permission assignment. Due to the exponentially increasing number of combinations, this is most likely to be done
using a program or script, according to the pseudocode in Text 45.
In  step  D,  the  asserted  relationships  between  members  of  ROLE_SET (directly_senior_to,  is_a,
inherits_pra_path) are set up.
In step E, the Jena rules are run to infer the object properties that depend on the properties asserted in step D,
namely senior_to, included_in and inherits_pra, which are respectively dependent on directly_senior_to, is_a and
inherits_pra_path. The nine Jena rules are described in Section 6.2.3.1, and are summarised in Code 59.
In step F, the PRA and DRA classes are populated to set up role permissions and denials, because the individuals
in these classes are base information for reasoning in the RBAC model. This can be done after step E because the
information about role permissions and denials is not needed for inferring relationships between roles.
[2_dra_full: (?z rdf:type rbac:DRA_FULL )
    <- 
    (?z rdf:type rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    (?z rbac:role ?r2 )
    (?z rbac:action ?a )
    (?z rbac:object_type ?o )
    (?r1 rbac:senior_to ?r2 )
    (?x rdf:type rbac:DRA )
    (?x rbac:role ?r1 )
    (?x rbac:action ?a )
    (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
]
[2_pra_full: (?z rdf:type rbac:PRA_FULL )
    <- 
    (?z rdf:type rbac:ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    (?z rbac:role ?r2)
    (?z rbac:action ?a )
    (?z rbac:object_type ?o )
    (?r2 rbac:senior_to ?r1 )
    (?r2 rbac:inherits_pra ?r1)
    (?x rdf:type rbac:PRA )
    (?x rbac:role ?r1 )
    (?x rbac:action ?a )
    (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
]
Code 60: Jena Rules for Step G.
In Step G, we populate the PRA_FULL and DRA_FULL classes with individuals through inference by running
the following two Jena rules in Code 60 (cf. Section 6.2.3.2).
In  step  H,  the  user-role  relationships  are  set  up,  i.e.  ROLE sub-classes  are  populated  with  individuals
representing users. Again, this is essential information needed for reasoning in the RBAC model, but it is not needed for
inferring either relationships between roles or assignment of permissions or denials to roles.
Finally, in step J, the remaining reasoning steps (3–5) are performed. We run 6 Jena rules ( Code 61, page 149)
which ultimately populated DENIED or AUTHORIZED classes (cf. Section 6.2.3.2).
At each stage in  Figure 85, the ESO-RBAC ontology is in a state  where the process  can be run from the
following  step  onwards.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  necessary  to  always  re-run  the  ESO-RBAC  process  from  the
beginning.
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[3_permittable: (?z rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
           <- 
           (?z rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:PRA_FULL )
           (?x rbac:role ?r )
           (?x rbac:action ?a )
           (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
           (?z rbac:user ?u )
           (?z rbac:role ?r )
           (?z rbac:action ?a )
           (?z rbac:object_instance ?oi )
           (?oi rdf:type ?o )
           (?u rdf_ext:inferred_type ?r )
]
[3_denied: (?z rdf:type rbac:DENIED )
           <- 
           (?z rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:DRA_FULL )
           (?x rbac:role ?r )
           (?x rbac:action ?a )
           (?x rbac:object_type ?o )
           (?z rbac:user ?u )
           (?z rbac:role ?r )
           (?z rbac:action ?a )
           (?z rbac:object_instance ?oi )
           (?oi rdf:type ?o )
           (?u rdf_ext:inferred_type ?r )
]
[4_not_denied: (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    noValue(?x rdf:type rbac:DENIED )
]
[4_permitted: (?z rdf:type rbac:PERMITTED )
    <- 
    (?z rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
    (?z rbac:user ?u )
    (?z rbac:role ?r )
    (?s rbac:user ?u )
    (?s rbac:role ?r )
    (?s rdf:type rbac:ACTIVE_USER_SESSION )
]
[5_authorizable: (?x rdf:type rbac:AUTHORIZABLE )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
    (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
]
[5_authorized: (?x rdf:type rbac:AUTHORIZED )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:PERMITTED )
    (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
]
Code 61: Jena Rules for Step J.
150
Figure 85: RBAC process using the ESO-RBAC ontology.
6.4 Modelling Dynamic RBAC in ESO-RBAC
Dynamic RBAC was also modelled according to the Strembeck & Neumann [21] model, and an example context
constraint was created and tested.
Table 18: Fact definition used in dynamic RBAC design in Prolog.
Fact Formula Description
associated_cc(Role, Permission, 
Object, ContextConstraint).
The context condition ContextConstraint applies when a 
user with role Role accesses object Object using Permission.
Table 19: Rules in Prolog dynamic RBAC design.
Rule Name Description
applied_cc Whether a context constraint applies to a user performing an action.
fail_context_constraint Whether an action fails a context constraint, considering its applicability.
violated Whether an action would fail a context constraint, irrespective of its applicability.
context_condition Defines the circumstances in which a user can perform an action on an object.
To recap, dynamic RBAC in predicate logic is based on the Prolog facts in Table 18, and the rules in Table 19.
Note that Separation of Duties was not implemented here.
Dynamic  RBAC  in  ESO-RBAC  uses  Jena  rules  context_constraint_applied,
context_condition_pass_1 and  context_condition_pass_2.  Dynamic RBAC requires the following
new classes in the ESO-RBAC ontology:
• CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT directly under RBAC.
• CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS, CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL and CONTEXT_CONDITION
under  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.  CONTEXT_CONDITION is  a  sub-class  of  CONTEXT_
CONDITION_POTENTIAL.  These  have  properties  user,  action,  object and  context_constraint;
context_constraint has CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT as its range.
• CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE,  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED and
CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED,  under  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.  CONTEXT_
CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED and  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED are  sub-classes  of
CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE.
It  should be noted that  context  conditions apply to combinations of  <user,  action, object>,  while context
constraints apply to combinations of <role, action, object>.
A context constraint is represented as follows:
• An individual in the class  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT, given the canonical name of the context constraint,
but with no other information about it.
• Individuals in the class  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE representing all possible combinations
of  context  constraint,  role,  action and object.  This  may be populated  using a script.  Some individuals  in
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CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE are  also  members  of  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_
ASSOCIATED, which is equivalent to the associated_cc facts in the Prolog implementation.
• Individuals in the class  CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL representing all possible combinations of
context constraint, user, (role), action and object. This may also be populated using a script.
• One or more Jena rules defining the applicability of the context constraint.
[context_constraint_applied: (?x rdf:type 
rbac:CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED)
           <- 
            (?cc rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT)
            (?y rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED)
            (?y rbac:context_constraint ?cc)
            (?y rbac:role ?r3)
            (?y rbac:action ?a)
            (?y rbac:object ?o)
            (?r3 rbac:senior_to ?r2)
            (?r1 rdf_ext:inferred_subClassOf ?r2)
            (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE)
            (?x rbac:role ?r1)
            (?x rbac:action ?a)
            (?x rbac:object ?o)
            (?x rbac:context_constraint ?cc)
]
Text 46: Jena rule for context_constraint_applied.
Figure 86: Rule context_constraint_applied.
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The  Jena  rule  context_constraint_applied,  given  in  Figure  86,  is  analogous  to  the  Prolog  rule
applied_cc. It determines whether a context constraint is applicable to a particular combination of role, action and
object,  depending  on  membership  of  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED and  seniority  and  inclusion
relationships among roles. As in the Prolog implementation, context constraints filter down the seniority hierarchy. Thus
if  a  <role,  action,  object> combination  is  explicitly  associated  with  a  context  constraint,  via  an  individual  in
CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED,  then any  <role, action, object> combinations for this role and any
roles junior to and/or inside it  have the context constraint applied to it.  all  individuals linking these  <role, action,
object> with the context constraint are moved to CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED.
CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE individual  ?x is  moved  to  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_
APPLIED if:
1. ?x has role ?r1;
2. ?r1 is an inferred sub-class of ?r2, and ?r3 is senior to ?r2;
3. CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED individual ?y has role ?r3, and
4. ?x and ?y both have action ?a, object ?o and CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT individual ?cc.
Figure 86 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 46 above.
Jena  rules  context_condition_pass_1 and context_condition_pass_2 determine  whether  a
<user,  action,  object> combination  passes  a  particular  context  constraint,  either  because  it  passes  any  context
condition  (context_condition_pass_1)  or  because  no  context  condition  applies  to  it
(context_condition_pass_2).
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[context_condition_pass_1: (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS)
           <- 
            (?y rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION)
            (?y rbac:user ?u)
            (?y rbac:action ?a)
            (?y cgce:object ?o)
            (?x rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE)
            (?x rbac:user ?u)
            (?x rbac:action ?a)
            (?x cgce:object ?o)
]
Text 47: Jena for rule context_condition_pass_1.
Figure 87: Rule context_condition_pass_1.
context_condition_pass_1,  given  in  Figure  87,  moves  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
individual ?x to CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS if ?x has the same values for rbac:user, rbac:action and object as
a  CONTEXT_CONDITION individual  ?y.  Note  that  ?y also  has  a  context_constraint property,  but
context_condition_pass_1 is not concerned about the value of this: it only needs to know that  ?y exists, not what
context constraints it is linked to.
Figure 87 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 47 above.
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[context_condition_pass_2: (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS)
           <- 
            (?y rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE)
            (?y rbac:action ?a)
            (?y rbac:object ?o)
            (?y rbac:role ?r)
            noValue(?y rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED )
            (?x rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE)
            (?x rbac:user ?u)
            (?x rbac:action ?a)
            (?x cgce:object ?oi)
            (?u rdf:type ?r)
            (?oi rdf:type ?o )
]
Text 48: Jena for rule context_condition_pass_2.
Figure 88: Rule context_condition_pass_2.
context_condition_pass_2,  given  in  Figure  88,  moves  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE
individual  ?x to  CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS if  there  is  no  individual  in  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_
APPLIED with the same user, action and object properties as ?x. The rule uses the noValue function to check all
individuals  in  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE and  determine  that  none  of  them are  in  CONTEXT_
CONSTRAINT_APPLIED. An individual would have been moved into  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED by
the rule context_constraint_applied.
Figure 88 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 48 above.
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Individuals  are  moved  into  CONTEXT_CONDITION by  the  Jena  rules  relating  to  the  specific  context
constraints.
The following is an example of a context constraint, nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient, which tests whether a
nurse is attached to the same ward that a particular patient is in. This context constraint is associated with the role
SENIOR_NURSE, for actions read and write on individuals in the class PATIENT. That is, the <role, action, object>
combinations  associated  with  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient are  <SENIOR_NURSE, read, PATIENT> and
<SENIOR_NURSE, write, PATIENT>. In other words, a nurse in role SENIOR_NURSE or junior to this can only
read and write information about patient in a ward to which he or she is attached. This context constraint is defined as
follows:
• Individuals  in  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_  APPLICABLE are  defined  to  represent  all  possible  <role,
action, object> combinations in the ontology for the context constraint nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient.
The  two  individuals  representing  the  combinations  <SENIOR_NURSE,  read,  PATIENT> and
<SENIOR_NURSE, write, PATIENT> are moved to CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_ASSOCIATED.
• Individuals in  CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL are defined representing all possible <user, action,
object> combinations for the context constraint nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient.
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[nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient: (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION)
           <- 
            (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL)
            (?x rbac:context_constraint cgce:nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient)
            (?x rbac:user ?nurse)
            (?x cgce:object ?patient)
            (?patient rdf:type cgce:PATIENT)
            (?nurse cgce:nurse_ward ?ward)
            (?patient cgce:patient_ward ?ward)
]
Text 49: Jena for rule nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient.
Figure 89: Rule nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient.
The  Jena  rule  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient defines  the  context  condition  test  for  the  context
constraint nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient.
The  rule  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient moves  CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL
individual ?x to CONTEXT_CONDITION if:
• ?x has is linked to the nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient context constraint, i.e., ?x has context_constraint
property nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient;
• ?x has user ?nurse and object ?patient;
• ?nurse is linked to individual ?ward via property nurse_ward, and
• ?patient is linked to the same individual ?ward via property patient_ward.
Figure 89 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 49 above.
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When the context constraint nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient is run, the following needs to happen:
1. context_constraint_applied is  run,  moving  all  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE
individuals  for  the  context  constraint  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient,  representing  roles
SENIOR_NURSE and  junior  roles  to  read  and  write  to  objects  in  the  PATIENT class,  to
CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLIED.
2. The  rule  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient is  run,  moving  all  individuals  in
CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL for  the  context  constraint  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient,
individuals representing users in roles SENIOR_NURSE and junior roles to read and write to objects in the
PATIENT class to CONTEXT_CONDITION.
3. The rule context_condition_pass_1 is run, moving all CONTEXT_CONDITION individuals for the
context constraint nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient to CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS.
4. The rule  context_condition_pass_2 is  run,  moving all  CONTEXT_CONDITION individuals  for
which  the  context  constraint  nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient does  not apply  to  CONTEXT_
CONDITION_PASS.
In ESO-RBAC, a context condition rule always applies to an individual ?x in class CONTEXT_CONDITION_
POTENTIAL, and runs a test to determine whether to move ?x to the class  CONTEXT_CONDITION, based on ?x
having as its  context_constraint property the individual in the class  CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT that specifies this
context constraint.
Finally, the Jena  rules  authorizable and  authorized are  modified so that  an individual  must  be in
CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS to be in the  AUTHORIZABLE and  AUTHORIZED classes.  The condition  (?x
rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS) is added to both rules.
The  new  5_authorizable,  given  in  Figure  90,  defines  AUTHORIZABLE as  the  intersection  of
PERMITTABLE,  NOT_DENIED and  CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS:  an  individual  is  moved  to
AUTHORIZABLE if  it  is  in  all  three  of  PERMITTABLE,  NOT_DENIED and  CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS
(Formula 12).
PERMITTABLE individual  ?x is  moved  to  AUTHORIZABLE if  ?x is  also  in  NOT_DENIED and  in
CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS. Note that this means that the same actual individual  ?x has to be in all three of
PERMITTABLE,  NOT_DENIED and  CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS (not  different  individual  with  the  same
object properties).
AUTHORIZABLE = PERMITTABLE ∩ NOT_DENIED
∩  CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS
Formula 12: Definition of AUTHORIZABLE.
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Figure 90 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 50 below.
[5_authorizable: (?x rdf:type rbac:AUTHORIZABLE )
           <-
           (?x rdf:type rbac:PERMITTABLE )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS )
]
Text 50: Jena for new rule 5_authorizable.
Figure 90: New rule 5_authorizable.
The new  5_authorized, given in  Figure 91, defines  AUTHORIZED as the intersection of  PERMITTED,
NOT_DENIED and CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS: an individual is moved to AUTHORIZED if it is in all three of
PERMITTED, NOT_DENIED and CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS (Formula 13).
PERMITTED instance ?x is moved to AUTHORIZABLE if ?x is also in NOT_DENIED.
AUTHORIZED = PERMITTED ∩ NOT_DENIED ∩
CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS
Formula 13: Definition of AUTHORIZED.
Figure 91 is converted into Jena syntax in Text 51 below.
[5_authorized: (?x rdf:type rbac:AUTHORIZED )
           <-
           (?x rdf:type rbac:PERMITTED )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
           (?x rdf:type rbac:CONTEXT_CONDITION_PASS )
]
Text 51: Jena for new rule 5_authorized.
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Figure 91: New rule 5_authorized.
Because the context condition rules do not depend on any of the classes populated in steps 2–4, they can be run
at any point after step 1 and before step 5.
6.5 Contrasting ESO-RBAC with SO-RBAC and with Prolog
Due to differences between Jena and SWRL, some rules in Steps 1 and 4 were implemented differently in ESO-
RBAC from in SO-RBAC.
The main advantage of Jena over SWRL in implementing ESO-RBAC is its ability to treat classes as individuals.
However, it has certain flaws. Unlike SWRL, it cannot work on inferred axioms. This means that it cannot identify an
individual as belonging to a sub-class of a class, and nor can it see relationships defined for sub-properties. Therefore,
certain properties have to be defined explicitly in ESO-RBAC, so that it can be run in Jena, when it is unnecessary to do
so for running in SWRL.
Thus,  ESO-RBAC does  not  have  the  is_a property for  roles,  as  this  is  represented  by sub-classing roles.
Additionally, although Jena cannot natively infer recursive sub-class or super-class relationships, additional rules have
been defined in ESO-RBAC to handle this. Therefore, included_in is also not used.
Most Jena rules in ESO-RBAC are direct transformations of the SWRL rules in SO-RBAC. The major difference
is  in  the  properties  that  link  the  individuals,  and  that  ?r is  a  class,  queried  as  an  individual.  The  antecedent  of
1_included_in_1, instead of requiring ?r to a member of class ROLE, requires it to be a member of ROLE_SET.
Note  that  the  RDF property  rdf:type defines  an  individual  as  a  member  of  a  class.  The syntax  ?r rdf:type
rbac:ROLE_SET in Jena is equivalent to  rbac:ROLE_SET(?r) in SWRL.  1_included_in_1 has an additional
condition, notEqual(?r, rbac:ROLE). ROLE is the top level of the hierarchy of classes representing roles. It is
placed  in  the  meta-class  ROLE_SET so  that  any  classes  added  immediately  below  ROLE are  also  added  to
ROLE_SET. However, this means that  ROLE itself would be treated as a role by Jena. To prevent this, the class
ROLE must be explicitly excluded from the reasoning process.
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In the recursive rule 1_included_in_3, the is_a condition is replaced by determining whether ?r1 is a sub-
class of ?r2. This is done using the RDF property rdfs:subClassOf.
Jena  also  does  not  populate  inferences  based  on  inverse  relationships.  Therefore,  an  additional  rule
1_junior_to is defined in Step 1 to assert junior_to axioms as inverses of corresponding senior_to axiom.
The  other  difference  is  in  Step  4,  with  the  rule  to  populate  NOT_DENIED.  Jena  does  not  use  SQWRL
properties, but has different syntax for achieving classical negation, namely the built-in function noValue. The rule is
thus as given in Text 52.
Therefore, Jena rule 4_not_denied is, in terms of syntax, similar to an equivalent rule in Prolog, rather than
to the equivalent SWRL rule. Unlike in SO-RBAC using SWRL, the class DENIED does not need a dummy individual.
Table 20 shows the correspondences between Prolog functions and ESO-RBAC classes and properties.
Table 20: Correspondences between Prolog functions and ESO-RBAC classes and properties.
Prolog ESO-RBAC Comments
login_session(SessionID,User,IP,Start_
Date,End_Date,Authentication_Strength,
LocationType,Computer,IP,OSLogin).
USER_SESSION
user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,
DOB).
PERSON, USER
ura(User,Role). (assignment of instance of 
USER to ROLE)
d_s(Senior_role,Junior_role). senior_to junior_to is 
inverse property. 
Transitive.
is_a(Inner_Role,Outer_Role). (assignment of Inner_Role 
as a subclass of 
Outer_Role)
pra(Role,Action,Object). PRA
dra(Role,Action,Object). DRA
associated_cc(Role,Permission,Object,
ContextConstraint).
ASSOCIATED_CC
6.6 Implementing ESO-RBAC based on a hospital environment
The ESO-RBAC implementation is  illustrated  through a scenario  with roles,  permissions,  denials,  seniority
relationships, inclusion relationships and inheritance paths.
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[4_not_denied: (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
    <-
    (?x rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
    noValue(?x rdf:type rbac:DENIED )
]
Text 52: Jena rule for populating NOT_DENIED.
• ADMIN, CLERK, MANAGER
• DOCTOR, SPECIALIST_DOCTOR, CONSULTANT, JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR, JUNIOR_STAFF_
DOCTOR_DAY, JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_NIGHT, SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR, SENIOR_
STAFF_DOCTOR_DAY, SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_NIGHT
• TECHNICIAN, JUNIOR_TECHNICIAN, SENIOR_TECHNICIAN
• NURSE, SENIOR_NURSE, SPECIALIST_NURSE, STAFF_NURSE, STAFF_NURSE_DAY, 
STAFF_NURSE_NIGHT, STUDENT_NURSE, STUDENT_NURSE_DAY, 
STUDENT_NURSE_NIGHT
Text 53: Sub-classes of ROLE defined as individuals in class ROLE_SET in the ESO-RBAC model.
Text 53 lists the classes (sub-classes of ROLE) were defined as individuals in class  ROLE_SET, reflecting a
simplified hospital scenario.
• PRA: junior_staff_doctor_read_patient, junior_staff_doctor_read_room, junior_staff_doctor_read_
vital_sign, junior_staff_doctor_read_ward, senior_staff_doctor_write_patient, senior_staff_doctor_
write_room, senior_staff_doctor_write_vital_sign, consultant_write_vital_sign, consultant_read_
computer, specialist_doctor_write_computer, student_nurse_read_patient, staff_nurse_read_room, 
staff_nurse_read_ward, staff_nurse_write_patient, senior_nurse_read_vital_sign, senior_nurse_
write_ward, specialist_nurse_read_computer, specialist_nurse_write_room, specialist_nurse_write_
vital_sign, specialist_nurse_write_computer
• DRA: consultant_read_room, consultant_write_ward, senior_nurse_read_ward, senior_staff_doctor_
read_computer, staff_nurse_write_patient
Text 54 Individuals representing permission and denial assertions in the ESO-RBAC model.
Text 54 lists the individuals representing permission and denial assertions in the ESO-RBAC model.
1. DOCTOR: JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR → SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR → CONSULTANT → 
SPECIALIST_DOCTOR
2. NURSE: STUDENT_NURSE → STAFF_NURSE → SENIOR_NURSE → SPECIALIST_NURSE
3. TECHNICIAN: JUNIOR_TECHNICIAN → SENIOR_TECHNICIAN
4. ADMIN: CLERK → MANAGER
5. JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR: JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_DAY, JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_NIGHT
6. SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR: SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_DAY, 
SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_NIGHT
7. STUDENT_NURSE: STUDENT_NURSE_DAY, STUDENT_NURSE_NIGHT
8. STAFF_NURSE: STAFF_NURSE_DAY, STAFF_NURSE_NIGHT
Text 55: Seniority relationships in the ESO-RBAC model.
Text 55 shows the role hierarchies indicated by the seniority relationships defined using directly_senior_to axioms.
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1. inherits_pra_path(SPECIALIST_DOCTOR, JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR)
2. inherits_pra_path(SPECIALIST_NURSE, STUDENT_NURSE)
Text 56:  Path inheritance axioms in the ESO-RBAC model.
Text 56 shows the path inheritance axioms defined in the ESO-RBAC model.
Figure 92: RBAC Model used to demonstrate SO-RBAC, excluding night and day duties.  Solid (black) lines represent 
seniority (d_s) relationships. Dashed (purple) lines represent is_a relationships. Arrows show direction of inheritance
of positive authorizations (permissions).
Figure 92 shows the full RBAC hierarchy.
Table 21: Numbers of users in each role defined in the ESO-RBAC ontologies.
Role Small Large
CLERK 1 2
MANAGER 1 1
JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR 3 4
SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR 3 4
CONSULTANT 1 2
SPECIALIST_DOCTOR 1 1
STUDENT_NURSE 3 4
STAFF_NURSE 3 4
SENIOR_NURSE 1 2
SPECIALIST_NURSE 1 1
JUNIOR_TECHNICIAN 1 2
SENIOR_TECHNICIAN 1 1
One or more USER individuals for each ROLE was created (Table 21), except for the roles ADMIN, DOCTOR,
TECHNICIAN and NURSE, as these are intended as abstract super-class roles to allow permissions to be defined for a
particular type of user generically.
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User individuals are named simply as <role>_<n>, where <n> is a number. The roles with day and night sub-
roles defined each had 3 or 4 users defined, named for the main role. For example, junior_staff_doctor_1 was assigned
directly  to  JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR;  junior_staff_doctor_2 to  JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_DAY,  and
junior_staff_doctor_3 to JUNIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_NIGHT. No personalized data were defined for any of these
users, because they are not relevant in this static RBAC model.
The users were linked to roles by assignment of the user individuals as members of the relevant  ROLE sub-
classes.
Instances were created for object types (classes) COMPUTER, PATIENT, ROOM, VITAL_SIGN and WARD.
One instance of each type was created for the small scenario, and three of each type for the large scenario. The instances
were named <object_name>_n, e.g. patient_1.
6.7 Results of Implementation
The ontological model was implemented using the Protégé Ontology Editor, using the Protégé-OWL plugin. The
Pellet Reasoner Inspector was used to test the consistency of the ontology’s classes, properties and instances.
The  classes  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE were
populated with individuals representing all possible permutations of roles, users and permissions using a Perl script,
which also added to PRA and DRA the individuals listed above.
There is no plug-in for Jena in Protégé. Therefore, Jena rules were defined in plain text files, to be run on the
command line using a Jena engine in Java, and running it. The rules for each step were defined in a separate Jena file. A
Unix shell script was written to execute all 5 steps in turn. The resulting OWL files (one for each stage) were then
examined in Protégé, and OWL n-triple files were created from them, to check that they ran correctly. The results of the
examination of the n-triple files are presented. The same models were run in ESO-RBAC as in SO-RBAC.
The numbers of triples of affected classes and properties at each stage were determined by exporting the OWL
files as  n-triple files, and analyzing these using the Unix shell tool  grep. Jena produces no reports of numbers of
classes, individuals and axioms, so these are not provided.
Table 22: Numbers of rules run and triples obtained by Jena for each 
ontology.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5
Jena rules exported to Jess 8 2 2 2 2
Unique triples created (small 
ontology)
126 62 131 166 98
Unique triples created (large 
ontology)
126 62 423 477 306
 
Table 23: Numbers of triples at 
stage 1.
Property Small Large
senior_to 26 26
junior_to 26 26
included_in 62 62
inherits_pra 49 49
Total 163 163
Table 22 shows the numbers of rules run and triples created by Jena in each step for each ontology. Note that
ESO-RBAC has one more rule than SO-RBAC in Step 1 (1_junior_to, described in Section 6.2.3.1, page 127).
The same numbers of triples were found for both ontologies, because Step 1 only operates on roles, and both
have the same roles (Table 23). Unlike in SO-RBAC, a rule for inferring junior_to axioms (as the reverse of senior_to
164
axioms)  in  rule  was  defined  (1_junior_to,  described  in  Section  6.2.3.1,  page  127),  because  Jena  does  not
automatically  create  corresponding  axioms  for  inverse  properties.  The  numbers  of  included_in and  inherits_pra
individuals were slightly larger than in SO-RBAC due to differences in the model used (the model used for ESO-RBAC
implemented the DAY_DUTY and NIGHT_DUTY roles, whereas the SO-RBAC model did not).
Table 24: Numbers of triples at stage 2.
Class Small Large
PRA_FULL 49 49
DRA_FULL 13 13
Total 62 62
 
Table 25: Numbers of triples at stage 3.
Class Small Large
PERMITTABLE 95 300
DENIED 36 123
Total 131 423
At Stage 2, the same triples were found in ESO-RBAC as in SO-RBAC (Table 24).
At Stage 3, the numbers of individuals in DENIED are one less than in SO-RBAC, due to the lack of the dummy
individual used in SO-RBAC (Table 25).
Table 26: Numbers of triples in stage 4.
Class Small Large
NOT_DENIED 144 477
PERMITTED 22 66
Total 166 543
 
Table 27: Numbers of triples in stage 5.
Class Small Large
AUTHORIZABLE 79 249
AUTHORIZED 19 57
Total 98 306
At Stage 4, the same triples were found in ESO-RBAC as in SO-RBAC (Table 26).
At Stage 5, the  AUTHORIZABLE and  AUTHORIZED classes were populated (Table 27). The same triples
were found in ESO-RBAC as in SO-RBAC.
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6.8 Results of ESO-RBAC Process in Protégé
This section displays screen shots captured using the Protégé OWLViz tab [117] at various stages of reasoning
(Figs. 94–114). All screen shots are taken from the small ontology.
6.8.1 Classes and Individuals
6.8.1.1 General
Figure 93: The ROLE_SET meta-class.
Figure 93 shows the ROLE_SET meta-class. Meta-classes are represented differently in Protégé from normal
classes (using the set of three small dots ( ) rather than the large dot ( )). The asserted instances of ROLE_SET are
the classes under ROLE, these show up as classes rather than as individuals in the Asserted tab. It can be seen from the
figure that ROLE_SET is a member of rbac:Class, which is a member directly of owl:Class as well as of RBAC.
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Figure 94: The OBJECT_INSTANCE hierarchy in our example.
Figure 94 shows the  OBJECT_INSTANCE hierarchy in ESO-RBAC. The main difference between this and the
equivalent  in  SO-RBAC is  that  here  there  is  no  object_instance property,  because  this  is  represented  by  class
membership. (Likewise, there is no OBJECT_TYPE class).
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Figure 95: The owl:Class meta-class.
 Figure 95 shows the owl:Class meta-class, which contains all classes other than those in ROLE_SET.
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Figure 96: The USER class.
USER, as shown in Figure 96, is now the super-class of ROLE, and USER instances are defined as members of
the ROLE classes.
Figure 97: The USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE class.
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is similar to that in SO-RBAC. However, as shown in Figure 97, the
range of rbac:ROLE is now a class (an instance of ROLE_SET) rather than an individual.
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Figure 98: The ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE class.
ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE is, again, similar to that in SO-RBAC (Figure 98). The object_type and
role properties have classes as their ranges. The range of object_type is owl:Class; note that as ROLE_SET is a sub-
class of this, role classes can also appear as the range of object_type.
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6.8.1.2 Initialization
Figure 99: Role SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR before Step 1 is run.
Figure 99 shows a ROLE class definition in ESO-RBAC. The screenshot is of the role class definition, rather
than that of the canonical individual (which does not exist in ESO-RBAC). (It is also possible to look at a ROLE class
as an individual in the meta-class ROLE_SET). All the properties used in roles in SO-RBAC are here, apart from is_a,
which is represented by super-classing.
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6.8.2 Reasoning
6.8.2.1 Stage 1
Figure 100: Role SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR after Step 1 is run.
Figure  100 shows  the  role  SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR after  Step  1  is  run.  included_in is  now  fully
populated, by SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR being a sub-class of DOCTOR.
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Figure 101: Role SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_DAY after Step 1 is run.
Figure 101 shows the role SENIOR_STAFF_DOCTOR_DAY after Step 1 is run.
Figure 102: DRA individuals at Stage 1.
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Figure 102 shows DRA at Stage 1, containing the individuals with which it is initialized. This is similar to the
DRA of  SO-RBAC  (Figure  52,  page  111).  However,  the  figure  shows  that  for  the  highlighted  individual,
CONSULTANT_write_WARD (as for all individuals in the class  DRA),  the individuals linked to it  via properties
rbac:object_type and rbac:role are classes, not plain individuals.
Figure 103: DRA_FULL at Stage 1.
Figure 103 shows DRA_FULL at Stage 1. This class is empty because it has not yet been populated in Step 2.
Figure 104: PRA individuals at Stage 1.
Figure 104 shows PRA at Stage 1, containing the individuals with which it is initialized.
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Figure 105: PRA_FULL at Stage 1. This class is empty because it has not yet been populated in Step 2.
Figure 105 shows DRA_FULL at Stage 1. This class is empty because it has not yet been populated in Step 2.
Figure 106: DENIED at Stage 2.
Figure 106 shows DENIED at Stage 2. This does not have the dummy individual that is needed in SO-RBAC
(Figure 45, page 107).
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6.8.2.2 Stage 2
Figure  107 shows  DRA_FULL after  it  has  been  populated  in  Step  2.  The  individual  JUNIOR_STAFF_
DOCTOR_read_COMPUTER is  highlighted.  This  individual  is  in  DRA_FULL,  but  not  in  DRA,  because  it
represents an inferred role-denial assignment.
Figure 108: PRA_FULL at Stage 2, having been populated in Step 2.
Figure 108 shows PRA_FULL after Step 2 has run. This class is analogous to DRA_FULL.
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Figure 107: DRA_FULL at Stage 2, having been populated in Step 2.
6.8.2.3 Stage 3
Figure 109 shows  DENIED after Step 3 has populated it  from  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and
DRA_FULL. Thus the individual highlighted also belongs to USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE.
Figure 110 shows PERMITTABLE after Step 3 has run. Step 3 has populated it from USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE and PRA _FULL. Note that no individual is highlighted in this screenshot.
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Figure 109: DENIED at Stage 3.
Figure 110: PERMITTABLE at Stage 3.
6.8.2.4 Stage 4
Figure 111: NOT_DENIED at Stage 4.
Figure 111 shows the results of populating NOT_DENIED in Step 4. Although each individual’s membership of
this class is defined many times due to the way the populating rule runs (as discussed earlier) each individual still
appears only once in the Protégé window.
Figure 112: PERMITTED at Stage 4.
Figure  112 shows  the  results  of  populating  PERMITTED in  Step  4.  As  well  as  being  a  member  of
PERMITTABLE and USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE (as is necessary for membership of PERMITTED), the
highlighted  individual  also  belongs  to  NOT_DENIED.  At  Stage  4,  every  individual  in  USER_PERMISSION_
ASSIGNABLE, PERMITTABLE and PERMITTED will belong to either DENIED or NOT_DENIED.
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6.8.2.5 Stage 5
Figure 113: AUTHORIZABLE at Stage 5.
Figure 113 shows  AUTHORIZABLE after  Step 5.  All  individuals belonging to  AUTHORIZABLE must  by
definition  belong  to  the  other  three  types  listed  for  this  individual  (PERMITTABLE,
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and NOT_DENIED).
Figure 114: AUTHORIZED at Stage 5.
Figure 114 shows AUTHORIZED after Step 5. Again, any individual in AUTHORIZED must also be a member
of AUTHORIZABLE, PERMITTABLE, USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and NOT_DENIED.
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6.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have created and tested ESO-RBAC, which builds on SO-RBAC to create a purely ontological
context-aware RBAC model written in OWL-Full. The reasoning is performed using Jena, since SWRL and Protégé
cannot reason on OWL-Full ontologies.
We have proved that it is feasible to move towards semantic modelling of access control in terms of using rules
which control permissions dynamically and take into account context-awareness of software applications which reside
in pervasive computational spaces. However, ESO-RBAC has still not managed to fully address access control that
assigns permissions according to situations created by pervasiveness of environments and computational spaces where
applications and their data reside.
As ESO-RBAC is written in OWL, it has the same issues for negation and axiom reasoning as SO-RBAC, as
described in Section 5.8. That is, negation has to be simulated, and each potential axiom needs to be explicitly defined
as an individual. This means that reasoning is, as with SO-RBAC, a time-consuming process in ESO-RBAC.
However, because ESO-RBAC uses  OWL-Full,  and so is  able to  use the OWL class  hierarchy in defining
hierarchies of roles in an object-oriented fashion, by exploiting the class-individual duality of OWL-Full. That is, roles
are defined as OWL classes. A role is defined as a ‘type of’ another role by sub-classing. A user is defined as being in a
role by the  USER individual being a member of the  ROLE class.  This approach contrasts ESO-RBAC with both
predicate logic and SO-RBAC, and provides the major benefit of implementing RBAC in the Semantic Web, which is
that hierarchies are defined natively in OWL.
However, Jena cannot work on inferred axioms, so it cannot identify an individual as belonging to a sub-class of
a class, and nor can it see relationships defined for sub-properties. This means that in ESO-RBAC certain additional
properties had to be defined to create instances  that  represent properties that  are supposed to be inferred, such as
recursive sub-classing. This is a flaw in the reasoner, rather than in OWL-Full itself, and a properly constituted OWL-
Full reasoner would not have this problem.
Test results indicate that ESO-RBAC was successful in building a purely ontological dynamic RBAC model both
the  static  and  dynamic  components  of  the  model  produced  results  that  were  consistent  with  the  model  based  on
predicate logic and with SO-RBAC (for the static component, as no dynamic rules were implemented in SO-RBAC). It
is hoped that reasoning tools will be developed for OWL-Full that allow ESO-RBAC to be run without the workarounds
that were found to be necessary in this testing. Beyond this, further work will be to develop the dynamic RBAC features
in the ESO-RBAC model, for instance to introduce a context constraint hierarchy (using the OWL class hierarchy, as
with roles), and to use heuristic rules to generate new context constraints dynamically. These are further discussed in
Section 7.2.3.
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Research
Predicate logic is useful for modelling access control to data, using logical rules based on a set of facts, and has
been used to describe various access control models including Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). In this research,
predicate logic is used throughout this research as the basis for implementing an RBAC model, based on the work of
Barker & Stuckey [18] and Strembeck & Neumann  [20][21], in Prolog, in a relational database management system
(RDBMS) and in ontologies.
The RBAC model has the following RBAC features discussed by Barker & Stuckey [18]. Static RBAC governs
access to data based only on the type of data (e.g. all data about patients, or about rooms in a hospital).
• User-Role Assignment, Role-Permission Assignment: This is the basic concept of RBAC, in which users are
assigned to roles,  and roles are assigned to permissions. In  this way, the access that a user has to data is
determined by the roles to which the user is assigned. Users are not assigned permissions directly.
• Role-Denial Assignment: This is the opposite of Role-Permission Assignment: roles are specifically denied
access to data. Denials override permissions, so if a user is both permitted and denied access to data through
different role assignments, then the user cannot access the object.
• Seniority: Roles are related to each other through a seniority hierarchy, and inherit permissions and denials
depending on their position in the hierarchy. Permissions are inherited up the seniority hierarchy, while denials
are inherited down it.
• Role inclusion: This is also a hierarchy of roles, but is separate from the seniority hierarchy. It defines a role as
being a type of another role; for example, defining a 'junior doctor' as a type of 'doctor'. Unlike in the seniority
hierarchy, permissions and denials are both inherited in the same direction in the inclusion hierarchy, towards
included roles.
• Path inheritance:  This is used for limiting the inheritance of permissions up the seniority hierarchy above
certain levels.
It is often necessary to give users access to specific data in a data set, or only in specific circumstances; for
example, a doctor only accessing data about patients he consults, or only having access at specific times of the day. This
is known as dynamic RBAC. In this research, dynamic RBAC is implemented using a model devised by Strembeck &
Neumann,  [20][21] using  context  constraints which selectively prevent  access  to  data according to  rules.  Context
constraints, like denials, are inherited down the seniority hierarchy.
7.1.1 Modelling RBAC in Prolog
The model was first implemented in Prolog facts and rules. The data relating to user-role assignments and role-
permission  assignments,  and  dynamic  context  constraints,  are  codified  in  Prolog  facts.  Prolog  rules are  used  to
computationally determine whether  users have access to data based on the facts.  Each time we wish to determine
whether a user should have access to data, a process is run on the base of Prolog facts to determine the permissions or
denials. We used SWI-Prolog to implement and test the RBAC model.
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7.1.2 Modelling RBAC in RDBMS
The Prolog model of RBAC was then applied to an RDBMS (Oracle 10g) using two different methods. The first
method offers a much simpler way of translating the Prolog facts and rules into RDBMS concepts. The second approach
provides greater security than the first by taking advantage of the inherent security features of the RDBMS. Each of
these is explained in the two paragraphs below. 
In the first method, the Prolog facts relating to user access are stored as records in database tables. The tables
holding RBAC data are in the same database as the data over which we run RBAC, but probably in a different schema.
The Prolog rules for RBAC are written either as database views using SQL upon the RBAC schema, or implemented as
triggers on the tables from the RBAC schema, using the PL/SQL procedural database programming language. This is
because some Prolog rules in the RBAC model use recursion, which current SQL does not handle. Using this method,
all aspects of the RBAC models can be implemented, and the RBAC can be determined by issuing standard SQL
queries on RBAC schema tables. This approach can be used to provide access control at the application level. It is
important to note that at the database level, the application always accesses the data using one user ID, which is likely to
be locked to accessing data from the application interfaces. The application would pass the user ID of the person who is
logged into it as a parameter to the database when the user attempts to access data, and this would form part of the
query to determine whether the application-level user gains the access. Furthermore, we can easily program both static
and dynamic RBAC at the application level because the rules for both can easily be translated into either SQL views or
PL/SQL (or equivalent) procedures.
The second method of implementing RBAC on a relational database provides access control at the  database
level by using the meta-data (or data dictionary) of the RDBMS. In this method, we have to distinguish between static
and dynamic RBAC. The static RBAC was mostly implemented using standard SQL CREATE ROLE, CREATE USER
and  GRANT commands.  However,  while  RBAC  permissions  can  be  implemented  this  way,  denials  cannot  be  so
implemented because GRANT is only a positive granting of permission: there is no negative authorisation in SQL access
control syntax. The dynamic RBAC was then implemented using Oracle's Virtual Private Databases (also called Row-
Level Access Control) feature.  [58] We found that most, but not all,  of the features of the RBAC model could be
implemented. We could not implement path inheritance restrictions. However, denials can be implemented using this
feature, because a rule can be set up such that a role is denied access to data in a table even if given access to it via a
GRANT command. The implementation of dynamic RBAC is product-specific, as it is not part of the SQL standard.
Postgres has a feature called VEIL [66] that also implements dynamic RBAC, but its syntax is different from that of
Oracle VPD. By contrast, the static RBAC implementation uses standard SQL commands, and is likely to be very
similar across RDBMSs, although some, such as MySQL, do not support RBAC in their data dictionary.
It is not appropriate to compare these two methods and give recommendations that one should be used instead of
another. The first method can implement all aspects of the RBAC model. The second method cannot implement all
features of the model. In particular, it could not implement the path inheritance restrictions, as there is no provision for
limiting preventing privileges from being inherited by roles in the Oracle 10g data dictionary. The implementation using
the second method is specific to the RDBMS, while the first method can be implemented similarly across all DBMSs,
since it uses standard SQL and straightforward trigger procedures.
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7.1.3 Modelling RBAC in OWL
In  OWL/SWRL enabled ontologies  we have managed to translate  Prolog facts  and rules  into OWL/SWRL
concepts. It is important to note that there are three versions of OWL. OWL-Lite was considered to be too limited for
use in defining an RBAC model.  RBAC models were developed in OWL-DL and OWL-Full.  OWL-Full  is  more
expressive than OWL-DL in that it can fully express RDF syntax; it allows classes to be manipulated as individuals,
which OWL-DL does not.
We started with OWL-DL for two reasons. OWL-DL is better supported by reasoners than OWL-Full, and it is
sufficient to demonstrate the concept of building an RBAC model in OWL. However, if we really wanted to take
advantage of the power of OWL ontologies, we had to move to OWL-Full, which unfortunately is not widely supported
by reasoners. In this research, we have demonstrated how both OWL-DL and OWL-Full can be used for managing
RBAC, and it remains to be seen if future development of reasoners will open more options in RBAC through OWL-
Full.
7.1.3.1 SO-RBAC in OWL-DL
The OWL-DL ontology was programmed using Protégé  [24]. Within Protégé, relationships from some logical
characteristics of OWL properties (symmetry and inversity, but not transitivity) can be inferred.
Initially, the Prolog facts and rules for RBAC were translated into OWL individuals, classes and properties with
little  change  in  semantics  of  the  original  Prolog  RBAC  model.  We still  have  facts  and  rules  from  Prolog  in
OWL/SWRL-enabled ontologies. The Prolog facts became either individuals bound to classes, or object properties, in
the OWL ontology. The Prolog rules  were translated into SWRL rules,  which were run upon the OWL ontology.
However,  a  few Prolog  rules  do  not  need  to  be  represented  as  SWRL rules  in  SO-RBAC,  because  they can  be
represented through the property hierarchy, allowing some object property relationships to be inferred.
Some  of  the  rules  in  Prolog  are  recursive.  In  theory,  the  need  for  recursive  rules  in  ontologies,  defining
relationships  between roles  using object  properties,  should  have  been  eliminated  by defining object  properties  as
transitive. However, Protégé does not infer properties based on transitivity. Therefore, these recursive SWRL rules still
have to be defined.
It is important to note that we used SWRL for two separate purposes in SO-RBAC. In principle, every fact in
Prolog can be represented as an individual of a class in OWL. However, facts representing binary relationships between
individuals can be represented using object properties in OWL, which is a natural choice. We give two examples. 
(a) The direct  seniority fact  d_s(manager, worker) is  represented in OWL using a  directly_senior_to
property linking (OWL constraints) the USER individuals manager and worker.
(b) The binary relationship of user-role assignment (ura facts in Prolog, e.g.  ura(john, doctor)) is, in
contrast, represented using individuals in a class in OWL (URA) to maintain the analogy with permission-role
assignment (pra facts in Prolog, e.g. pra(doctor, write, patient), which is a ternary relationship
and therefore has to be represented by a class (PRA) in OWL.
All facts represented in the SO-RBAC model by object properties (method (a) above) link one role to another in
the RBAC model.  We used SWRL in both cases, because they define constraints upon the OWL model.  They are
prerequisites for running reasoning rules that ultimately grant permissions and denials.
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In  this  thesis,  the  implementation  in  OWL-DL is  only  shown  for  static  RBAC.  Dynamic  RBAC  can  be
implemented in  SO-RBAC using OWL-DL, with additional  OWL classes  and SWRL rules  to  address  the context
constraints. The reasoning process for dynamic RBAC would, like the reasoning process granting permissions and
denials in static RBAC, be a direct translation from the Prolog implementation in Section 3.3.
Many reasoners have been implemented for OWL-DL, making it easy to create and test an ontology in this
version  of  OWL.  However,  the  OWL-DL  implementation  of  SO-RBAC  largely  follows  the  predicate  logic
implementation, which was predetermined by the Prolog RBAC model. Therefore, we were unable to take advantage of
the native features of OWL, such as the direct modelling of a role hierarchy using the OWL class hierarchy. This has
been addressed in OWL-Full, which is used for modelling ESO-RBAC.
7.1.3.2 ESO-RBAC in OWL-Full
We have implemented static and dynamic RBAC using OWL-Full. This RBAC model is named ESO-RBAC.
OWL-Full makes it much easier to design an RBAC model natively in OWL. This is because it can take full advantage
of the OWL class hierarchy, so that OWL sub-classes can be used to define RBAC role inclusion, rather than having to
define separate object properties and use SWRL for it as in (b) from the previous section.
OWL-Full has class-individual duality, which means that it allows classes to be manipulated by reasoning rules
as if they were individuals. This is clearly an advantage, because it allows inference at two different levels: at the level
of individuals when copying them through reasoning rules across ontological classes, and at the class level where the
initial hierarchies of OWL classes can be extended through reasoning. However, there was no need to exploit OWL at
this level in ESO-RBAC, but we instead manipulated the object properties of classes as if these were individuals. Thus,
in ESO-RBAC, the relationship between roles and sub-roles, which are OWL classes, can be implemented naturally in
OWL-Full. Additionally, the relationship of a user to a role can be defined simply by defining the user as an individual
that is a type of a particular  ROLE class, rather than using a separate  URA class. This is also a ‘natural’ OWL-Full
implementation of the relationship between a role and a user, as defined in Prolog.
In ESO-RBAC, unlike in SO-RBAC, there is not a precise relationship between Prolog facts and OWL classes or
properties, or between Prolog rules and reasoning rules. As noted above, some Prolog facts are implemented as class-
individual  memberships  in  OWL-Full,  because of  class-individual  duality. Furthermore,  in  theory, some rules  (for
example,  the  recursive  rules  relating  to  the  RBAC  concept  of  Role  Inclusion)  can  be  eliminated  due  to  their
representation via the OWL-Full class hierarchy.
ESO-RBAC was tested by running reasoning rules in Jena (we did not use SWRL because it does not support
OWL-Full  and  cannot  deal  with  class-individual  duality).  Jena  follows  the  same  semantics  in  terms  of  creating
reasoning rules as SWRL. It is important to note that we had to write additional reasoning rules when running Jena
compared with running reasoning rules in SWRL. This is because there is no Jena plug-in for Protégé that works on
OWL-Full.
Inverse relationships are used in the (E)SO-RBAC model to define inverse properties to directly_senior_to and
senior_to, respectively called directly_junior_to and junior_to. The Protégé environment automatically fills in inverse
object  property  relationships.  Thus,  when  a  senior_to relationship  is  defined  between  two  individuals,  the
corresponding inverse junior_to relationship is also defined. If  r1 senior_to r2 is defined, then because  junior_to is
defined as inverse of senior_to, the triple r2 junior_to r1 is also filled in.
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The Jena rules were run outside of Protégé on the command line using a Java program that implements Jena.
Therefore,  the Protégé environment was not available to infer the inverse relationships, and so in this ESO-RBAC
implementation using Jena, the properties directly_junior_to and junior_to have to be defined directly using Jena rules.
Furthermore, the SWRL plug-in for Protégé can identify indirect sub-classes (sub-classes of sub-classes), and
identifies an individual as a membership of a class if it is membership of any sub-class of this class. However, Jena does
not  recognise  either  inferred  sub-classing  or  inferred  class  membership,  but  only  direct  sub-classes  and  direct
membership of a class. Therefore, it was found to be necessary when using Jena in ESO-RBAC to define additional
rules to infer these relationships.
7.2 Evaluation
7.2.1 OWL in general
7.2.1.1 Concerns with OWL
 Monotonicity in OWL
Unlike description logic, OWL is monotonic. This has two meanings in the context of an OWL ontology.
Persistence of Reasoning Results
First, reasoning places individuals into classes. In other words, individuals placed in a class in an OWL ontology
cannot be retracted by the reasoning process. The results of reasoning in OWL are always persistent. Therefore, running
the same reasoning process repeatedly upon the same instance of an ontology, when the data asserted upon initialisation
have changed, does not erase individuals from classes when the reasoning process based on the new data would not
move them there. From that perspective, we cannot expect that our reasoning process, which grants either permissions
or denials,  can be re-run without first  erasing individuals which had been moved to various classes as a  result  of
previous reasoning. In SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC, every class contains either only asserted individuals or only inferred
individuals, thus making it simple to erase individuals where appropriate before any reasoning is performed. Similarly,
reasoning in OWL-Full can define a class (treated as an individual) as a sub-class of another class, but cannot break a
link in the class hierarchy.
 Negation in OWL
Second, OWL uses an open-world assumption, in contrast to the closed-world assumption of DL systems. This
has implications for modelling negations in our RBAC models.
Negation is handled differently in predicate logic and OWL. Predicate logic uses closed-world reasoning, i.e.
‘negation as failure’, in which any query not proven to be true is taken to be false. Prolog has a function not, which
negates any predicate that it governs. However, there is no explicit negation function in SWRL, to indicate that an
object-property relationship does not occur between two individuals, or that an individual is not a member of a class.
OWL uses  open-world  reasoning,  where  something has  to  be  explicitly asserted  as  being not  true,  and reasoning
languages do not have a negation function as such. 
However, closed-world reasoning can be simulated in ontological reasoning languages. In SO-RBAC, this is
achieved using SQWRL (Semantic Query-enhanced Web Rule Language) functions makeSet and notElement to test
for the presence or absence of an individual in a set. The SQWRL function makeSet makes a set consisting of a list of
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previously defined individuals. The SQWRL functions element and notElement respectively check whether a given
individual is, or is not, a member of a set. These two functions, in combination enables negation-as-failure to be used
with OWL and SWRL. This is explained as follows. We want the class NOT_DENIED to contain all elements in the
class USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE that are not in DENIED. This is done by first using makeSet to create a
set containing all individuals that are in the class DENIED, then using notElement to check that an individual is not a
member of that set. 
rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?x) ∧ rbac:DENIED(?y) ˚ 
sqwrl:makeSet(?d, ?y) ˚ sqwrl:notElement(?x, ?d) → 
rbac:NOT_DENIED(?x)
The function notElement(?x, ?d) has to compare an individual ?x with each member of the set ?d to check that
?x is not in set  ?d. This may be a time consuming process, if there is a large number of individuals in the set  ?d.
Moreover,  in  this  rule,  notElement(?x,  ?d) has  to  be  run  many times,  once  for  each  element  ?x in  the  class
USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE. Therefore, this rule takes a long time to run.
In Jena, for ESO-RBAC, classical negation can achieved using the function  noValue. The equivalent to the
above SWRL rule in Jena is as follows.
[4_not_denied: (?x rdf:type rbac:NOT_DENIED )
   <-
  (?x rdf:type rbac:USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE )
  noValue(?x rdf:type rbac:DENIED )
]
This  function  checks  whether  individual  ?x is  in  USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE,  and  is  not  in
DENIED,  and if both conditions are satisfied, puts  ?x in the class  NOT_DENIED. The syntax for the negation is
simpler  in  Jena  than  in  SWRL,  because  there  is  only  one  function  (noValue)  instead  of  two  (makeSet and
notElement). However, the function noValue still needs to compare every ?x against every individual in the class
DENIED, so the negation process is still slow.
In summary, the lack of explicit classical negation in OWL means that this has to be simulated in the reasoning
languages, and this simulation process is slow. 
We take  the  liberty  to  interpret  the  monotonicity  of  OWL as  an  advantage  from  a  software  engineering
perspective,  because our ontologies will never grow as a consequence of repeatedly executed reasoning processes.
Repeated reasoning upon the same ontological model does not make our ontological solutions complex in terms of the
class hierarchy or in terms of the number of individuals. However, re-running the reasoning process on a changed data
set involves erasing the ontology and repopulating (and possibly rebuilding) it.
 Populating OWL classes with individuals
In Prolog, a rule can be queried based on a dataset, and all axioms that apply to it are automatically returned.
Consider the following rule
pra_full(R1,A,O) :-
  senior_to(R1,R2),
  pra(R2,A,O).
This rule rpa_full, when run, returns every combination of (R1,P,O) (axiom) identified by the antecedents
senior_to and  rpa. It  should be noted that no new facts are created when a rule such as this is run in Prolog.
Instead, the axioms that meet the conditions of the rule are computed every time it is run. The axioms that meet the
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antecedent predicates senior_to and rpa may themselves be either computed through some other rule, or be stored
as facts.
In contrast, the OWL reasoning process can only move individuals that already exist. While new object property
relationships can be created, new individuals cannot. Each reasoning rule works on a base of individuals that have been
placed in a class, and object property relationships that have been created, and stored in the ontology. For example,
consider the equivalent SWRL rule to the above Prolog rule for rpa_full:
PRA(?x) ∧ role(?x, ?r1) ∧ action(?x, ?a) ∧ object_type(?x, ?o) ∧ 
senior_to(?r2, ?r1) ∧ ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE(?z) ∧
role(?z, ?r2) ∧ action(?z, ?a) ∧ object_type(?z, ?o) → PRA_FULL(?z)
Note that in SWRL, each of the properties of an individual need to be specified separately: there is no construct
similar to  rpa_full(R1,A,O) in OWL. In this SWRL rule,  PRA,  ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE and
PRA_FULL are classes. An individual ?z is added to the PRA_FULL class if it matches the rules in the antecedent.
However, the individual ?z, with the object properties specified in the antecedent, must already exist in the ontology if
it is to be moved to PRA_FULL. It is not created if it does not exist.
Therefore, all individuals representing potential permission states relating to a role, user, class and action need to
be created when setting up and populating the ontology. This can take a long time to do, due to the large number of
individuals that need to be created. In a model with 250 users, 10 roles, 2 actions and 700 objects in 10 object classes,
the numbers are as follows:
• 10 × 2 × 10 = 200 ROLE_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individuals
• 250 × 2 × 700 = 350,000 USER_PERMISSION_ASSIGNABLE individuals
If we add 5 dynamic context conditions, then the numbers of CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE and
CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL individuals, in addition to those, are as follows:
• 10 × 2 × 10 × 5 = 1,000 CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT_APPLICABLE individuals
• 250 × 2 × 700 × 5 = 1,750,000 CONTEXT_CONDITION_POTENTIAL individuals
It can be seen that the number of individuals that need to be created in the ontology before reasoning grows
quickly with increasing size of model in terms of roles, data and users. Because of this, the reasoning process takes a
long time to run. Even with the small models used in testing, it was necessary to perform chain reasoning, as running all
the reasoning steps at once was found to take far too long, and in some cases crashed. However, chain reasoning leads
to the creation of very large output files that need to be stored temporarily. But in a situation-aware system, where the
permissions depend on factors external to the data (such as time of day, or temperature), the reasoning process would
have to be performed, from some stage, with every query.
 OWL Speed and Efficiency
We have identified two ways in which reasoning was slow. The first is in the rules used to perform negation, as
noted above. This problem cannot easily be solved. The second is that processing was found to be slow when running a
rule that reasons on individuals that had been moved in a previous rule, in the same process. To resolve this problem,
the reasoning was broken down into steps, with the ontology saved in a new file after each step, to be reasoned on in the
next step.
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7.2.1.2 Advantages of OWL
 Faster reasoning on persistence
If  the  permissions  and  data  have  not  changed  since  reasoning  was  performed,  then  querying  permissions
involves simply querying a static ontology, rather than running a computation, i.e. reasoning rules. Therefore, queries
on individuals, once reasoning has been performed, is likely to be faster in OWL than using predicate logic, because
predicate logic may query on views, while OWL always queries on stored data.
In SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC, we propose performing the reasoning in stages. This is done for two reasons. It is
faster than doing it all at once, as detailed above. But also, it means that changes to the data and permission assignments
do not necessarily require a complete renewal of the ontology. Instead, the ontology can be reset to an earlier stage, and
the reasoning re-run from there.
 Use of natural class and property hierarchy in OWL
A very common feature  of  RBAC,  and  one  used  in  the  model  discussed  in  this  thesis,  is  the  use  of  role
hierarchies. There is no natural way of representing hierarchies in predicate logic. By contrast, the class hierarchy in
OWL means  that  OWL is  naturally  suited  to  representing  hierarchies,  without  the  need  to  define  predicates  that
explicitly do this.
Similarly, an inherent feature of RBAC is defining a user as a ‘member’ of a role. In predicate logic, this has to
be explicitly expressed using a predicate such as  ura(user,role). Due to the limitations of OWL-DL, we also
found this to be necessary for the SO-RBAC model. However, in OWL-Full, it is possible to define users as individuals,
and roles as classes, and assign a user to a role by making the user individual a member of the role class. This means
that the relationship between the user and the role is represented in a way that is natural for OWL. The ability to use
classes and individuals interchangeably, and decide when we need constraints (as opposed to classes and individuals)
when describing a particular domain of interest, is a great advantage. In other words, OWL does not define what needs
to be an individual, class or constraint.
Similarly, the use of hierarchical classes and hierarchical property relationships means that many rules that are
necessary in predicate logic can be omitted from ontological reasoning languages. For example, the following Prolog
rule
senior_to(R1, R2) :- directly_senior_to(R1, R2)
can be expressed in OWL by defining senior_to as a sub-property of directly_senior_to, and no reasoning rule
is necessary to define this. In theory, is should also be possible to eliminate all recursive rules in the reasoning language
by defining properties such as  senior_to as transitive. However, the ontological building tool that we used (Protégé)
does  not  infer  property  relationships  transitivity,  and  nor  do  either  of  the  reasoning  languages  SWRL or  Jena.
Additionally, Jena does not infer indirect  sub-classes,  which are used extensively in the OWL-FULL model ESO-
RBAC. The state of  the art  in ontological  reasoning tools needs further development,  particularly in OWL-FULL,
before the full power of ontological reasoning can be exploited. However, given the generic nature of the semantic web,
it should be possible to develop such reasoners; this is a matter for further research.
The inference mechanism in OWL and SWRL/Jena is more thus powerful than that of predicate logic. Static
ontologies can be queried quickly; the data obtained by the reasoning process are reusable: they do not have to be
recomputed each time unlike in predicate logic and in RDBMS syntax. The ontologies need to be repopulated whenever
the information that they are modelling changes. However, this need not necessarily mean that the entire ontology needs
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to be rebuilt from scratch each time the data or the RBAC rules change; SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC are designed so
that  the reasoning is performed in steps,  with each step creating a consistent  ontology representing a stage in the
reasoning process,  and the reasoning process can be partially run from any stage. Alternatively, since the types of
information going into particular parts of the class hierarchy are well defined, a partial reasoning process could be re-
run by clearing and re-populating those classes where information has changed, and re-running whichever steps of the
reasoning process need to be re-run.
 Not Vendor Specific
SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC are not database vendor specific. Section 3 documents a way of implementing some
of the features of dynamic RBAC in an RDBMS. However, the syntax of the dynamic RBAC mechanism in particular
is specific to the RDBMS used. OWL allows the development of a generic, non-vendor-specific syntax for dynamic
RBAC.
SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC and types of data repositories to which they control access: potentially these can
access any data repository and are particularly suited to accessing data in the semantic web.
Permissions and Denials granted through SWRL and Jena are application-independent.  They depend on the
positioning of individuals in classes in the RBAC ontologies, and these can be queried by any reasoning language using
standard reasoning syntax.
 Independence of query layer from ontology
The querying layer is also independent of the ontology, which is stored in OWL files. There is no need to load or
link the contents of a data file into a database schema, or to load the data into an application environment such as that of
Prolog. Any reasoning tool can be used to run a query on an OWL file, which is stored as a plain file on a computer
system; there is no requirement to use a specific environment to query an OWL file.
 Summary
In summary, the main advantages of OWL over predicate logic in modelling RBAC are as follows:
• the  ability to  use  the  ontological  class  and  property hierarchies  as  part  of  the  model,  allowing a  natural
representation of hierarchical relationships and eliminating the need for certain computations;
• the ability to query static ontologies quickly without recomputation;
• independence of the querying layer from the ontology;
• OWL and reasoning languages are not vendor-specific.
However, the ontology needs to be rebuilt every time the data or permissions change, and the reasoning process
is slow and the OWL files are large.
7.2.2 SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC Models
Our first RBAC model, SO-RBAC, uses OWL-DL, and is based on similar reasoning rules to those used in
predicate logic (Prolog). The purpose of SO-RBAC is to demonstrate the feasibility of writing an RBAC model in
OWL.  However, consequently SO-RBAC does not  take  full  advantage  of  the flexibility offered  by OWL,  due  to
limitations in OWL-DL discussed earlier in this section. Following this proof of concept, we developed ESO-RBAC,
which uses OWL-Full, giving much greater freedom to break away from the confines of DL and create a model that is
naturally suited to OWL. 
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The core ESO-RBAC model is reusable across any domain. There are two main classes at the top level of the
ESO-RBAC hierarchy, called  DATA and  RBAC.  The  DATA super-class contains exclusively domain-specific data,
equivalent to the information that might be stored in user-created tables in a relational database. However, because
OWL has a class hierarchy, relationships between information and types of information can be defined in a much more
flexible, ‘object oriented’ fashion than is possible in a relational data model.
The RBAC super-class contains the information defining permissions and denials. The class structure of RBAC
is mostly not domain-specific. The only part that is domain specific is the set of roles, which is defined under the ROLE
class under RBAC. All other classes under the RBAC super-class are directly related to the RBAC model. It is in the
RBAC super-class that individuals representing user permissions and denials are moved by the SO-RBAC or ESO-
RBAC reasoning process. In SO-RBAC these are normal OWL individuals, while in ESO-RBAC they are classes that
are treated as individuals by the reasoner.
The re-usability across domains of the RBAC model in Prolog is similar to that in OWL. As in OWL, Prolog
allows the reuse of the same rules to reason permissions and denials based on whatever roles, permissions and data are
defined by the domain administrator. This is also similar to the separation of user-defined data and meta-data (data
dictionary) in a relational database. Therefore, in principle, it should be possible to define RBAC rules in a relational
database that is independent of the user-manipulated data. However, in section  3.5 we found that RDBMSs do not
implement all of the features of RBAC models discussed in Chapter 2. The only way of implementing certain features,
such as path inheritance restrictions, in the RDBMS that we tested would be to implement the RBAC model as a series
of  normal database tables,  rather  than using the data dictionary. This approach jeopardises  the separation between
RBAC data and ordinary data. However, this can be mitigated by defining the RBAC data tables in a separate database
schema from other data.
Implementation of SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC would use an OWL API to determine who would be permitted
and denied access to certain data from the application layer, completely independent of the structure and type of data
accessed. There are many tools available for populating OWL from any data source, including flat files or a DBMS. In
this thesis, the data model was populated using a script in order to prove the concept that SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC
provide a mechanism for creating permissions and denial completely independently of the types of data sources on
which we wish to control access. It is very easy to retrieve the content of OWL classes storing individuals relating to
permissions and denials from any type of software applications built in integrated development environments that have
plug-ins to an OWL API. 
7.2.2.1 Reasoning processes
Uniquely, both SO-RBAC and ESO-RBAC infer at the OWL level rather than at the application level. ESO-
RBAC exploits the natural hierarchy of OWL and performs all reasoning inside OWL using OWL reasoners. Other
ontological RBAC models leave much of the reasoning process to other layers. Our RBAC model is the only one in
which the ontological reasoning process is completely automated through SWRL or Jena rule chaining. In particular, we
are not aware of any other ontological RBAC model that resolves conflicts between permission and denial by using
negation  functionality  in  OWL reasoners  to  enforce  the  standard  RBAC rule  that  ‘denials  override  permissions’.
Additionally, ESO-RBAC is unique in using the ontological class hierarchy to define some relationships between roles,
and the user-role assignments; this eliminates the need to define them explicitly using OWL properties or reasoner
functions. The use of the class hierarchy to define RBAC relationships natively allows the use of RBAC with object-
190
oriented data modelling. It should also be noted that the data on which the RBAC model operates (in the DATA super-
class in the (E)SO-RBAC models) could also be defined through the class hierarchy; in ESO-RBAC in particular, this
allows for considerable flexibility in defining permission to perform action on object types; for example, defining an
RPA relationship  on  a  class  of  DATA would  implicitly  define  the  same  relationship  on  sub-classes  of  that  class.
Although object-oriented data models could be created in DL or in relational databases, such a representation would be
rather convoluted and unnatural. OWL allows hierarchical relationships among both roles and data to be defined and
related to each other, and ESO-RBAC uniquely performs reasoning on such a model. 
 Pre-requisites in the Reasoning Process
Our reasoning process, which grants correct permissions or denials requires: 
i. An ontological model, which stores the semantic essential in the process of granting permissions and denials.
Therefore (E)SO-RBAC Ontology should be ready to expand its basic structures into hierarchies and accept its
individuals and accommodate required constraints in order to enable the SO-RBAC reasoning process.
ii. Clearly defined steps in the (E)SO-RBAC process which specify which ontological classes and constraints are
involved in the process and what would be the outcome of each of its step. 
We would like to draw the reader’s attention to the dual roles of steps in the reasoning process, because we use
reasoning in various stages of the process, but only after pre-conditions for the reasoning have been met, by the same
process. However, “meeting pre-conditions” in the proposed process does not necessarily mean that we must use a
particular reasoning mechanism for it. We give two examples.
We often populate a selection of ontological classes from existing data sources of a particular domain of interest
and use the word “assert” (even if the selection of (E)SO-RBAC classes has to be populated at initialization), but we
also “infer” (as opposed to “assert”) ontological individuals in a selection of ontological classes through the reasoning
process. In both cases these might be pre-conditions for continuing with a particular step of our process of granting
permissions and denials.
The same applies to constraints: we sometimes define them as a part  of our ontological  model (i.e. manual
assertions, as a part of ontological initialization is expected) or  infer constraints through reasoning if they are pre-
conditions in the process of granting permissions or denials.
Therefore, assertions and inference are interwoven in the reasoning process, but in its final stage, after we meet
all pre-conditions, a chain of SWRL or Jena rules is running in one go and securing permissions or denials.
 Characteristics of the Reasoning Process
We draw the reader’s attention to a few important characteristics of the (E)SO-RBAC reasoning process.
At each stage the (E)SO-RBAC ontology is in a state where the process can be run from the following step
onwards. In other words, it is not necessary to always re-run the (E)SO-RBAC process from the beginning. 
A portion of (E)SO-RBAC ontological classes will remain ‘empty’ until a reasoning process determines which
individuals from the asserted classes will be ‘moved’ (or copied) into (E)SO-RBAC classes which were empty on
(E)SO-RBAC initialisation.
It is evident from the process that we perform initial assertions in steps B, C and D. However, assertions continue
in stages F (we assert role permissions and role denials) and in stage H when we insert individuals into URA class (in
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SO-RBAC) or assign them to ROLE classes (in ESO-RBAC). Therefore we do not limit assertions to the first few steps
of the process and consequently they are interwoven with inference.
Reasoning in (E)SO-RBAC process, with SWRL or Jena rules, occurs in steps E, G and J. However, In the
(E)SO-RBAC process we perform two types of reasoning.
• The first type is in step E, when we use SWRL or Jena for creating a set of new object properties. All of the
object properties for which this is done have ROLE class as both domain and range, as the purpose of this step
is to set up all the relationships between roles in the RBAC model.
• The second type of reasoning is performed stages G and H, where we run SWRL or Jena rules in order to move
(copy)  individuals  across  (E)SO-RBAC in order  to  determine permission or  denials  in  particular  request,
imposed by a user, who has a ‘role’ and would like to perform an ‘activity’ upon set of “objects”. 
Therefore the outcome of our reasoning that a particular user name, which has been moved across the (E)SO-
RBAC ontology according to our reasoning process, can be found as an individual of either PERMITTED or DENIED
ontological class.
7.2.3 Future Works
Future work would be to further develop dynamic RBAC in the ESO-RBAC model. Section 6.4 demonstrates
the use of context constraints, modelled on the system of Strembeck & Neumann [21], in the ESO-RBAC model, and
defines  a  single  context  constraint  applicable  to  the  healthcare  domain  considered  herein.  This  context  constraint
ensures that junior nurses can only modify the data of patients in their ward, based on data individuals stored in the
DATA super-class as well as user data stored in the RBAC super-class. It would be beneficial to further test the ability
of the model to handle complex context constraints, which may not only be internal (depending on data in the ontology
on which the ESO-RBAC is operating) but also external, that is, depending on external data, such as environmental
factors. This would move towards the goal of creating an ontological RBAC model that could be applied to pervasive,
situation-aware systems. In such a scenario, an application would populate the  DATA part of the ontology based on
environmental  triggers,  such as  ambient  temperature,  or  location or  other  mutable characteristics  of  a  person.  For
instance:
• A technician could be permitted to operate a particular equipment depending on the presence of a more senior
technician in the same environment.
• In a hospital  ward, an emergency situation involving a patient, as determined by the vital  signs stored as
individuals in the ontology, could trigger a relaxation of the usual restriction where only a nurse or doctor in
charge of the patient’s ward can access and modify information about that patient, and allow medical staff with
suitable expertise (also defined in the ontology) who is present in the ward to help the patient.
We would like to  refine this system of context constraints,  for  example by making it  hierarchical.  Context
constraints are already defined in a particular class in the ESO-RBAC model; making this CONTEXT_CONSTRAINT
class hierarchical would further improve the model.
The main difficulty with defining an ontology in OWL-Full is the lack of fully functioning reasoners for it.
Although Jena does work with the class-individual duality that is used extensively in ESO-RBAC for describing role-
role and user-role relationships, it  cannot handle inferred sub-classes or class memberships. That is, Jena can only
recognize direct class memberships and sub-classes in the reasoning process. Therefore, a workaround was necessary in
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the version of ESO-RBAC presented herein to ensure that indirect sub-classing could be used in reasoning. Hopefully,
reasoners will be developed for OWL-Full that do not require such workarounds and allow the ESO-RBAC process to
be simplified to eliminate the initial step (step 0) that was found to be necessary when running ESO-RBAC with Jena.
We cannot think of any fundamental changes that would be made to the ESO-RBAC model, which does the job
of inferring authorisations of users to perform actions based on user-role and role-permission relationships in an OWL
ontology. The class  hierarchy for  the  RBAC information  used  in  ESO-RBAC is  very similar  to  the  one  that  we
originally envisaged  for  a  hierarchical  RBAC model  that  could be extended to include  dynamic  features  (context
constraints). It  evolved as we learnt about how reasoning works in OWL, but the original idea remains intact.  We
believe that ESO-RBAC has much more potential for future development than the earlier SO-RBAC. When SO-RBAC
was developed, the concept of ESO-RBAC was already fully formed. SO-RBAC was developed initially because it was
found to be much easier to develop an OWL ontology using OWL-DL, due to the greater capabilities of reasoners such
as SWRL for this flavour of OWL. However, because SO-RBAC is developed in OWL-DL, it is tied to its roots in
descriptive logic, limiting its ability to fully exploit the object-oriented hierarchical data modelling that is possible in
OWL,  and thus limiting its  usefulness  for  ontological  modelling of RBAC. It  was really developed as  a  proof of
concept, to show that it is possible to develop an RBAC model in which user authorization is inferred entirely by the
OWL reasoner. We would therefore  focus on developing ESO-RBAC by improving and refining its  modelling of
dynamic and situation-aware access control.
Finally, current context-aware RBAC models, including ESO-RBAC, are based on enumerated contexts. That is,
the contexts are stored in rules based on fixed criteria. The permissions or roles are dynamically assigned according to
rules, but the rules themselves are static. This is a serious limitation, because in many context-aware systems, it  is
difficult to know what contexts need to be taken into consideration, or what permissions and roles to assign according to
them. Thus, a security model that changes permissions based on heuristic rules would be of benefit. This would not
only assign the roles and permissions dynamically, but also dynamically generate the rules by which these are assigned
according to context changes. The rules are then meta-programmed. The possibility of unpredictable and very frequent
context changes, and the complexity or rigidity of RBAC models [47], means that some other access control models,
which are not based on roles, have been proposed. These include location (M-ZONES AC [47]) and trust (TRUSTAC
[121], TrustBAC [122]).  Therefore, future work should consider the semantic modelling of access control in terms of
using heuristic rules which control permissions:
(a) dynamically,
(b) according to environments where software applications and their data reside, and
(c) according to situations created by pervasiveness of environments and computational spaces.
Tasks (a)–(c) are very challenging, and solutions based on semantic access control mechanisms, which satisfy
(a)–(c) might not be trivial. Therefore in this chapter we start using ontologies and semantic web tools, which could
enrich traditional RBAC, and make it applicable to a variety of situations in pervasive computing environments. The
aim is to assess whether we can create RBAC model through ontologies which address as far as possible the tasks (a)–
(c) above.
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Appendix II: Prolog Rules in Static RBAC
% inclusion of equal-status roles (this is done so that day/night duty roles
% do not have to be defined twice)
included_in(R1,R1).
included_in(R1,R2) :- is_a(R1,R2).
included_in(R1,R3) :- is_a(R1,R2),
                      included_in(R2,R3).
% Role hierarchies
senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(R1,_).
senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(_,R1).
senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R2).
senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R3), senior_to(R3,R2).
% Inheritance paths
inherits_rpa(R1,R1,_,_).
inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
                           senior_to(R3,R4),
                           inherits_rpa_path(R1,R4,P,O).
% Access control rules structure
rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
                    senior_to(R2,R3),
                    rpa(R3,P,O),
                    inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O).
permittable(U,P,O) :- permittable(U,P,O,R).
permittable(U,P,O,R) :- ura(U,R)
                            rpa_full(R,P,O).
permitted(U,P,O) :-    ura(U,R),
                       permitted(U,P,O,R).
permitted(U,P,O,R) :-  currently_active(U,R,_),
                       permittable(U,P,O,R).
d_rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
                      senior_to(R3,R2),
                      d_rpa(R3,P,O).
denied(U,P,O) :- ura(U,R),
                  d_rpa_full(R,P,O).
authorizable(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
                               authorizable(U,P,O,R).
authorizable(U,P,O,R) :- permittable(U,P,O,R),
                               not(denied(U,P,O)).
authorized(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
                       authorized(U,P,O,R).
authorized(U,P,O,R) :- permitted(U,P,O,R),
                       not(denied(U,P,O)).
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Appendix III: Prolog Rules in Dynamic RBAC
% inclusion of equal-status roles (this is done so that day/night duty roles
% do not have to be defined twice)
included_in(R1,R1).
included_in(R1,R2) :- is_a(R1,R2).
included_in(R1,R3) :- is_a(R1,R2),
                      included_in(R2,R3).
% Role hierarchies
senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(R1,_).
senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(_,R1).
senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R2).
senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R3), senior_to(R3,R2).
% Inheritance paths
inherits_rpa(R1,R1,_,_).
inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
                           senior_to(R3,R4),
                           inherits_rpa_path(R1,R4,P,O).
% Access control rules structure
rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
                    senior_to(R2,R3),
                    rpa(R3,P,O),
                    inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O).
permittable(U,P,O) :- permittable(U,P,O,R).
permittable(U,P,O,R) :- ura(U,R)
                            rpa_full(R,P,O).
% currently_active
currently_active(U,R1,D1) :- activate(U,R1,D1,Password),
                   password(U,Password),
                   ura(U,R1),
                   (
                     not(deactivate(U,R1,_));
                     deactivate(U,R1,D2),
                     date_time_stamp(D1,T1),
                     date_time_stamp(D2,T2),
                     T2 < T1
                   ),
                   not(inconsistent_dsd(U,R1,D1)).
permitted(U,P,O) :-    ura(U,R),
                       permitted(U,P,O,R).
permitted(U,P,O,R) :- currently_active(U,R,_),
                       not(fail_context_constraint(U,R,P,O)),
                       permittable(U,P,O,R).
d_rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
                      senior_to(R3,R2),
                      d_rpa(R3,P,O).
denied(U,P,O) :- ura(U,R),
                  d_rpa_full(R,P,O).
authorizable(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
                               authorizable(U,P,O,R).
authorizable(U,P,O,R) :- permittable(U,P,O,R),
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                         not(denied(U,P,O)).
authorized(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
                       authorized(U,P,O,R).
authorized(U,P,O,R) :- permitted(U,P,O,R),
                       not(denied(R,P,O)).
% separation of duties
% dsd: dynamic separation of duties
dsd_conflict(R1,R2) :- dsd(R1,R2), !.
dsd_conflict(R1,R2) :- dsd(R2,R1).
% ssd: static separation of duties
% This is not modelled in the Prolog implementation
ssd_conflict(R1,R2) :- ssd(R1,R2), !.
ssd_conflict(R1,R2) :- ssd(R2,R1).
inconsistent_ssd(U,R1) :- ura(U,R1),
                          ssd(R1,R2),
                          ura(U,R2).
inconsistent_dsd(U,R1,D1) :- activate(U,R2,D2,Password),
                             password(U,Password),
                             dsd_conflict(R1,R2),
                             date_time_stamp(D1,T1),
                             (
                               not(deactivate(U,R2,_));
                               deactivate(U,R2,D3),
                               date_time_stamp(D3,T3),
                               T3 < T1
                             ),
                             date_time_stamp(D2,T2),
                             T2 =< T1.
% Evaluation of context constraints: from Strembeck & Neuman with some names changed
% context constraints inherit down the hierarchy
applied_cc(R1,P,O,CC) :-
  associated_cc(R3,P,O,CC),
  senior_to(R3,R2),
  included_in(R1,R2).
applied_cc(R,P,O,CC) :-
  associated_cc(R,P,O,CC).
% whether context constraints are violated: negates context_condition
% violated(ContextConstraint,User,Permission,Object).
violated(CC,U,P,O) :- not(context_condition(CC,U,P,O)).
fail_context_constraint(U,R,P,O) :-
  applied_cc(R,P,O,CC),
  violated(CC,U,P,O).
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Appendix IV: Prolog Facts in Static RBAC
% role(Role).
% object(Object).
% user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB).
% password(Username,Password).
% d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole).
% is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole).
% inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,Object).
% rpa(Role,Permission,Object).
% ura(User,Role).
% ssd(Role1,Role2).
% dsd(Role1,Role2).
% activate(User,Role,DateTime,Password).
% DateTime is of form date(Year, Month, Day, Hour, Min, Sec, Offset, TimeZone, DST)
% e.g. date(2006, 8, 23, 08, 15, 0, 0, 'BST', true)
% nurse_ward(User,Ward).
% role
% role(Role).
role(consultant).
role(specialist_registrar).
role(senior_house_officer).
role(senior_house_officer_day).
role(senior_house_officer_night).
role(house_officer).
role(house_officer_day).
role(house_officer_night).
role(specialist_nurse).
role(sister).
role(sister_day).
role(sister_night).
role(staff_nurse).
role(staff_nurse_day).
role(staff_nurse_night).
role(student_nurse).
role(student_nurse_day).
role(student_nurse_night).
role(senior_data_manager).
role(junior_data_manager).
role(receptionist).
role(manager).
role(day_duty).
role(night_duty).
% object
% object(Object).
object(ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
object(room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
object(bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
object(patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
object(diagnosis(Diagnosis_code,Illness_name,Usual_Symptoms)).
object(ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
object(patient_diagnosis(Patient_Diagnosis_Number,Diagnosing_Doctor,Diagnosis_Desc,Cons_
Number,Diagnosis_Code)).
% user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB).
user(dr_sugar,'Sugar','Ed','1 Montgomery Ave','12/06/1975').
user(dr_python,'Python','Adam','45 Escort Road','24/01/1950').
user(dr_edmonds,'Edmonds','Sophie','49 Convent Gardens','10/10/1968').
user(dr_bowie,'Bowie','Diane','253 Kings Road','02/03/1962').
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user(dr_peters,'Peters','Peter','59 Monkety Crescent','19/01/1980').
user(dr_davies,'Davies','Sheena','10 Auchtermuchty Way','15/02/1979').
user(dr_williams,'Williams','Lucie','23 Monkswood Drive','15/07/1977').
user(dr_jones,'Jones','John','The Manse, Church Lane','18/07/1977').
user(dr_evans,'Evans','Renate','3 Geering Road','12/03/1970').
user(dr_fish,'Fish','Michael','The Vane, Weatherby','28/12/1955').
user(dr_ghosh,'Ghosh','Chandra','10 Kennington Road','11/07/1959').
user(dr_kellett,'Kellett','James','104 The Vale','15/02/1959').
user(miss_jacobson,'Jacobson','Lucinda','14 The Mansion','01/02/1969').
user(mrs_jones,'Jones','Hannah','13 Consort Road','15/05/1955').
user(mr_kenning,'Kenning','Stephen','10 Roadrunner Crescent','13/01/1977').
user(miss_strand,'Strand','Jasmine','The Lodge, Linden Avenue','15/06/1987').
user(mrs_canning,'Canning','Elizabeth','100 Western Road','22/03/1969').
user(mr_clarkson,'Clarkson''Jeremy','43 Vroom Vroom Road','30/09/1962').
user(miss_lewis,'Lewis','Christine','16 Trent Drive','13/05/1980').
user(miss_jackson,'Jackson','Lisa','56 Restorick Road','12/09/1975','queen').
user(mrs_james,'James','Wendy','40 Transvision Road','07/05/1966','vamp').
user(miss_darch,'Darch','Ruth','31 Finstock Street','21/06/1979','woodstock').
user(mr_lewis,'Lewis','Donald','15 Montana Lane','29/12/1980','bronze').
user(miss_davies,'Davies','Caroline','10 The Avenue','17/09/1971','cruise').
user(mrs_lewis,'Lewis','Charlotte','20 High Road','06/07/1974').
user(mr_davies,'Davies','Jonathan','15 Low Road','14/07/1959').
user(mr_minnow,'Minnow','Robert','5 Montrose Place','08/07/0966').
user(mr_avery,'Avery','Caspar','13 Cod Street','15/08/1981').
user(mr_mctaggart,'McTaggart','James','10 Fortean Street','21/02/1977').
% password(Username,Password).
password(dr_sugar,'desk').
password(dr_python,'chair').
password(dr_edmonds,'window').
password(dr_bowie,'brick').
password(dr_peters,'mother').
password(dr_davies,'tennis').
password(dr_williams,'file').
password(dr_jones,'cricket').
password(dr_evans,'dragon').
password(dr_fish,'cock').
password(dr_ghosh,'onion').
password(dr_kellett,'thadeus').
password(miss_jacobson,'re$t').
password(mrs_jones,'carlena').
password(mr_kenning,'walnut').
password(miss_strand,'c001ie').
password(mrs_canning,'compile').
password(mr_clarkson,'wheeler').
password(miss_lewis,'mcginty').
password(miss_jackson,'queen').
password(mrs_james,'vamp').
password(miss_darch,'woodstock').
password(mr_lewis,'bronze').
password(miss_davies,'cruise').
password(mrs_lewis,'cream').
password(mr_davies,'rookie').
password(mr_minnow,'little_fish').
password(mr_avery,'fern').
password(mr_mctaggart,'jimmy').
% direct seniority
% d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole).
d_s(consultant,specialist_registrar).
d_s(specialist_registrar,senior_house_officer).
d_s(senior_house_officer,house_officer).
d_s(specialist_nurse,sister).
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d_s(sister,staff_nurse).
d_s(staff_nurse,student_nurse).
d_s(senior_data_manager,junior_data_manager).
d_s(manager,receptionist).
d_s(manager,consultant).
d_s(manager,specialist_nurse).
d_s(manager,senior_data_manager).
% is_a relationships
% is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole).
is_a(student_nurse_day,student_nurse).
is_a(student_nurse_night,student_nurse).
is_a(staff_nurse_day,staff_nurse).
is_a(staff_nurse_night,staff_nurse).
is_a(sister_day,sister).
is_a(sister_night,sister).
is_a(student_nurse,nurse).
is_a(staff_nurse,nurse).
is_a(sister,nurse).
is_a(specialist_nurse,nurse).
is_a(student_nurse,nurse).
is_a(staff_nurse,nurse).
is_a(sister,nurse).
is_a(specialist_nurse,nurse).
is_a(house_officer_day,house_officer).
is_a(house_officer_night,house_officer).
is_a(senior_house_officer_day,senior_house_officer).
is_a(senior_house_officer_night,senior_house_officer).
is_a(house_officer,doctor).
is_a(senior_house_officer,doctor).
is_a(specialist_registrar,doctor).
is_a(consultant,doctor).
is_a(junior_data_manager,data_manager).
is_a(senior_data_manager,data_manager).
is_a(receptionist,administrator).
is_a(manager,administrator).
is_a(student_nurse_day,day_duty).
is_a(staff_nurse_day,day_duty).
is_a(sister_day,day_duty).
is_a(house_officer_day,day_duty).
is_a(senior_house_officer_day,day_duty).
is_a(student_nurse_night,night_duty).
is_a(staff_nurse_night,night_duty).
is_a(sister_night,night_duty).
is_a(house_officer_night,night_duty).
is_a(senior_house_officer_night,night_duty).
% inheritance paths: currently everything is inherited across whole hierarchies,
% except that manager does not inherit from anyone except receptionist.
% inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,Object).
inherits_rpa_path(consultant,house_officer,_,_).
inherits_rpa_path(specialist_nurse,student_nurse,_,_).
inherits_rpa_path(senior_data_manager,junior_data_manager,_,_).
inherits_rpa_path(manager,receptionist,_,_).
% rpa
% rpa(Role,Permission,Object).
rpa(house_officer,select,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(house_officer,select,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(house_officer,select,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
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rpa(house_officer,select,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(house_officer,select,diagnosis(Diagnoses_code,Illness_name,Usual_Symptoms)).
rpa(house_officer,select,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(house_officer,select,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,
Cons_Description,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(house_officer,select,patient_diagnosis(Patient_Diagnosis_
Number,Diagnosing_Doctor,Diagnosis_Desc,Cons_Number,Diagnosis_Code)).
rpa(senior_house_officer,update,diagnosis(Diagnoses_code,Illness_name,Usual_Symptoms)).
rpa(senior_house_officer,update,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_
Description,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_house_officer,update,patient_diagnosis(Patient_
Diagnosis_Number,Diagnosing_Doctor,Diagnosis_Desc,Cons_Number,Diagnosis_Code)).
rpa(specialist_registrar,insert,patient_diagnosis(Patient_
Diagnosis_Number,Diagnosing_Doctor,Diagnosis_Desc,Cons_Number,Diagnosis_Code)).
rpa(consultant,insert,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,
Cons_Description,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(student_nurse,select,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(student_nurse,select,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,bed_capacity)).
rpa(student_nurse,select,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(student_nurse,select,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(student_nurse,select,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(staff_nurse,update,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)). % 
should be able to put them in a ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)
rpa(staff_nurse,select,diagnosis(Patient_diagnosis_Number,
Diagnoses_code,Illness_name,Usual_Symptoms)).
rpa(staff_nurse,select,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(staff_nurse,select,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,
Cons_Description,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(staff_nurse,select,patient_diagnosis(Patient_Diagnosis_
Number,Diagnosing_Doctor,Diagnosis_Desc,Cons_Number,Diagnosis_Code)).
rpa(sister,update,patient_diagnosis(Diagnoses_code,Illness_name,Usual_Symptoms)).
rpa(specialist_nurse,update,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,bed_capacity)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,
First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,diagnosis(Diagnoses_code,Illness_name,Usual_Symptoms)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,
Cons_Date,Cons_Description,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,patient_diagnosis(Patient_
Diagnosis_Number,Diagnosing_Doctor,Diagnosis_Desc,Cons_Number,Diagnosis_Code)).
rpa(receptionist,select,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(manager,update,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(manager,insert,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(junior_data_manager,insert,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
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rpa(senior_data_manager,select,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,Type,Bed_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,Type)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,
Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,
Address,DOB,Bed_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,
Cons_Description,?Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
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rpa(senior_data_manager,index,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,Cons_Description,
Patient_ID,?Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,
Cons_Description,?Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,ae_consultation(Cons_Number,Cons_Date,
Cons_Description,?Patient_ID,Doctor_ID)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,patient_diagnoses).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,nurse_ward(Ward_ID,Type,Ward_Capacity)).
% access on rbac-related data: reserved for senior data manager
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,user(Username,LastName,FirstName,Address,DOB)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,password(Username,Password)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,role(Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,role(Role)).
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rpa(senior_data_manager,select,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,d_s(SeniorRole,JuniorRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,inherits_rpa_path(SeniorRole,JuniorRole,Permission,
Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,is_a(InnerRole,OuterRole)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
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rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,ssd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,dsd(Role1,Role2)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,ura(User,Role)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,select,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,insert,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,update,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,delete,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,drop,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,grant,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,references,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,index,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,alter,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,create_view,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(senior_data_manager,show_view,d_rpa(Role,Permission,Object)).
rpa(Role,Permission,password(Username,Password)) :-
  role(Role),
  (Permission == select; Permission == update).
% ura
% ura(User,Role).
ura(dr_peters,house_officer_day).
ura(dr_davies,house_officer_night).
ura(dr_williams,house_officer_day).
ura(dr_jones,house_officer_night).
ura(dr_fish,house_officer_night).
ura(dr_ghosh,senior_house_officer_day).
ura(dr_edmonds,senior_house_officer_night).
ura(dr_bowie,senior_house_officer_day).
ura(dr_python,specialist_registrar).
ura(dr_kellett,specialist_registrar).
ura(dr_sugar,consultant).
ura(dr_evans,consultant).
ura(miss_strand,student_nurse_day).
ura(miss_strand,student_nurse_night).
ura(mrs_lewis,staff_nurse_day).
ura(mr_davies,staff_nurse_day).
ura(mr_kenning,staff_nurse_night).
ura(mr_minnow,staff_nurse_night).
ura(mr_avery,sister_day).
ura(mrs_jones,sister_day).
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ura(miss_jackson,sister_night).
ura(mrs_jones,sister_night).
ura(miss_jacobson,specialist_nurse).
ura(mr_mctaggart,specialist_nurse).
ura(mr_clarkson,junior_data_manager).
ura(miss_lewis,junior_data_manager).
ura(mrs_canning,senior_data_manager).
ura(miss_darch,receptionist).
ura(mrs_james,manager).
% junior data managers who are also something else
ura(miss_strand,junior_data_manager).
ura(miss_darch,junior_data_manager).
% receptionists who are also something else
ura(dr_peters,receptionist).
ura(dr_evans,receptionist).
% attach nurses to wards (probably needs its own data table)
% nurse_ward(User,Ward).
nurse_ward(miss_strand,ward1).
nurse_ward(miss_strand,ward2).
nurse_ward(mrs_lewis,ward1).
nurse_ward(mr_davies,ward2).
nurse_ward(mr_kenning,ward1).
nurse_ward(mr_minnow,ward1).
nurse_ward(mr_avery,ward1).
nurse_ward(mrs_jones,ward2).
nurse_ward(miss_jackson,ward1).
deactivate(null,null,0).
drpa(null,null,null).
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Appendix V: Context Constraints in Static RBAC
% context_condition(Name,User,Permission,Object).
% associated_cc(Role,Permission,Object,ContextConstraint).
% context conditions
% context_condition(Name,User,Permission,Object).
context_condition(nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient,Nurse,P,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,
First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)) :-
  bed(Bed_ID,Room_ID,_),
  room(Room_ID,Ward_ID,_,_),
  nurse_ward(Nurse,Ward_ID).
context_condition(staff_nurse_or_sister_active_for_2_hours,U,P,O):-
  active(Nurse,R1,D),
  nurse_ward(Nurse,W),
  nurse_ward(U,W),
  date_time_stamp(D,T),
  get_time(Stamp),
  Stamp - T >= 60*60*2, % number of seconds representing 2 hours
  included_in(R1,R2),
  (R2 = sister; R2 = staff_nurse).
context_condition(patient_treated_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,P,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,
First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)) :-
  ae_consultation(_,_,_,Patient_ID,Doctor_ID).
context_condition(patient_treated_by_doctor,Doctor_ID,P,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,
First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID)) :-
  ae_consultation(Cons_Number,_,_,Patient_ID,_),
  patient_diagnosis(_,Doctor_ID,_,Cons_Number,_).
% temporal conditions
context_condition(day_duty,U,P,O) :-
  get_time(Stamp),
  stamp_date_time(Stamp,D,local),
  D = date(_, _, _, H, _, _, _, _, _),
  H >= 9, H < 21.
  
context_condition(night_duty,U,P,O) :-
  get_time(Stamp),
  stamp_date_time(Stamp,D,local),
  D = date(_, _, _, H, _, _, _, _, _),
  (H >= 21; H < 9).
context_condition(office_hours,U,P,O) :-
  get_time(Stamp),
  stamp_date_time(Stamp,D,local),
  D = date(_, _, _, H, _, _, _, _, _),
  H >= 9, H < 17,
  format_time(codes(Day), '%a', D),
  (Day = "Mon"; Day = "Tue"; Day = "Wed"; Day = "Thu"; Day = "Fri").
  
context_condition(user_is_same_as_logged_in,U,P,password(Username,Password)) :-
  password(Username,Password),
  U = Username.
% association of context constraints with roles and permissions
% associated_cc(Role,Permission,Object,ContextConstraint).
associated_cc(sister,_,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,DOB,Bed_ID),
nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient).
associated_cc(senior_house_officer,_,patient(Patient_ID,Last_Name,First_Name,Address,
DOB,Bed_ID),patient_treated_by_doctor).
associated_cc(student_nurse,_,_,staff_nurse_or_sister_currently_active_for_2_hours).
associated_cc(junior_data_manager,_,_,office_hours).
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associated_cc(receptionist,_,_,office_hours).
associated_cc(day_duty,_,_,day_duty).
associated_cc(night_duty,_,_,night_duty).
associated_cc(Role,_,password(Username,Password),user_is_same_as_logged_in) :-
  role(Role),
  Role \== senior_data_manager.
% ssd(Role1,Role2).
% dsd(Role1,Role2).
% static separation of duties
% ssd(Role1,Role2).
% a senior_data_manager cannot be anything else
ssd(senior_data_manager,X):-
  role(X),
  X \== senior_data_manager.
  
  
% dynamic separation of duties
% dsd(Role1,Role2).
dsd(consultant,receptionist).
% a junior data manager cannot be simultaneously logged in as anything else
dsd(junior_data_manager,X):-
  role(X),
  X \== junior_data_manager.
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Appendix VI: RBAC and database diagrams
Figure 115: Role Inclusion in Hospital Database. Solid lines represent d_s relationships; dotted lines 
represent is_a relationships.
Figure 116: ERD of RBAC schema: tables only. Blue boxes are tables. Cyan boxes are tables linking pairs of roles. 
Jade boxes are tables populated by triggers to form the results of recursive rules.
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Figure 117: ERD of RBAC data: tables and views. Blue boxes are tables. Cyan boxes are tables linking
pairs of roles. Jade boxes are tables populated by triggers to form the results of recursive rules. Green 
boxes are views. An arrow represents the ‘many’ end of a 1:many relationship. Double-relationships, 
where an object has two relationships with another object, are in green; the rest are in blue.
Figure 118: Formation of views from constituent objects, as determined by CREATE VIEW statements. 
Arrows point to view formed. All arrows representing objects forming a specific view have the same 
colour. Some tables do not participate in any CREATE VIEW statements.
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Appendix VII: Oracle Database: Data Description
Table 28: Roles and permissions in Hospital database
Role Directly Senior to
(Inherits from)
Permissions
House_Officer Read: Ward, Room, Bed, Patient, Diagnosis, User, 
AE_Consultation, Patient_Diagnosis
Senior_House_Officer House_Officer Update: Diagnosis, AE_Consultation, 
Patient_Diagnosis
Specialist_Registrar Senior_House_Officer Insert: Patient_Diagnosis
Consultant Specialist_Registrar Insert: AE_Consultation
Student_Nurse Read: Ward, Room, Bed, Patient, User
Staff_Nurse Student_Nurse Update: Patient
Read Diagnosis, User, AE_Consultation, 
Patient_Diagnosis
Sister Staff_Nurse Update: Patient_Diagnosis
Specialist_Nurse Sister Update: AE_Consultation
Junior_Data_Manager Insert: Ward, Room, Bed, Patient, Diagnosis, 
AE_Consultation, Patient_Diagnosis
Senior_Data_Manager Junior_Data_Manager Complete access to entire database
Receptionist Read: Patient
Manager Receptionist Update: Patient
Insert: Patient
usr(  user_id ,  last_name,  first_name, address, date_of_birth )
password( user_id, password )
role(  role )
d_s( senior_role,  junior_role )
inherits_rpa_path( senior_role, junior_role, action, object )
is_a( inner_role, outer_role )
ura( usr, role )
rpa( role, action, object )
d_rpa( role, action, object )
usr_session( usr, role, start_time, end_time )
dsd( role1, role2 )
ssd( role1, role2 )
senior_to( senior_role,  junior_role )
included_in( inner_role, outer_role )
-- temporary tables
senior_to_staging( senior_role, junior_role )
included_in_staging( inner_role, outer_role )
Text 57: Schema for RBAC model, listing tables.
219
inherits_rpa ( senior_role, junior_role, action, object )
rpa_full ( role, action, object, senior_role, junior_role )
permittable ( usr, object, action, role )
currently_active ( usr, role, start_time )
permitted ( usr, object, action, role )
d_rpa_full ( role, action, object, senior_role, junior_role )
denied ( usr, action, object, role )
authorizable ( usr, object, action, role )
authorized ( usr, object, action, role )
dsd_conflict ( role1, role2 )
ssd_conflict ( role1, role2 )
Text 58: Schema for RBAC model, listing views.
Table 29: Triggers for modelling static RBAC
Trigger Condition Action
AFTER INSERT ON role Apply included_in(R1,R1) by inserting the appropriate entry in the 
included_in table.
AFTER INSERT ON d_s Populate senior_to with any new values to be added as a result of new entry
in d_s.
AFTER UPDATE ON d_s DELETE FROM senior_to, and repopulate it.
AFTER DELETE ON d_s DELETE FROM senior_to, and repopulate it.
AFTER INSERT ON is_a Populate included_in with any new values to be added as a result of new 
entry in is_a.
AFTER UPDATE ON is_a DELETE FROM included_in, and repopulate it.
AFTER DELETE ON is_a DELETE FROM included_in, and repopulate it.
BEFORE INSERT ON ura Prevent insertion if new entry would cause SSD conflict.
BEFORE UPDATE ON ura Prevent update if it would cause SSD conflict.
BEFORE INSERT ON session Prevent insertion if new entry would cause DSD conflict.
BEFORE UPDATE ON session Prevent any such update except one that ends a session (i.e. set end_time to 
the current time)
BEFORE INSERT ON 
password
Encrypt password (in some implementations). The password is stored in the 
password table in encrypted form.
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Table 30: Triggers for RBAC enforcement mechanism
Trigger Condition Function(s)
Called (if any)
Action
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE ON role add_role CREATE :new.role
AFTER UPDATE OR DELETE ON role drop_role DROP :old.role
BEFORE UPDATE ON role Prevent operation
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE ON d_s grant_role GRANT :new.senior_role TO 
:new.junior_role
AFTER UPDATE OR DELETE ON d_s revoke_role REVOKE :old.senior_role FROM 
:old.junior_role
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE ON is_a grant_role GRANT new.outer_role TO 
new.inner_role
AFTER UPDATE OR DELETE ON is_a revoke_role REVOKE old.outer_role FROM 
old.inner_role
AFTER INSERT ON rpa grant_priv GRANT privilege ON object TO role
AFTER DELETE ON rpa revoke_priv REVOKE privilege ON object FROM 
role
BEFORE UPDATE ON rpa Prevent this operation
AFTER DELETE ON ura revoke_role REVOKE role FROM user if user is 
currently active in it (otherwise, it would not be 
assigned)
AFTER INSERT ON ura grant_role GRANT role TO user if user is active in 
role (this shouldn't happen)
BEFORE INSERT ON ura Prevent insertion if SSD conflict exists
BEFORE UPDATE ON ura Prevent this operation
BEFORE UPDATE ON usr Prevent operation
BEFORE UPDATE ON usr Prevent operation
BEFORE UPDATE ON password Prevent operation if attempting to modify 
user_id
AFTER INSERT ON password create_user CREATE new.user
AFTER DELETE ON password drop_user DROP old.user
AFTER INSERT ON usr_session grant_role GRANT role TO user
AFTER UPDATE ON usr_session revoke_role REVOKE role FROM user
BEFORE INSERT ON usr_session 1. Query currently_active to 
determine whether an active session with
this user and role already exists.
2. Check for DSD violations (user active in
another role that conflicts with this role).
3. Check for user not assigned to role in 
ura.
If any of these are true, then prevent insertion.
BEFORE UPDATE ON usr_session Prevent operation unless it is to deactivate session
by modifying end_time
BEFORE DELETE ON usr_session Prevent operation
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Table 31: Number of unique rpa_full rows by role
Role Unique
rpa_full
rows
Users Assigned permittable
day_duty 0 0 0
night_duty 0 0 0
nurse 0 0 0
student_nurse 5 0 0
student_nurse_d 5 1 5
student_nurse_n 5 1 5
staff_nurse 9 0 0
staff_nurse_d 9 2 18
staff_nurse_n 9 2 18
sister 10 0 0
sister_d 10 2 20
sister_n 10 2 20
specialist_nurse 13 2 26
doctor 0 0 0
house_officer 8 0 0
house_officer_d 8 2 16
house_officer_n 8 3 24
snr_house_officer 11 0 0
snr_house_officer_d 11 2 22
snr_house_officer_n 11 1 11
specialist_registrar 12 2 24
consultant 13 2 26
administrator 0 0 0
receptionist 1 3 3
manager 8 1 8
data_manager 0 0 0
jnr_data_manager 7 (not tested) (not tested)
snr_data_manager 153 (not tested) (not tested)
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Appendix VIII: SQL Code for Static RBAC 
Tables
CREATE TABLE usr (
  user_id VARCHAR(10),
  last_name  VARCHAR(50),
  first_name VARCHAR(50),
  address   VARCHAR(50),
  date_of_birth       DATE,
    Primary Key (user_id)
);
CREATE TABLE password (
  user_id VARCHAR(10),
  password VARCHAR(41),
    Primary Key (user_id),
    FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES usr (user_id)
);
CREATE TABLE role (
  role VARCHAR(64),
    Primary Key (role)
);
-- dummy role mimicking anonymous variable _ in Prolog
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( '_' );
-- direct seniority
CREATE TABLE d_s (
  senior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  junior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    Primary Key (senior_role,junior_role),
    FOREIGN KEY (senior_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (junior_role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
-- rpa path inheritance
CREATE TABLE inherits_rpa_path (
  senior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  junior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  action VARCHAR(64),
  object VARCHAR(64),
    Primary Key (senior_role,junior_role,action,object),
    FOREIGN KEY (senior_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (junior_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    CONSTRAINT check_action_inherits_rpa_path
    CHECK ( action IN ( 'select', 'insert', 'update', 'delete', 'alter', '_' ) )
);
CREATE TABLE is_a (
  inner_role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  outer_role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    Primary Key (inner_role,outer_role),
    FOREIGN KEY (inner_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (outer_role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
CREATE TABLE ura(
  usr VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
  role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    PRIMARY KEY (usr, role),
    FOREIGN KEY (usr) REFERENCES usr(user_id),
    FOREIGN KEY (role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
CREATE TABLE rpa(
  role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
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  action VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
  object VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    PRIMARY KEY (role, object, action),
    FOREIGN KEY (role) REFERENCES role(role),
    CONSTRAINT check_action_rpa
    CHECK ( action IN ( 'select', 'insert', 'update', 'delete', 'alter' ) )
);
CREATE TABLE d_rpa(
  role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  action VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
  object VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    PRIMARY KEY (role, object, action),
    FOREIGN KEY (role) REFERENCES role(role),
    CONSTRAINT check_action_d_rpa
    CHECK ( action IN ( 'select', 'insert', 'update', 'delete', 'alter' ) )
);
CREATE TABLE usr_session(
  usr VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
  role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  start_time TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
  end_time TIMESTAMP,
    FOREIGN KEY (usr) REFERENCES usr(user_id),
    FOREIGN KEY (role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
-- dynamic separation of duties
CREATE TABLE dsd(
  role1 VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  role2 VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    PRIMARY KEY (role1, role2),
    FOREIGN KEY (role1) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (role2) REFERENCES role(role)
);
-- static separation of duties
CREATE TABLE ssd(
  role1 VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  role2 VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    PRIMARY KEY (role1, role2),
    FOREIGN KEY (role1) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (role2) REFERENCES role(role)
);
-- the following tables can only be updated by triggers
-- senior role
CREATE TABLE senior_to(
  senior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  junior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
--    Primary Key (senior_role,junior_role),
    FOREIGN KEY (senior_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (junior_role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
CREATE TABLE included_in (
  inner_role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  outer_role VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
    Primary Key (inner_role,outer_role),
    FOREIGN KEY (inner_role) REFERENCES role(role),
    FOREIGN KEY (outer_role) REFERENCES role(role)
);
CREATE TABLE log (
  txt VARCHAR(512)
);
-- temporary tables
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CREATE TABLE senior_to_staging(
  senior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  junior_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL
);
CREATE TABLE included_in_staging(
  inner_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL,
  outer_role  VARCHAR(64) NOT NULL
);
Views
CREATE VIEW inherits_rpa AS
-- inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O) :- senior_to(R1,R2),
--                           senior_to(R3,R4),
--                           inherits_rpa_path(R1,R4,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT s1.junior_role AS senior_role, s2.senior_role AS junior_role, action, object
    FROM senior_to s1, senior_to s2, inherits_rpa_path
    WHERE s1.senior_role = inherits_rpa_path.senior_role
    AND s2.junior_role = inherits_rpa_path.junior_role;
CREATE VIEW rpa_full AS -- all permissions to all roles, both explicit and implicit (by 
inheritance)
-- rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R1,R2),
--                     senior_to(R2,R3),
--                    rpa(R3,P,O),
--                    inherits_rpa(R2,R3,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT included_in.inner_role AS role, action, object, senior_role, junior_role 
FROM rpa, included_in, senior_to
    WHERE included_in.outer_role = senior_to.senior_role
    AND senior_to.junior_role = rpa.role
    AND (
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role FROM inherits_rpa WHERE action = '_' AND object = '_')
      OR
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role,action) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role,action FROM inherits_rpa WHERE object = '_')
      OR
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role,object) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role,object FROM inherits_rpa WHERE action = '_')
      OR
      (senior_to.senior_role,senior_to.junior_role,action,object) IN
        (SELECT senior_role,junior_role,action,object FROM inherits_rpa)
    )
;
CREATE VIEW permittable AS 
-- permittable(U,P,O) :- ura(U,R),
--                           permittable(U,P,O,R).
-- permittable(U,P,O,R) :- rpa_full(R,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, object, action, ura.role AS role FROM ura, rpa_full
    WHERE ura.role = rpa_full.role;
CREATE VIEW currently_active AS
-- currently_active(U,R1,D1)
-- This behaves differently from its equivalent in Prolog, 
-- hence the full predicate is not shown.
-- Unlike in Prolog, it does not test for DSD inconsistency,
-- since this is already done when inserting a row in active.
-- active is equivalent to both activate and deactivate in Prolog.
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, role, start_time FROM usr_session 
  WHERE usr_session.start_time < SYSTIMESTAMP
  AND (usr_session.end_time > SYSTIMESTAMP or usr_session.end_time is null);
CREATE VIEW permitted AS
-- permitted(U,P,O) :-    ura(U,R),
--                        permitted(U,P,O,R).
-- permitted(U,P,O,R1) :- included_in(R0,R1),
--                        currently_active(U,R0,_),
--                        not(fail_context_constraint(U,R0,P,O)),
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--                        permittable(U,P,O,R1).
  SELECT DISTINCT permittable.usr AS usr, object, action, permittable.role AS role FROM 
permittable, currently_active
    WHERE permittable.usr = currently_active.usr and permittable.role = currently_active.role;
CREATE VIEW d_rpa_full AS 
-- d_rpa_full(R1,P,O) :- included_in(R3,R2),
--                       senior_to(R1,R2),
--                       d_rpa(R1,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT included_in.inner_role AS role, action, object, senior_role, junior_role 
FROM d_rpa, included_in, senior_to
    WHERE included_in.outer_role = senior_to.junior_role
    AND d_rpa.role = senior_to.senior_role;
CREATE VIEW denied AS 
-- denied(U,P,O) :-    ura(U,R),
--                     denied(U,P,O,R).
--
-- denied(U,P,O,R) :- d_rpa_full(R,P,O).
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, action, object, ura.role AS role FROM ura, d_rpa_full
    WHERE ura.role = d_rpa_full.role;
CREATE VIEW authorizable AS
-- usr_authorization(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
--                               usr_authorization(U,P,O,R).
-- usr_authorization(U,P,O,R) :- usr_permission(U,P,O,R),
--                                not(denied(U,P,O,R)).
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, object, action, role FROM permittable
  WHERE (usr, object, action, role) NOT IN
      (SELECT usr, object, action, role FROM denied);
CREATE VIEW authorized AS
-- authorized(U,P,O) :-   ura(U,R),
--                        authorized(U,P,O,R).
-- authorized(U,P,O,R) :- permitted(U,P,O,R),
--                        not(denied(R,P,O)).
  SELECT DISTINCT usr, object, action, role FROM permitted
  WHERE (usr, object, action, role) NOT IN
      (SELECT usr, object, action, role FROM denied);
CREATE VIEW dsd_conflict AS
-- dsd_conflict(R1,R3) :- included_in(R1,R2),
--                        included_in(R3,R4),
--                        dsd(R2,R4), !.
--                        dsd(R4,R2).
-- Entries in dsd with '_' are expanded to all roles.
  SELECT i1.inner_role AS role1, i2.inner_role AS role2 FROM dsd, included_in i1, included_in 
i2
    WHERE i1.outer_role = dsd.role1 AND i2.outer_role = dsd.role2
    UNION
  SELECT i2.inner_role AS role1,i1.inner_role AS role2 FROM dsd, included_in i1, included_in 
i2
    WHERE i1.outer_role = dsd.role1 AND i2.outer_role = dsd.role2
    UNION
  SELECT i1.inner_role AS role1,role AS role2 FROM dsd, role, included_in i1 
    WHERE i1.outer_role = dsd.role1 AND dsd.role1 <> role.role AND dsd.role2 = '_'
    UNION
  SELECT role AS role1,i1.inner_role AS role2 FROM dsd, role, included_in i1 
    WHERE i1.outer_role = dsd.role1 AND dsd.role1 <> role.role AND dsd.role2 = '_'
    UNION
  SELECT i2.inner_role AS role1, role AS role2 FROM dsd, role, included_in i2 
    WHERE i2.outer_role = dsd.role2 AND dsd.role2 <> role.role AND dsd.role1 = '_'
    UNION
  SELECT role AS role1, i2.inner_role AS role2 FROM dsd, role, included_in i2 
    WHERE i2.outer_role = dsd.role2 AND dsd.role2 <> role.role AND dsd.role1 = '_'
;
CREATE VIEW ssd_conflict AS
-- ssd_conflict(R1,R3) :- included_in(R1,R2),
--                        included_in(R3,R4),
--                        ssd(R2,R4), !.
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--                        ssd(R4,R2).
-- Entries in ssd with '_' are expanded to all roles.
  SELECT i1.inner_role AS role1, i2.inner_role AS role2 FROM ssd, included_in i1, included_in 
i2
    WHERE i1.outer_role = ssd.role1 AND i2.outer_role = ssd.role2
    UNION
  SELECT i2.inner_role AS role1,i1.inner_role AS role2 FROM ssd, included_in i1, included_in 
i2
    WHERE i1.outer_role = ssd.role1 AND i2.outer_role = ssd.role2
    UNION
  SELECT i1.inner_role AS role1,role AS role2 FROM ssd, role, included_in i1 
    WHERE i1.outer_role = ssd.role1 AND ssd.role1 <> role.role AND ssd.role2 = '_'
    UNION
  SELECT role AS role1,i1.inner_role AS role2 FROM ssd, role, included_in i1 
    WHERE i1.outer_role = ssd.role1 AND ssd.role1 <> role.role AND ssd.role2 = '_'
    UNION
  SELECT i2.inner_role AS role1, role AS role2 FROM ssd, role, included_in i2 
    WHERE i2.outer_role = ssd.role2 AND ssd.role2 <> role.role AND ssd.role1 = '_'
    UNION
  SELECT role AS role1, i2.inner_role AS role2 FROM ssd, role, included_in i2 
    WHERE i2.outer_role = ssd.role2 AND ssd.role2 <> role.role AND ssd.role1 = '_'
;
Triggers
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER role_after_all
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON role
FOR EACH ROW 
BEGIN
     -- Update also needs to modify d_s tables etc. CASCADE UPDATE?
     IF UPDATING OR DELETING THEN 
         DELETE FROM included_in
             WHERE inner_role = :old.role
             AND outer_role = :old.role;
        drop_role(full_db_user(:old.role));
     END IF;
     IF UPDATING OR INSERTING THEN 
     -- Insert an entry for the new role in included_in,
--      corresponding to the rule
--      included_in(R1,R1).
         INSERT INTO included_in(inner_role,outer_role)
         VALUES (:new.role,:new.role);
         create_role(full_db_user(:new.role));
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER role_before_update
BEFORE UPDATE ON role
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    RAISE_APPLICATION_ERROR(-20000, 'You cannot change the name of a role once created.');
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER d_s_after_all
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON d_s
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FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    IF (DELETING OR UPDATING) THEN 
        revoke_role(full_db_user(:old.junior_role),full_db_user(:old.senior_role));
    END IF;
    IF (UPDATING OR INSERTING) THEN 
        grant_role(full_db_user(:new.junior_role),full_db_user(:new.senior_role));
    insert into log values ( 'GRANT ' || full_db_user(:new.junior_role)
         || ' TO ' || full_db_user(:new.senior_role) );
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER d_s_after_all_sl
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON d_s
BEGIN
    IF (DELETING OR UPDATING) THEN 
      delete_senior_to();
    END IF;
    insert_senior_to();
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER senior_to_after_insert_sl
AFTER INSERT ON senior_to
BEGIN
  
    recourse_senior_to();
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER is_a_after_all
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON is_a
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
   IF (DELETING OR UPDATING) THEN 
       revoke_role(full_db_user(:old.outer_role),full_db_user(:old.inner_role));
    END IF;
    IF (UPDATING OR INSERTING) THEN 
       grant_role(full_db_user(:new.outer_role),full_db_user(:new.inner_role));
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER is_a_after_all_sl
AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON is_a
BEGIN
    insert_included_in();
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER included_in_after_insert_sl
AFTER INSERT ON included_in
BEGIN
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    recourse_included_in();
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER rpa_after_insert
AFTER INSERT ON rpa
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    grant_priv(:new.action, quote_ident(:new.object), full_db_user(:new.role) );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER rpa_after_delete
AFTER DELETE ON rpa
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    revoke_priv(:old.action, quote_ident(:old.object), full_db_user(:old.role) );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER rpa_before_update
BEFORE UPDATE ON rpa
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    raise_application_error(-20000, 'You cannot alter an existing user-role assignment.');
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ura_before_insert
BEFORE INSERT ON ura
FOR EACH ROW 
DECLARE
  v_conflicting_roles INTEGER;
BEGIN
    -- Check for static separation of duty
    -- rules that conflict with this attempt to
    -- insert a user-role assignment.
    -- If any are found, then the ura cannot be inserted.
    -- Implements rule
    -- inconsistent_ssd(U,R1) :- ura(U,R1),
    --                           ssd(R1,R2),
    --                           ura(U,R2).
    SELECT count(*) INTO v_conflicting_roles FROM ssd_conflict, ura 
        WHERE ssd_conflict.role1 = ura.role 
        AND ssd_conflict.role2 = :new.role
        AND ura.usr = :new.usr;
  
    IF v_conflicting_roles > 0 THEN
        RAISE_APPLICATION_ERROR(-20000, 'Conflicting roles: cannot assign ' || :new.usr || ' 
to ' || :new.role || '.');
    END IF;
END;
/
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CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ura_before_update
BEFORE UPDATE ON ura
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    raise_application_error(-20000, 'You cannot alter an existing user-role assignment.');
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ura_after_delete
AFTER DELETE ON ura
FOR EACH ROW
DECLARE
    v_active_usr INTEGER;
BEGIN
    SELECT count(*) INTO v_active_usr FROM currently_active
        WHERE usr = :old.usr;
    IF v_active_usr > 0 THEN
        revoke_role(full_db_user(:old.role),full_db_user(:old.usr));
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ura_after_insert
AFTER INSERT ON ura
FOR EACH ROW
DECLARE
    v_active_usr INTEGER;
BEGIN
    SELECT count(*) INTO v_active_usr FROM currently_active
      WHERE usr = :new.usr;
    IF v_active_usr > 0 THEN -- this shouldn't happen: user should not be active in role 
unless ura already there
        grant_role(full_db_user(:new.role),full_db_user(:new.usr));
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER password_after_insert
AFTER INSERT ON password
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    create_user( full_db_user(:new.User_Id), :new.password);
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER password_after_delete
AFTER DELETE ON password
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    drop_user(full_db_user(:old.User_Id));
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER usr_session_after_insert
AFTER INSERT ON usr_session
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    grant_role(full_db_user(:new.role),full_db_user(:new.usr));
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END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER usr_session_after_update
AFTER UPDATE ON usr_session
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    IF (:new.end_time >= SYSDATE AND :old.end_time is null) THEN
        revoke_role(full_db_user(:new.role),full_db_user(:new.usr));
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER usr_session_before_insert
BEFORE INSERT ON usr_session
FOR EACH ROW
DECLARE
    v_conflicting_roles INTEGER;
    v_current_sessions INTEGER;
    v_ura INTEGER;
BEGIN
    -- Check for existing active session with this user and role.
    -- If exists, cannot activate a new one.
    SELECT count(*) INTO v_current_sessions
      FROM currently_active
      WHERE usr = :new.usr AND role = :new.role;
    if v_current_sessions > 0 THEN
        raise_application_error(-20000, 'User already active in role: cannot activate ' || 
:new.usr || ' as ' || :new.role || '.');
    END IF;
    -- Check for dynamic separation of duty
    -- rules that conflict with this attempt to
    -- activate a user with a role.
    -- If any are found, then the activation cannot take place.
    -- Implements rule
    -- inconsistent_dsd(U,R1,D1) :- activate(U,R2,D2,Password),
    --                              password(U,Password),
    --                              dsd_conflict(R1,R2),
    --                              date_time_stamp(D1,T1),
    --                              (
    --                                not(deactivate(U,R2,_));
    --                                deactivate(U,R2,D3),
    --                                date_time_stamp(D3,T3),
    --                                T3 < T1
    --                              ),
    --                              date_time_stamp(D2,T2),
    --                              T2 =< T1.
    :new.start_time := CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;
    
    SELECT count(*) INTO v_conflicting_roles 
        FROM dsd_conflict, usr_session 
        WHERE dsd_conflict.role1 = usr_session.role 
        AND dsd_conflict.role2 = :new.role
        AND usr_session.usr = :new.usr
        AND usr_session.start_time < CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
        AND (usr_session.end_time > CURRENT_TIMESTAMP or usr_session.end_time is null);
  
    SELECT count(*) INTO v_ura FROM ura
        WHERE usr = :new.usr AND role = :new.role;
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    IF v_conflicting_roles > 0 THEN
        raise_application_error(-20000, 'Conflicting roles: cannot activate ' || :new.usr || '
as ' || :new.role || '.');
    END IF;
    IF v_conflicting_roles > 0 OR v_ura = 0 THEN
        raise_application_error(-20000, 'Not assigned to role: cannot activate ' || :new.usr 
|| ' as ' || :new.role || '.');
    END IF;
 END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER usr_session_before_update
BEFORE UPDATE ON usr_session
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
   IF :new.usr <> :old.usr OR :new.role <> :old.role OR :new.start_time <> :old.start_time 
OR :new.end_time < SYSDATE THEN
        RAISE_APPLICATION_ERROR(-20000, 'You cannot update a session once created, except to 
end it.');
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER usr_session_before_delete
BEFORE DELETE ON usr_session
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    RAISE_APPLICATION_ERROR(-20000, 'You cannot delete a session once created.');
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER password_before_update
BEFORE UPDATE ON password
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    IF :new.user_id <> :old.user_id THEN
        RAISE_APPLICATION_ERROR(-20000, 'You cannot change a user''s ID once the user has been
created.');
    END IF;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER usr_before_update
BEFORE UPDATE ON usr
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
    IF :new.user_id <> :old.user_id THEN
        RAISE_APPLICATION_ERROR(-20000, 'You cannot change a user''s ID once the user has been
created.');
    END IF;
END;
/
Functions
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION is_part_of( p_inner_role VARCHAR, p_outer_role VARCHAR )
RETURN BOOLEAN
IS
  v_num_rows1 INT;
  v_num_rows2 INT;
BEGIN
  SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_num_rows1 FROM included_in, senior_to WHERE
    p_inner_role = included_in.inner_role AND
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    included_in.outer_role = senior_to.junior_role AND
    senior_to.senior_role = p_outer_role;
  SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_num_rows2 FROM included_in WHERE
    p_inner_role = included_in.inner_role AND
    included_in.outer_role = p_outer_role;
  RETURN (v_num_rows1 + v_num_rows2 > 0);
END;
/
-- replace single with double quote for safe passage.
-- this is equivalent to a predefined function in Postgres
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION quote_ident( username VARCHAR )
RETURN VARCHAR
IS
BEGIN
  RETURN replace(username, '''', '''''');
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION get_username
RETURN VARCHAR
IS
  v_username VARCHAR(64);
BEGIN
  SELECT user INTO v_username FROM DUAL;
  RETURN v_username;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION get_schema
RETURN VARCHAR
IS
  v_username VARCHAR(64);
  v_schema VARCHAR(64);
BEGIN
  v_username := get_username;
  
  SELECT DEFAULT_TABLESPACE INTO v_schema 
  FROM sys.dba_users WHERE username  = v_username;
  RETURN v_schema;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION get_usr
RETURN VARCHAR
IS
  v_username VARCHAR(64);
BEGIN
  select user into v_username from dual;
  return nls_lower(replace(v_username, get_schema() || '1_', ''));
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION full_db_user( username VARCHAR )
RETURN VARCHAR
IS
  v_schema VARCHAR(64);
BEGIN
    v_schema := get_schema();
    RETURN v_schema || '1_' || quote_ident(username);
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END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE insert_senior_to
IS
BEGIN 
  -- Add entries to table senior_to according to each rule,
  -- if they are not already there.
  
  
  -- senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(R1,_).
  INSERT INTO senior_to( 
    SELECT DISTINCT senior_role,senior_role FROM d_s 
      WHERE (senior_role,senior_role) NOT IN
      (SELECT senior_role,junior_role from senior_to)
  );
  
  -- senior_to(R1,R1) :- d_s(_,R1).
  INSERT INTO senior_to( 
    SELECT DISTINCT junior_role,junior_role FROM d_s 
      WHERE (junior_role,junior_role) NOT IN
      (SELECT senior_role,junior_role from senior_to)
  );
  
  -- senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R2).
  INSERT INTO senior_to(
    SELECT DISTINCT senior_role,junior_role FROM d_s 
      WHERE (senior_role,junior_role) NOT IN
      (SELECT senior_role,junior_role from senior_to)
  );
  
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE recourse_senior_to
IS
  v_rows INT;
BEGIN 
  DELETE FROM senior_to_staging;
  -- senior_to(R1,R2) :- d_s(R1,R3), senior_to(R3,R2).
  INSERT INTO senior_to_staging(
    (SELECT DISTINCT senior_to.senior_role, d_s.junior_role
      FROM d_s JOIN senior_to
      ON d_s.senior_role = senior_to.junior_role
    )
--      WHERE (senior_to.senior_role, d_s.junior_role) NOT IN
      MINUS
      (SELECT senior_role,junior_role from senior_to)
  );
  SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_rows FROM senior_to_staging;
  IF (v_rows > 0 ) THEN
    INSERT INTO senior_to (
      (SELECT * FROM senior_to_staging)
      MINUS
      (SELECT senior_role,junior_role from senior_to)
    );
  END IF;
  DELETE FROM senior_to_staging;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE delete_senior_to
IS
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BEGIN 
  DELETE FROM senior_to
    WHERE junior_role <> senior_role
    AND (
      junior_role NOT IN (SELECT junior_role FROM d_s)
      OR senior_role NOT IN (SELECT senior_role FROM d_s)
    )
    OR junior_role = senior_role
    AND (
      junior_role NOT IN (SELECT junior_role FROM d_s)
      AND senior_role NOT IN (SELECT senior_role FROM d_s)
    )
  ;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE insert_included_in
IS
BEGIN 
    -- Add entries to table included_in according to each rule,
    -- if they are not already there.
    -- included_in(R1,R2) :- is_a(R1,R2).
    INSERT INTO included_in(
        SELECT DISTINCT is_a.inner_role,is_a.outer_role 
            FROM is_a WHERE (inner_role,outer_role) NOT IN
            (SELECT inner_role,outer_role from included_in)
    );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE recourse_included_in
IS
  v_rows INT;
BEGIN 
  DELETE FROM included_in_staging;
  -- included_in(R1,R3) :- is_a(R1,R2), included_in(R2,R3).
  INSERT INTO included_in_staging(
    (SELECT DISTINCT included_in.inner_role, is_a.outer_role
    FROM is_a JOIN included_in
    ON is_a.inner_role = included_in.outer_role)
    MINUS
    (SELECT inner_role,outer_role from included_in)
  );
  SELECT COUNT(*) INTO v_rows FROM included_in_staging;
  IF (v_rows > 0 ) THEN
    INSERT INTO included_in (SELECT * FROM included_in_staging);
  END IF;
  DELETE FROM included_in_staging;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE grant_role( role1 VARCHAR, role2 VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN 
    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT ' || role1
         || ' TO ' || role2;
END;
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/CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE revoke_role( role1 VARCHAR, role2 VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN 
    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'REVOKE ' || role1
         || ' FROM ' || role2;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE create_user( user_id VARCHAR, password VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'CREATE USER ' || user_id || ' IDENTIFIED BY "' || password  || '" DEFAULT
TABLESPACE ' || get_schema();
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT CREATE SESSION TO ' || user_id;
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE TO ' || user_id;
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT EXECUTE ON DBMS_RLS TO ' || user_id;
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT EXECUTE ON DBMS_SESSION TO ' || user_id;
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER TO ' || user_id;
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT EXECUTE ON "' || get_schema() || '"."SET_CONTEXT" TO ' || user_id;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE drop_user( user_id VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DROP USER ' || user_id;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE create_role( role VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'CREATE ROLE ' || role;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE drop_role( role VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DROP ROLE ' || role;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE grant_priv( action VARCHAR, object VARCHAR, role VARCHAR )
IS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT ' || action
         || ' ON ' ||object
         || ' TO ' || role;
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE PROCEDURE revoke_priv( action VARCHAR, object VARCHAR, role VARCHAR )
IS
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PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'REVOKE ' || action
         || ' ON ' || object
         || ' FROM ' || role;
END;
/
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Appendix IX: SQL Code for Dynamic RBAC: Generic
Tables
CREATE TABLE tbl_rows (
  row_id VARCHAR(256),
  object VARCHAR(64)
);
Views 1
These are run before setting up context constraints for databases to which RBAC model is applied.
CREATE VIEW permittable_by_row AS
  SELECT usr, permittable.object as object, action, role, row_id
    FROM permittable, tbl_rows
    WHERE permittable.object = tbl_rows.object;
CREATE VIEW permitted_by_row AS
  SELECT usr, permitted.object as object, action, role, row_id
    FROM permitted, tbl_rows
    WHERE permitted.object = tbl_rows.object;
CREATE VIEW authorizable_by_row AS
  SELECT usr, authorizable.object as object, action, role, row_id
    FROM authorizable, tbl_rows
    WHERE authorizable.object = tbl_rows.object;
CREATE VIEW authorized_by_row AS
  SELECT usr, authorized.object as object, action, role, row_id
    FROM authorized, tbl_rows
    WHERE authorized.object = tbl_rows.object;
Views 2
These are run after setting up context constraints for databases to which RBAC model is applied, as this is when
fails_context_constraints is set up.
CREATE VIEW permittable_cc AS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM permittable_by_row
    MINUS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_context_constraints
;
CREATE VIEW permitted_cc AS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM permitted_by_row
    MINUS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_context_constraints
;
CREATE VIEW authorizable_cc AS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM authorizable_by_row
    MINUS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_context_constraints
;
CREATE VIEW authorized_cc AS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM authorized_by_row
    MINUS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_context_constraints
;
Triggers
-- security context
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER cc_logon_trigger
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AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
DECLARE
  v_latest_logon VARCHAR(30);
  v_fulluser VARCHAR(30);
  v_user VARCHAR(30) := get_usr();
  v_schema VARCHAR(30) := get_schema();
  v_grant VARCHAR(255);
  v_role VARCHAR(30) := '';
  CURSOR c_get_roles IS
    SELECT role FROM currently_active WHERE usr = (SELECT get_usr FROM DUAL);
BEGIN
  
  -- get user
  OPEN c_get_roles;
   
  LOOP
    FETCH c_get_roles INTO v_role;
    EXIT WHEN c_get_roles%NOTFOUND;
  
--     set context constraints
    set_context.set_cc(v_role);
--     set_context.set_day_duty;
  END LOOP;
  CLOSE c_get_roles;
END;
/
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Appendix X: SQL Code for Dynamic RBAC: Hospital Database
Tables
CREATE TABLE patient_bed ( -- needed for nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient
  patient_id VARCHAR(256),
  bed_id VARCHAR(64)
);
Views
These correspond to context constraints.
-- context constraints
CREATE VIEW nurse_patient AS
  SELECT permittable_by_row.usr as usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row, nurse_ward, room, bed, patient
    WHERE object = 'patient'
    AND permittable_by_row.usr = nurse_ward.usr
    AND nurse_ward.ward = room.ward_id
    AND room.room_id = bed.room_id
    AND bed.bed_id = patient.bed_id
    AND patient.patient_id = permittable_by_row.row_id
    ORDER BY usr, action, row_id;
CREATE VIEW patient_doctor AS
  SELECT usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row, ae_consultation
    WHERE object = 'patient'
    AND permittable_by_row.usr = ae_consultation.doctor_id
    AND ae_consultation.patient_id = permittable_by_row.row_id
  UNION
  SELECT usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row, ae_consultation, patient_diagnosis
    WHERE object = 'patient'
    AND permittable_by_row.usr = patient_diagnosis.diagnosing_doctor
    AND patient_diagnosis.cons_number = ae_consultation.cons_number
    AND ae_consultation.patient_id = permittable_by_row.row_id;
CREATE VIEW day_duty AS
  SELECT usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row
    WHERE TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'HH24') >= 9 AND TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'HH24') < 21;
CREATE VIEW night_duty AS
  SELECT usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row
    WHERE TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'HH24') < 9 OR TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'HH24') >= 21;
CREATE VIEW weekend_duty AS
  SELECT usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row
    WHERE  TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'D') = 7  OR TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'D') = 1;
CREATE VIEW office_hours AS
  SELECT usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row
    WHERE (
      TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'D') >= 2  AND TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'D') <= 6
    ) AND (
      TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'HH24') >= 9 AND TO_CHAR (SYSDATE, 'HH24') < 17
    );
CREATE VIEW staff_nurse_sister_2h AS
  SELECT DISTINCT permittable_by_row.usr, action, object, row_id
    FROM permittable_by_row,included_in,currently_active
    WHERE currently_active.role = included_in.inner_role
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    AND (included_in.outer_role = 'sister' OR included_in.outer_role = 'staff_nurse')
    AND currently_active.start_time <  SYSDATE - 2/24;
-- application
CREATE VIEW applies_nurse_patient AS
  SELECT DISTINCT role, object FROM nurse_patient, included_in, senior_to, ura
  WHERE object = 'patient'
  AND nurse_patient.usr = ura.usr
  AND ura.role = included_in.inner_role
  AND included_in.outer_role = senior_to.junior_role
  AND senior_to.senior_role = 'sister';
CREATE VIEW applies_patient_doctor AS
  SELECT DISTINCT role, object FROM patient_doctor, included_in, senior_to, ura
  WHERE object = 'patient'
  AND patient_doctor.usr = ura.usr
  AND ura.role = included_in.inner_role
  AND included_in.outer_role = senior_to.junior_role
  AND senior_to.senior_role = 'snr_house_officer';
CREATE VIEW applies_day_duty AS
  SELECT DISTINCT inner_role AS role FROM is_a
  WHERE outer_role = 'day_duty';
CREATE VIEW applies_night_duty AS
  SELECT DISTINCT inner_role AS role FROM is_a
  WHERE outer_role = 'night_duty';
CREATE VIEW applies_office_hours AS
  SELECT DISTINCT role FROM role
  WHERE (
    role = 'office_hours'
  );
CREATE VIEW applies_staff_nurse_sister_2h AS
  SELECT DISTINCT inner_role AS role FROM included_in
  WHERE outer_role = 'student_nurse';
CREATE VIEW fails_nurse_patient AS
  SELECT DISTINCT ura.usr AS usr, object, row_id, action, ura.role AS role FROM 
permittable_by_row, ura
  WHERE permittable_by_row.usr = ura.usr
  AND (ura.usr, action, object, row_id) NOT IN (
    SELECT usr, action, object, row_id FROM nurse_patient
  ) AND (ura.role, object) IN (
    SELECT role, object FROM applies_nurse_patient
  );
CREATE VIEW fails_patient_doctor AS
  SELECT DISTINCT ura.usr AS usr, object, row_id, action, ura.role AS role FROM 
permittable_by_row, ura
  WHERE permittable_by_row.usr = ura.usr
  AND (ura.usr, action, object, row_id) NOT IN (
    SELECT usr, action, object, row_id FROM patient_doctor
  ) AND (ura.role, object) IN (
    SELECT role, object FROM applies_patient_doctor
  );
CREATE VIEW fails_day_duty AS
  SELECT DISTINCT  ura.usr AS usr, object, row_id, action, ura.role AS role FROM 
permittable_by_row, ura
  WHERE permittable_by_row.usr = ura.usr
  AND (ura.usr, action, object, row_id) NOT IN (
    SELECT usr, action, object, row_id FROM day_duty
  ) AND ura.role IN (
    SELECT role FROM applies_day_duty
  );
CREATE VIEW fails_night_duty AS
  SELECT DISTINCT ura.usr AS usr, object, row_id, action, ura.role AS role FROM 
permittable_by_row, ura
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  WHERE permittable_by_row.usr = ura.usr
  AND (ura.usr, action, object, row_id) NOT IN (
    SELECT usr, action, object, row_id FROM night_duty
  ) AND ura.role IN (
    SELECT role FROM applies_night_duty
  );
CREATE VIEW fails_office_hours AS
  SELECT DISTINCT ura.usr AS usr, object, row_id, action, ura.role AS role FROM 
permittable_by_row, ura
  WHERE permittable_by_row.usr = ura.usr
  AND (ura.usr, action, object, row_id) NOT IN (
    SELECT usr, action, object, row_id FROM office_hours
  ) AND ura.role IN (
    SELECT role FROM applies_office_hours
  );
CREATE VIEW fails_staff_nurse_sister_2h AS
  SELECT DISTINCT ura.usr AS usr, object, row_id, action, ura.role AS role FROM 
permittable_by_row, ura
  WHERE permittable_by_row.usr = ura.usr
  AND (ura.usr, action, object, row_id) NOT IN (
    SELECT usr, action, object, row_id FROM staff_nurse_sister_2h
  ) AND ura.role IN (
    SELECT role FROM applies_staff_nurse_sister_2h
  );
CREATE VIEW fails_context_constraints AS
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_nurse_patient 
    UNION
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_patient_doctor
    UNION
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_day_duty
    UNION
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_night_duty
    UNION
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_office_hours
    UNION
  SELECT usr, object, row_id, action, role FROM fails_staff_nurse_sister_2h
;
Triggers
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER patient_insert
AFTER INSERT ON patient
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  INSERT INTO patient_bed(patient_id, bed_id) values( :new.patient_id, :new.bed_id );
  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.patient_id, 'patient' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER patient_update
AFTER UPDATE ON patient
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE patient_bed SET patient_id = :new.patient_id, bed_id = :new.bed_id WHERE patient_id =
:old.patient_id AND bed_id = :old.bed_id;
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.patient_id WHERE row_id = :old.patient_id AND object = 
'patient';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER patient_delete
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AFTER DELETE ON patient
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM patient_bed WHERE patient_id = :old.patient_id AND bed_id = :old.bed_id;
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.patient_id AND object = 'patient';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ward_insert
AFTER INSERT ON ward
FOR EACH ROW 
BEGIN
  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.ward_id, 'ward' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER room_insert
AFTER INSERT ON room
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.room_id, 'room' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER bed_insert
AFTER INSERT ON bed
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.bed_id, 'bed' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER diagnosis_insert
AFTER INSERT ON diagnosis
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.diagnosis_code, 'diagnosis' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ae_consultation_insert
AFTER INSERT ON ae_consultation
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.cons_number, 'ae_consultation' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER patient_diagnosis_insert
AFTER INSERT ON patient_diagnosis
FOR EACH ROW 
BEGIN
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  INSERT INTO tbl_rows(row_id, object) values( :new.patient_diagnosis_number, 
'patient_diagnosis' );
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ward_update
AFTER UPDATE ON ward
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.ward_id WHERE row_id = :old.ward_id AND object = 'ward';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER room_update
AFTER UPDATE ON room
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.room_id WHERE row_id = :old.room_id AND object = 'room';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER bed_update
AFTER UPDATE ON bed
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.bed_id WHERE row_id = :old.bed_id AND object = 'bed';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER diagnosis_update
AFTER UPDATE ON diagnosis
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.diagnosis_code WHERE row_id = :old.diagnosis_code AND 
object = 'diagnosis';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ae_consultation_update
AFTER UPDATE ON ae_consultation
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.cons_number WHERE row_id = :old.cons_number AND object = 
'ae_consultation';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER patient_diagnosis_update
AFTER UPDATE ON patient_diagnosis
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  UPDATE tbl_rows SET row_id = :new.patient_diagnosis_number WHERE row_id = 
:old.patient_diagnosis_number AND object = 'patient_diagnosis';
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END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ward_delete
AFTER DELETE ON ward
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.ward_id AND object = 'ward';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER room_delete
AFTER DELETE ON room
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.room_id AND object = 'room';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER bed_delete
AFTER DELETE ON bed
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.bed_id AND object = 'bed';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER diagnosis_delete
AFTER DELETE ON diagnosis
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.diagnosis_code AND object = 'diagnosis';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER ae_consultation_delete
AFTER DELETE ON ae_consultation
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.cons_number AND object = 'ae_consultation';
END;
/
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER patient_diagnosis_delete
AFTER DELETE ON patient_diagnosis
FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
  DELETE FROM tbl_rows WHERE row_id = :old.patient_diagnosis_number AND object = 
'patient_diagnosis';
END;-
/
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Appendix XI: Oracle VPD Context for Hospital Database
Head
CREATE OR REPLACE PACKAGE set_context
IS
  PROCEDURE set_cc( p_role VARCHAR );
  
  PROCEDURE set_day_duty;
  PROCEDURE set_night_duty;
  PROCEDURE set_office_hours;
  PROCEDURE set_staff_sister_active_2_h;
  PROCEDURE set_nurse_ward;
  PROCEDURE set_patient_doctor;
  PROCEDURE set_denials( p_role VARCHAR );
END;
/
Body
CREATE OR REPLACE PACKAGE BODY set_context
AS
 
  PROCEDURE set_cc( p_role VARCHAR )
  IS
  BEGIN
    IF( is_part_of(p_role,'day_duty' )) THEN
      set_day_duty;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role,'night_duty' )) THEN
      set_night_duty;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role,'sister')) THEN
      set_nurse_ward;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role, 'snr_house_officer')) THEN
      set_patient_doctor;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role, 'office_hours')) THEN
      set_office_hours;
    END IF;
    IF( is_part_of(p_role, 'student_nurse' )) THEN
      set_staff_sister_active_2_h;
    END IF;
    set_denials(p_role);
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_day_duty
  IS
  BEGIN
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'day_duty', 'y');
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_night_duty
  IS
  BEGIN
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'night_duty', 'y');
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_office_hours
  IS
  BEGIN
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'office_hours', 'y');
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_staff_sister_active_2_h
  IS
  BEGIN
246
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'staff_sister_active_2_h', 'y');
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_nurse_ward
  IS
  BEGIN
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'nurse_in_same_ward_as_patient', 'y');
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_patient_doctor
  IS
  BEGIN
    dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'patient_treated_by_doctor', 'y');
  END;
  
  PROCEDURE set_denials( p_role VARCHAR )
  IS
    v_action VARCHAR(64);
    v_object VARCHAR(64);
  CURSOR c_get_denials IS
    SELECT action, object FROM d_rpa_full WHERE role = p_role;
  BEGIN
    OPEN c_get_denials;
   
    LOOP
      FETCH c_get_denials INTO v_action, v_object;
      EXIT WHEN c_get_denials%NOTFOUND;
  
      -- set context constraints
      dbms_session.set_context('hosp', 'denied_' || v_object || '_' || v_action, 'y');
    END LOOP;
    CLOSE c_get_denials;
  END;
end;
/
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Appendix XII: Oracle VPD Policy for Hospital Database
Adding
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
248
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'BED',
            policy_name => 'CC_BED',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'BED',
            policy_name => 'CC_BED_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'BED',
            policy_name => 'CC_BED_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'BED',
            policy_name => 'CC_BED_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'BED',
            policy_name => 'CC_BED_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
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            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'ROOM',
            policy_name => 'CC_ROOM',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'ROOM',
            policy_name => 'CC_ROOM_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'ROOM',
            policy_name => 'CC_ROOM_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'ROOM',
            policy_name => 'CC_ROOM_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'ROOM',
            policy_name => 'CC_ROOM_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
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end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'WARD',
            policy_name => 'CC_WARD',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'WARD',
            policy_name => 'CC_WARD_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'WARD',
            policy_name => 'CC_WARD_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'WARD',
            policy_name => 'CC_WARD_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'WARD',
            policy_name => 'CC_WARD_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
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/begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_DIAGNOSIS',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_DIAGNOSIS_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_DIAGNOSIS_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_DIAGNOSIS_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_DIAGNOSIS_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
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begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'AE_CONSULTATION',
            policy_name => 'CC_AE_CONSULTATION',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'AE_CONSULTATION',
            policy_name => 'CC_AE_CONSULTATION_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'AE_CONSULTATION',
            policy_name => 'CC_AE_CONSULTATION_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'AE_CONSULTATION',
            policy_name => 'CC_AE_CONSULTATION_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'AE_CONSULTATION',
            policy_name => 'CC_AE_CONSULTATION_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
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begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS',
            policy_name => 'CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
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begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'USR',
            policy_name => 'CC_USR',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC',
            statement_types => 'select, insert, update, delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'USR',
            policy_name => 'CC_USR_SELECT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_SELECT',
            statement_types => 'select',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'USR',
            policy_name => 'CC_USR_INSERT',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_INSERT',
            statement_types => 'insert',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'USR',
            policy_name => 'CC_USR_UPDATE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_UPDATE',
            statement_types => 'update',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.add_policy(
            object_schema => 'HOSP',
            object_name => 'USR',
            policy_name => 'CC_USR_DELETE',
            function_schema => 'HOSP',
            policy_function => 'POLICY.CC_DELETE',
            statement_types => 'delete',
            update_check => TRUE,
            enable => TRUE,
            static_policy => FALSE);
end;
/
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Dropping
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT','CC_PATIENT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT','CC_PATIENT_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT','CC_PATIENT_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT','CC_PATIENT_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT','CC_PATIENT_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','BED','CC_BED');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','BED','CC_BED_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','BED','CC_BED_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','BED','CC_BED_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','BED','CC_BED_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','ROOM','CC_ROOM');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','ROOM','CC_ROOM_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','ROOM','CC_ROOM_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','ROOM','CC_ROOM_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','ROOM','CC_ROOM_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
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    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','WARD','CC_WARD');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','WARD','CC_WARD_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','WARD','CC_WARD_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','WARD','CC_WARD_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','WARD','CC_WARD_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','DIAGNOSIS','CC_DIAGNOSIS');
end;
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','DIAGNOSIS','CC_DIAGNOSIS_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','DIAGNOSIS','CC_DIAGNOSIS_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','DIAGNOSIS','CC_DIAGNOSIS_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','DIAGNOSIS','CC_DIAGNOSIS_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','AE_CONSULTATION','CC_AE_CONSULTATION');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','AE_CONSULTATION','CC_AE_CONSULTATION_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','AE_CONSULTATION','CC_AE_CONSULTATION_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','AE_CONSULTATION','CC_AE_CONSULTATION_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','AE_CONSULTATION','CC_AE_CONSULTATION_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS','CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS');
end;
/
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begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS','CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS','CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS','CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS','CC_PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS_DELETE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','USR','CC_USR');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','USR','CC_USR_SELECT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','USR','CC_USR_INSERT');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','USR','CC_USR_UPDATE');
end;
/
begin
    dbms_rls.drop_policy('HOSP','USR','CC_USR_DELETE');
end;
/
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Appendix XIII: Hospital Database CREATE TABLE statements
CREATE TABLE ward
(
ward_id       VARCHAR(10),
type          VARCHAR(10),
ward_capacity VARCHAR(10),
primary key (ward_id)
);
CREATE TABLE room
(
room_id      VARCHAR(10),
ward_id      VARCHAR(10),
type         VARCHAR(10),
bed_capacity VARCHAR(10),
primary key (room_id),
Foreign Key (ward_id) references ward(ward_id)
);
CREATE TABLE bed
(
bed_id     VARCHAR(10),
room_id    VARCHAR(10),
type       VARCHAR(10),
primary key (bed_id),
Foreign Key (room_id) references room(room_id)
);
CREATE TABLE patient
(
patient_id VARCHAR(50),
last_name   VARCHAR(50),
first_name  VARCHAR(50),
address    VARCHAR(50),
date_of_birth        VARCHAR(10),
bed_id    Varchar(10),
Primary Key (patient_id),
Foreign key (bed_id) references bed(bed_id)
);
CREATE TABLE diagnosis
(
diagnosis_code  VARCHAR(10),
illness_name     VARCHAR(50),
usual_symptoms  Varchar(200),
Primary Key (diagnosis_code)
);
CREATE TABLE ae_consultation
(
cons_number      VARCHAR(10),
cons_date        VARCHAR(10),
cons_description VARCHAR(100),
patient_id       VARCHAR(50),
doctor_id        VARCHAR(16),
Primary Key (cons_number),
Foreign Key (patient_id) references patient(patient_id),
Foreign Key (doctor_id) references usr(user_id)
);
CREATE TABLE patient_diagnosis
(
patient_diagnosis_number VARCHAR(10),
diagnosing_doctor VARCHAR(16),
diagnosis_desc   VARCHAR(100),
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cons_number       VARCHAR(10),
diagnosis_code    VARCHAR(10),
Primary Key (patient_diagnosis_number),
Foreign Key (diagnosing_doctor) references usr(user_id),
Foreign Key (cons_number) references ae_consultation(cons_number),
Foreign Key (diagnosis_code) references diagnosis(diagnosis_code)
);
CREATE TABLE nurse_ward
(
    usr VARCHAR(16) NOT NULL,
    ward  VARCHAR(10) NOT NULL,
    PRIMARY KEY (usr, ward),
    FOREIGN KEY (usr) REFERENCES usr(user_id),
    FOREIGN KEY (ward) REFERENCES ward(ward_id)
);
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Appendix XIV: Test Script for RBAC Enforcement
ALTER SESSION SET CURRENT_SCHEMA="HOSP";
@format
select REGEXP_SUBSTR(user, 'U[0-9]+') "User" FROM DUAL;
SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
SELECT * FROM all_users WHERE username LIKE 'HOSP1_%' ORDER BY USERNAME;
SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM 
ALL_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
/* select data */
SELECT user_id "User_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", 
date_of_birth FROM usr;
SELECT * FROM ward;
SELECT * FROM room;
SELECT * FROM bed;
SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address 
"Address", date_of_birth FROM patient;
SELECT diagnosis_code "Diag_Code", illness_name "Illness_Name", usual_symptoms 
"Usual_Symptoms" FROM diagnosis;
SELECT cons_number "Cons_Num", cons_date, cons_description "Cons_Description", patient_id 
"Patient_ID", doctor_id "Doctor_ID" FROM ae_consultation;
SELECT patient_diagnosis_number "PD_Num", diagnosing_doctor "Doctor_ID", diagnosis_desc 
"Diagnosis_Desc", cons_number "Cons_Num", diagnosis_code "Diag_Code" FROM patient_diagnosis;
SELECT * FROM nurse_ward;
SELECT * FROM password;
SELECT * FROM role;
SELECT * FROM d_s;
SELECT * FROM senior_to;
SELECT * FROM ura;
SELECT * FROM rpa;
SELECT role "Role", action "Action", object "Object", senior_role "Senior Role", junior_role 
"Junior Role" FROM rpa_full;
SELECT * FROM d_rpa;
SELECT role "Role", action "Action", object "Object", senior_role "Senior Role", junior_role 
"Junior Role"  FROM d_rpa_full;
SELECT * FROM denied;
SELECT * FROM dsd;
SELECT * FROM dsd_conflict;
SELECT * FROM ssd;
SELECT * FROM ssd_conflict;
SELECT * FROM is_a;
SELECT * FROM included_in;
SELECT senior_role "Senior Role", junior_role "Junior Role", action "Action", object "Object" 
FROM inherits_rpa;
SELECT senior_role "Senior Role", junior_role "Junior Role", action "Action", object "Object" 
FROM inherits_rpa_path;
SELECT usr "User_ID", role "Role", start_time "Start_Time", end_time "End_Time" FROM 
usr_session;
SELECT * FROM currently_active;
SELECT * FROM authorizable;
SELECT * FROM permittable;
SELECT * FROM permitted;
SELECT * FROM authorized;
/* insert data */
UPDATE patient SET date_of_birth = TO_DATE('1979-12-12', 'YYYY-MM-DD') WHERE patient_id = 
12345;
UPDATE ward SET ward_capacity = 15 WHERE ward_id = 'ward2';
UPDATE room SET bed_capacity = 3 WHERE room_id = 'Room1H';
UPDATE bed SET type='Electric' WHERE bed_id = 'Bed001';
UPDATE usr SET date_of_birth = ('1976-06-15', 'YYYY-MM-DD') WHERE user_id = 'u0019';
UPDATE diagnosis SET usual_symptoms = usual_symptoms || ', with foaming at the mouth.' WHERE 
diagnosis_code = 'diag003';
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UPDATE ae_consultation SET cons_description = 'Diarrhea and Vomiting' WHERE cons_number = 
'c00022';
UPDATE patient_diagnosis SET diagnosis_desc = 'Coronary Heart Disease' WHERE 
patient_diagnosis_number = 'pd00008';
/* insert data */
INSERT INTO usr(
  user_id,
  last_name,
  first_name,
  address,
  date_of_birth
) VALUES (
  'u0030',
  'Juric',
  'Radmila',
  'University of Westminster',
  TO_DATE('1960-05-17', 'YYYY-MM-DD')
);
INSERT INTO ward (
  ward_id,
  type,
  ward_capacity
) VALUES (
  'ward3',
  'Operating',
  12
);
INSERT INTO room (
  room_id,
  ward_id,
  type,
  bed_capacity
) VALUES (
  'Room1G',
  'ward3',
  'Public',
  2
);
INSERT INTO bed (
  bed_id,
  room_id,
  type
) VALUES (
  'Bed023',
  'Room1G',
  'Electric'
);
INSERT INTO patient (
  patient_id,
  last_name,
  first_name,
  address,
  date_of_birth,
  bed_id
) VALUES (
  12367,
  'Christ',
  'Jesus H.',
  'The Stables, The Inn, Bethlehem',
  TO_DATE('0000-12-25', 'YYYY-MM-DD'),
  'Bed023'
);
INSERT INTO diagnosis (
  diagnosis_code,
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  illness_name,
  usual_symptoms
) VALUES (
  'diag010',
  'Asthma',
  'Wheezing, lack of breath'
);
INSERT INTO ae_consultation (
  cons_number,
  cons_date,
  cons_description,
  patient_id,
  doctor_id
) VALUES (
  'c00023',
  TO_DATE('2007-08-17', 'YYYY-MM-DD'),
  'Diarrhea',
  12365,
  'u0001'
);
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis (
  patient_diagnosis_number,
  diagnosing_doctor,
  diagnosis_desc,
  cons_number,
  diagnosis_code
) VALUES (
  'pd00023',
  'u0010',
  'Stomach infection',
  'c00023',
  'diag002'
);
/*
Pretend to delete data.
This only tests whether the tables are
accessible for condition.
the WHERE clause always fails, so
nothing actually gets deleted.
*/
DELETE FROM ae_consultation WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM authorized WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM bed WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM diagnosis WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM patient_diagnosis WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM patient WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM nurse_ward WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM room WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM ward WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM currently_active WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM authorizable WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM permittable WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM authorized WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM permitted WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM denied WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM dsd_conflict WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM ssd_conflict WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM d_rpa_full WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM rpa_full WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM inherits_rpa WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM dsd WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM inherits_rpa_path WHERE 0 <> 0;
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DELETE FROM is_a WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM included_in WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM d_s WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM senior_to WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM usr_session WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM ssd WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM usr WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM role WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM password WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM ura WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM d_rpa WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM rpa WHERE 0 <> 0;
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Appendix XV: Hospital Database RBAC INSERT Statements
connect hosp/hosp
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0001','Sugar','Ed','1 Montgomery Ave',TO_DATE('12/06/1975', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0002','Python','Adam','45 Escort Road',TO_DATE('24/01/1950', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0003','Edmonds','Sophie','49 Convent Gardens',TO_DATE('10/10/1968', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0004','Bowie','Diane','253 Kings Road',TO_DATE('02/03/1962', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0005','Peters','Peter','59 Monkety Crescent',TO_DATE('19/01/1980', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0006','Davies','Sheena','10 Auchtermuchty Way',TO_DATE('15/02/1979', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0007','Williams','Lucie','23 Monkswood Drive',TO_DATE('15/07/1977', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0008','Jones','John','The Manse, Church Lane',TO_DATE('18/07/1977', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0009','Evans','Renate','3 Geering Road',TO_DATE('12/03/1970', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0010','Fish','Michael','The Vane, Weatherby',TO_DATE('28/12/1955', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0011','Ghosh','Chandra','10 Kennington Road',TO_DATE('11/07/1959', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0012','Kellett','James','104 The Vale',TO_DATE('15/02/1959', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0013','Jacobson','Lucinda','14 The Mansion',TO_DATE('01/02/1969', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0014','Jones','Hannah','13 Consort Road',TO_DATE('15/05/1955', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0015','Kenning','Stephen','10 Roadrunner Crescent',TO_DATE('13/01/1977', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0016','Strand','Jasmine','The Lodge, Linden Avenue',TO_DATE('15/06/1987', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0017','Canning','Elizabeth','100 Western Road',TO_DATE('22/03/1969', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0018','Clarkson','Jeremy','43 Vroom Vroom Road',TO_DATE('30/09/1962', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0019','Lewis','Christine','16 Trent Drive',TO_DATE('13/05/1980', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0020','Jackson','Lisa','56 Restorick Road',TO_DATE('12/09/1975', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0021','James','Wendy','40 Transvision Road',TO_DATE('07/05/1966', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0022','Darch','Ruth','31 Finstock Street',TO_DATE('21/06/1979', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0023','Lewis','Donald','15 Montana Lane',TO_DATE('29/12/1980', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0024','Davies','Caroline','10 The Avenue',TO_DATE('17/09/1971', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0025','Lewis','Charlotte','20 High Road',TO_DATE('06/07/1974', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0026','Davies','Jonathan','15 Low Road',TO_DATE('14/07/1959', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0027','Minnow','Robert','5 Montrose Place',TO_DATE('08/07/0966', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0028','Avery','Caspar','13 Cod Street',TO_DATE('15/08/1981', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
INSERT INTO usr( user_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth ) VALUES 
( 'u0029','McTaggart','James','10 Fortean Street',TO_DATE('21/02/1977', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ) );
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INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0001','desk' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0002','chair' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0003','window' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0004','brick' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0005','mother' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0006','tennis' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0007','file' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0008','cricket' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0009','dragon' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0010','cock' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0011','onion' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0012','thadeus' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0013','re$t' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0014','carlena' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0015','walnut' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0016','c001ie' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0017','compile' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0018','wheeler' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0019','mcginty' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0020','queen' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0021','vamp' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0022','woodstock' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0023','bronze' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0024','cruise' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0025','cream' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0026','rookie' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0027','little_fish' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0028','fern' );
INSERT INTO password( user_id, password) VALUES ( 'u0029','jimmy' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'nurse' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'doctor' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'data_manager' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'administrator' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'consultant' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'specialist_registrar' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer_d' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer_n' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_d' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_n' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'specialist_nurse' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'sister' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'sister_d' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'sister_n' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse_d' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse_n' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse_d' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse_n' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'receptionist' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'manager' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'day_duty' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'night_duty' );
INSERT INTO role( role ) VALUES ( 'office_hours' );
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INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'consultant','specialist_registrar' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES 
( 'specialist_registrar','snr_house_officer' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','house_officer' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'specialist_nurse','sister' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'sister','staff_nurse' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','student_nurse' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','jnr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'manager','receptionist' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'manager','consultant' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'manager','snr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO d_s( senior_role, junior_role ) VALUES ( 'manager','specialist_nurse' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'consultant','house_officer','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'specialist_nurse','student_nurse','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'snr_data_manager','jnr_data_manager','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','receptionist','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','house_officer','select','ae_consultation');
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','staff_nurse','_','patient_diagnosis');
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','staff_nurse','select','_');
-- s/junior/jnr, s/senior/snr, s/night/n, s/day/d due to restriction in length of role names 
in Oracle
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse_d','student_nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse_n','student_nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse_d','staff_nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse_n','staff_nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'sister_d','sister' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'sister_n','sister' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse','nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'sister','nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'specialist_nurse','nurse' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_d','house_officer' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_n','house_officer' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES 
( 'snr_house_officer_d','snr_house_officer' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES 
( 'snr_house_officer_n','snr_house_officer' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','doctor' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','doctor' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'specialist_registrar','doctor' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'consultant','doctor' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','data_manager' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','data_manager' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'receptionist','administrator' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'manager','administrator' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse_d','day_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse_d','day_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'sister_d','day_duty' );
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INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_d','day_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer_d','day_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse_n','night_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse_n','night_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'sister_n','night_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_n','night_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer_n','night_duty' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'receptionist','office_hours' );
INSERT INTO is_a( inner_role, outer_role ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','office_hours' );
INSERT INTO dsd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager', '_' );
INSERT INTO dsd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'receptionist', 'nurse' );
INSERT INTO dsd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'administrator', 'doctor' );
INSERT INTO dsd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'day_duty', 'night_duty' );
INSERT INTO ssd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager', '_' );
INSERT INTO ssd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'manager', 'consultant' );
INSERT INTO ssd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'doctor', 'nurse' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'patient_diagnosis'
);
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','update', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','update', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','update', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'specialist_registrar','insert', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'consultant','insert', 'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse','select', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse','select', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse','select', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse','select', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'student_nurse','select', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','update', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','select', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','select', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','select', 'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','select', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'sister','update', 'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'specialist_nurse','update', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'specialist_nurse','update', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'specialist_nurse','insert', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'receptionist','select', 'patient' );
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INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'manager','insert', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'ae_consultation'
);
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 
'patient_diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'nurse_ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'nurse_ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'nurse_ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'nurse_ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'nurse_ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'usr' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'password' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'password' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'password' );
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INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'password' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'password' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'role' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'role' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'role' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'role' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'role' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'd_s' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'd_s' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'd_s' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'd_s' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'd_s' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'inherits_rpa_path' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 
'inherits_rpa_path' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'inherits_rpa_path' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'inherits_rpa_path' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 
'inherits_rpa_path' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'is_a' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'is_a' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'is_a' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'is_a' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'is_a' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'ssd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'ssd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'ssd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'ssd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'ssd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'dsd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'dsd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'dsd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'dsd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'dsd' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'ura' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'ura' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'ura' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'ura' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'ura' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'd_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'd_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'd_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'd_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'd_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'usr_session' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'usr_session' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'usr_session' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'usr_session' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'usr_session' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'senior_to' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'senior_to' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'senior_to' );
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INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'senior_to' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'senior_to' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'included_in' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'included_in' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'included_in' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'included_in' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','alter', 'included_in' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'currently_active' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 
'currently_active' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'currently_active' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'currently_active' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'authorizable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 
'authorizable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'authorizable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'authorizable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'permittable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'permittable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'permittable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'permittable' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'authorized' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'authorized' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'authorized' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'authorized' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'permitted' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'permitted' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'permitted' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'permitted' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'denied' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'denied' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'denied' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'denied' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'dsd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 
'dsd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'dsd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'dsd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'ssd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 
'ssd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'ssd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'ssd_conflict' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'd_rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'd_rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'd_rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'd_rpa_full' );
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INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 'rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 'rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 'rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 'rpa_full' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','select', 
'inherits_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','insert', 
'inherits_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','update', 
'inherits_rpa' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_data_manager','delete', 
'inherits_rpa' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0005','house_officer_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0006','house_officer_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0007','house_officer_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0008','house_officer_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0010','house_officer_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0011','snr_house_officer_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0003','snr_house_officer_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0004','snr_house_officer_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0002','specialist_registrar' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0012','specialist_registrar' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0001','consultant' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0009','consultant' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0016','student_nurse_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0016','student_nurse_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0025','staff_nurse_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0026','staff_nurse_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0015','staff_nurse_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0027','staff_nurse_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0028','sister_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0014','sister_d' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0020','sister_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0014','sister_n' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0013','specialist_nurse' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0029','specialist_nurse' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0018','jnr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0019','jnr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0017','snr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0022','receptionist' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0021','manager' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0016','jnr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0022','jnr_data_manager' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0005','receptionist' );
INSERT INTO ura( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0009','receptionist' );
-- denials
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','select', 'ward' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'sister','select', 'usr' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'staff_nurse','select', 'usr' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer','select', 'bed' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer','select', 'usr' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'night_duty','select', 'patient' );
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insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'administrator','update', 'patient' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'nurse','update', 'patient' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'nurse','update', 'ward' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'office_hours','insert', 'ward' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'office_hours','update', 'bed' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'snr_house_officer_d', 'update', 
'ae_consultation' );
insert into d_rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'house_officer_n', 'select', 'diagnosis' );
-- permissions
insert into rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'day_duty','select', 'usr' );
insert into rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'doctor','select', 'patient' );
insert into rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'administrator','insert', 'patient' );
insert into rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'administrator','insert', 'usr' );
insert into rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'data_manager','insert', 'usr' );
insert into rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'administrator','update', 'patient' );
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Appendix XVI: Hospital Database Data INSERT Statements
connect hosp/hosp
INSERT INTO ward( ward_id, type, ward_capacity ) VALUES ( 'ward1', 'Operating', '10' );
INSERT INTO ward( ward_id, type, ward_capacity ) VALUES ( 'ward2', 'Hemotology', '12' );
INSERT INTO room( room_id, ward_id, type, bed_capacity ) VALUES ( 'Room1O', 'ward1', 'Public',
'4' );
INSERT INTO room( room_id, ward_id, type, bed_capacity ) VALUES ( 'Room2O', 'ward1', 'Public',
'4' );
INSERT INTO room( room_id, ward_id, type, bed_capacity ) VALUES ( 'Room3O', 'ward1', 
'Private', '2' );
INSERT INTO room( room_id, ward_id, type, bed_capacity ) VALUES ( 'Room1H', 'ward2', 'Public',
'4' );
INSERT INTO room( room_id, ward_id, type, bed_capacity ) VALUES ( 'Room2H', 'ward2', 'Public',
'4' );
INSERT INTO room( room_id, ward_id, type, bed_capacity ) VALUES ( 'Room3H', 'ward2', 
'Private', '4' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed001', 'Room1O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed002', 'Room1O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed003', 'Room1O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed004', 'Room1O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed005', 'Room2O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed006', 'Room2O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed007', 'Room2O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed008', 'Room2O', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed009', 'Room3O', 'Electric' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed010', 'Room3O', 'Electric' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed011', 'Room1H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed012', 'Room1H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed013', 'Room1H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed014', 'Room1H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed015', 'Room2H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed016', 'Room2H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed017', 'Room2H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed018', 'Room2H', 'Normal' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed019', 'Room3H', 'Electric' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed020', 'Room3H', 'Electric' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed021', 'Room3H', 'Electric' );
INSERT INTO bed( bed_id, room_id, type ) VALUES ( 'Bed022', 'Room3H', 'Electric' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12345', 'Smith', 'John', '33 Oak  Street', TO_DATE( '12/12/1970', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 
'Bed001' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12354', 'Davies', 'Kenneth', '405 Kingston Road', TO_DATE( '13/03/1980', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed002' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12353', 'Williams', 'Louise', '15 Wellstone Street', TO_DATE( '31/05/1955', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed003' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12352', 'McDonald', 'Ronald', '23 Portobello Road', TO_DATE( '15/06/1977', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed004' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12355', 'Wilkinson', 'Matthew', '15 Touchwood Lane', TO_DATE( '15/02/1950', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed005' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12356', 'Matthewman', 'Wendy', '23a Tisbury Road', TO_DATE( '12/12/1990', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed006' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12357', 'Kenwood', 'Robert', '14 Minster Lane', TO_DATE( '15/09/1966', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed007' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
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VALUES ( '12358', 'Constantine', 'Frederick', '1 The Avenue', TO_DATE( '14/03/1933', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed008' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12347', 'Fowler', 'Robert', '443 Sidney Gardens', TO_DATE( '11/10/1984', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed009' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12359', 'Kelly', 'Yasmin', '14 Crusader Road', TO_DATE( '15/02/1982', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed010' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12349', 'Jones', 'Julia', '12 Oakley Road', TO_DATE( '11/11/1971', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 
'Bed011' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12346', 'King', 'Steve', '44 Fulham Broadway', TO_DATE( '11/02/1945', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed012' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12350', 'Cole', 'Katherine', '22 Bridge  Road', TO_DATE( '09/08/1950', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed013' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12351', 'Robinson', 'Tim', '11 Horsenden Lane', TO_DATE( '08/07/1960', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed014' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12360', 'James', 'Timothy', '16 Bender Lane', TO_DATE( '01/06/1944', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ),
'Bed015' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12361', 'David', 'Frances', '177 Calder Pass', TO_DATE( '02/07/1966', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed016' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12362', 'Treville', 'Marcus', '103 Stanford Drive', TO_DATE( '22/01/1988', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed017' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12363', 'Mckenzie', 'Angus', '100 Creswood Road', TO_DATE( '21/03/1969', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed018' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12348', 'Philips', 'Cindy', '10 Brentworth Road', TO_DATE( '04/03/1977', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed019' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12364', 'Churchill', 'Winston', '88 Kenwood Drive', TO_DATE( '13/05/1966', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed020' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12365', 'Bhatti', 'Salima', '10 Firewood Lane', TO_DATE( '12/06/1979', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed021' );
INSERT INTO patient( patient_id, last_name, first_name, address, date_of_birth, bed_id ) 
VALUES ( '12366', 'Dijkstra', 'Ravi', '17 Strongwood Close', TO_DATE( '14/08/1955', 
'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Bed022' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag001', 
'Appendicitis', 'Pain in the iliac fossa on the right side. Loss of appetite and sometimes 
vomiting occur,although this is rarely severe. There may be constipation or diarrhoea.' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag002', 
'Food Poisoning', 'Nausea,vomiting,diarrhoea and stomach pain' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag003', 
'Epilepsy', 'Recurrent fits or seizures' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag004', 
'Heart Attack', 'Extreme pain in the left hand side of the chest' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag005', 
'Gastroesophageal reflux disease', 'burning pain behind the breastbone,a taste of acid in the 
back of the throat or mouth' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag006', 
'Pubic Lice', 'Intense itching in the affected area,black powder in underwear,brown eggs on 
the hair' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag007', 
'Dementia', 'Memory loss is a very common symptom,in particular,short-term memory loss' );
INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag008', 'Sun
Allergy', 'Painful skin when outside in the sun' );
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INSERT INTO diagnosis( diagnosis_code, illness_name, usual_symptoms ) VALUES ( 'diag009', 
'Eczema', 'Itchy skin' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00001', TO_DATE( '01/02/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Stomach pains', '12345', 'u0001' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00002', TO_DATE( '24/01/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Extreme case of diarrhea', '12346',
'u0002' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00003', TO_DATE( '14/12/2005', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Faints a lot', '12347', 'u0003' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00004', TO_DATE( '03/04/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Itching on and around groin', 
'12348', 'u0004' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00005', TO_DATE( '20/01/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Forgetting things that he always 
used to remember', '12349', 'u0005' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00006', TO_DATE( '26/11/2005', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Extreme pain in left side', 
'12350', 'u0001' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00007', TO_DATE( '30/04/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Chest pains', '12351', 'u0002' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00008', TO_DATE( '30/04/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Chest pains', '12352', 'u0007' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00009', TO_DATE( '01/09/2005', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Extreme pain in left side', 
'12353', 'u0008' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00010', TO_DATE( '15/06/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'In pain when steps outside', 
'12354', 'u0010' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00011', TO_DATE( '25/07/2005', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Itching all over body', '12355', 
'u0011' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00012', TO_DATE( '20/08/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Chest pains', '12356', 'u0012' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00013', TO_DATE( '21/09/2005', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Itching in left lower leg', 
'12357', 'u0009' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00014', TO_DATE( '22/03/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Memory loss', '12358', 'u0001' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00015', TO_DATE( '29/07/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Regular fits', '12359', 'u0002' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00016', TO_DATE( '12/01/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Itching on and around groin', 
'12360', 'u0003' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00017', TO_DATE( '28/02/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Stomach pains', '12361', 'u0004' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00018', TO_DATE( '10/03/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Chest pains', '12362', 'u0012' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00019', TO_DATE( '15/04/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Occasional fits', '12363', 
'u0009' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00020', TO_DATE( '12/05/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Extreme stomach pains', '12364', 
'u0007' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00021', TO_DATE( '05/02/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Severe memory loss', '12365', 
'u0011' );
INSERT INTO ae_consultation( cons_number, cons_date, cons_description, patient_id, doctor_id )
VALUES ( 'c00022', TO_DATE( '16/08/2006', 'DD/MM/YYYY' ), 'Diarrhea', '12366', 'u0010' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00001', 'u0001', 'Patient has been diagnosed with 
Appendicitis', 'c00001', 'diag001' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00002', 'u0002', 'Patient has been diagnosed with 
food poisoning', 'c00002', 'diag002' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00003', 'u0003', 'Patient has been diagnosed with 
epilepsy', 'c00003', 'diag003' );
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INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00004', 'u0004', 'Patient has been diagnosed with 
pubic lice', 'c00004', 'diag006' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00005', 'u0005', 'Patient has been diagnosed with 
dementia', 'c00005', 'diag007' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00006', 'u0001', 'Patient has had a heart attack', 
'c00006', 'diag004' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00007', 'u0002', 'patient has been diagnosed with 
gastroesophageal reflux disease', 'c00007', 'diag005' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00008', 'u0007', '', 'c00008', 'diag005' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00009', 'u0001', '', 'c00009', 'diag004' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00010', 'u0010', '', 'c00010', 'diag008' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00011', 'u0011', '', 'c00011', 'diag009' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00012', 'u0012', '', 'c00012', 'diag005' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00013', 'u0009', '', 'c00013', 'diag009' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00014', 'u0001', '', 'c00014', 'diag007' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00015', 'u0011', '', 'c00015', 'diag003' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00016', 'u0003', '', 'c00016', 'diag006' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00017', 'u0004', '', 'c00017', 'diag001' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00018', 'u0012', '', 'c00018', 'diag005' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00019', 'u0009', '', 'c00019', 'diag003' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00020', 'u0007', '', 'c00020', 'diag001' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00021', 'u0011', '', 'c00021', 'diag007' );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis( patient_diagnosis_number, diagnosing_doctor, diagnosis_desc, 
cons_number, diagnosis_code ) VALUES ( 'pd00022', 'u0010', '', 'c00022', 'diag002' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0016', 'ward1' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0016', 'ward2' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0025', 'ward1' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0026', 'ward2' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0015', 'ward1' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0027', 'ward1' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0028', 'ward1' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0014', 'ward2' );
INSERT INTO nurse_ward( usr, ward ) VALUES ( 'u0020', 'ward1' );
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Appendix XVII: Discussion of Testing and Output
Role Permissions and Denials (rpa and d_rpa)
These produced the same data for each Condition, as expected. The permissions and denials associated with
roles do not change according to user activity. The output of  rpa and  d_rpa is described by type of role, in the
following order:
1. Temporal RBAC Roles: day_duty and night_duty
2. Job Roles: Data Managers 
3. Job Roles: Doctors
4. Job Roles: Nurses
5. Job Roles: Administrators
1 Temporal RBAC Roles: day_duty and night_duty
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'day_duty' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'day_duty' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
Output 1: rpa and rpa_full results for day_duty and night_duty.
No rows were  produced,  as  would be  expected  (Output  1).  day_duty has  no permissions assigned  to  it.
Additionally, it is not inside any other role, either via a hierarchy or inclusion, so has no implicit role assignments either.
It is a container role for all day-duty roles, such as house_officer_d and staff_nurse_d, so that the temporal
context constraints associated with day-duty roles can be applied easily, The role night_duty works analogously for
night-duty roles.
2 Job Roles: Data Managers 
Again, data_manager is a container role, with no permissions directly assigned (Output 2). All roles assigned
to users are within one of  data_manager,  doctor,  nurse and administrator. These specify the type of
role, but do not have any users directly assigned to them. Permissions could be assigned to these roles as a way of
saying “all users of this type can do X”, but the model implemented does not use this facility.
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SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'data_manager' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'data_manager' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
Output 2: rpa and rpa_full results for data_manager.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'jnr_data_manager' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |ae_consultation
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |bed
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |diagnosis
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |patient
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |patient_diagnosis
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |room
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |ward
7 rows selected.
Output 3: rpa results for jnr_data_manager.
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'ward' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'room' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'bed' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'patient' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'diagnosis' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'ae_consultation' );
INSERT INTO rpa( role, action, object ) VALUES ( 'jnr_data_manager','insert', 'patient_diagnosis' );
Code 62: INSERT statements into rpa for jnr_data_manager.
The role  jnr_data_manager has permissions directly assigned to it, as shown by Output 3. These can be
inferred from the appropriate INSERT INTO rpa statements (Code 62).
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'jnr_data_manager' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |ae_consultation
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |bed
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |diagnosis
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |patient
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |patient_diagnosis
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |room
jnr_data_manager              |insert          |ward
7 rows selected.
Output 4: rpa_full results for jnr_data_manager.
The query on rpa_full produced the same data rows as the rpa query (Output 4). This is because although
jnr_data_manager is contained within data_manager via an is_a (inclusion) relationship, data_manager
has no rows in rpa.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'snr_data_manager' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
snr_data_manager              |alter           |ae_consultation
...
146 rows selected.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'snr_data_manager' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
snr_data_manager              |alter           |ae_consultation
...
153 rows selected.
Output 5: Partial rpa and rpa_full results for snr_data_manager.
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The queries on rpa and rpa_full for the role snr_data_manager produced different results (Output 5).
This  is  because  snr_data_manager is  contained  within  jnr_data_manager via  a  d_s (directly  senior)
relationship (as well as being contained within data_manager). Most rows returned are omitted in Output 5 to save
space.  The  query  on  rpa_full for  snr_data_manager returns  153  roles:  the  146  directly  assigned  to
snr_data_manager in rpa, and the 7 inherited from jnr_data_manager.
The large number of rows involved mean that this is perhaps not the best example. For a better example of static
permission inheritance, consider roles of type doctor.
3 Job Roles: Doctors
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'doctor' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'doctor' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
Output 6: rpa and rpa_full results for doctor.
The doctor role has no permissions assigned to it (Output 6). However, if it did have any, then they would be
inherited  directly  by  all  roles  contained  within  it  by  an  is_a relationship,  which  are  house_officer,
senior_house_officer, specialist_registrar and consultant.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'house_officer' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
house_officer                 |select          |ae_consultation
house_officer                 |select          |bed
house_officer                 |select          |diagnosis
house_officer                 |select          |patient
house_officer                 |select          |patient_diagnosis
house_officer                 |select          |room
house_officer                 |select          |usr
house_officer                 |select          |ward
8 rows selected.
Output 7: rpa results for house_officer.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'house_officer' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
house_officer                 |select          |ae_consultation
house_officer                 |select          |bed
house_officer                 |select          |diagnosis
house_officer                 |select          |patient
house_officer                 |select          |patient_diagnosis
house_officer                 |select          |room
house_officer                 |select          |usr
house_officer                 |select          |ward
8 rows selected.
Output 8: rpa_full results for house_officer.
For house_officer, rpa returns the 8 permissions directly assigned to it (Output 7). rpa_full returns the
same 8 permissions (Output 8), since house_officer does not inherit any permissions from elsewhere.
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SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'house_officer_d' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
Output 9: rpa results for house_officer_d.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'house_officer_d' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
house_officer_d               |select          |ae_consultation
house_officer_d               |select          |bed
house_officer_d               |select          |diagnosis
house_officer_d               |select          |patient
house_officer_d               |select          |patient_diagnosis
house_officer_d               |select          |room
house_officer_d               |select          |usr
house_officer_d               |select          |ward
8 rows selected.
Output 10: rpa_full results for house_officer_d.
house_officer_d refers to a “house officer on day duty”. The role thus inherits permissions from both
house_officer and day_duty. The rpa query on house_officer_d produces no rows, since no permissions
are directly assigned to it  (Output 9). However,  rpa_full retrieves the 8 permissions that  house_officer_d
inherits from house_officer (it inherits none from day_duty) (Output 10).
house_officer_n refers  to  a  “house  officer  on  night  duty”,  and  thus  inherits  permissions  from  both
house_officer and night_duty, analogously to house_officer_d (data not shown).
The role snr_house_officer inherits permissions from house_officer via a d_s assignment.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'snr_house_officer' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
snr_house_officer             |select          |ae_consultation
snr_house_officer             |select          |bed
snr_house_officer             |select          |diagnosis
snr_house_officer             |select          |patient
snr_house_officer             |select          |patient_diagnosis
snr_house_officer             |select          |room
snr_house_officer             |select          |usr
snr_house_officer             |select          |ward
snr_house_officer             |update          |ae_consultation
snr_house_officer             |update          |diagnosis
snr_house_officer             |update          |patient_diagnosis
11 rows selected.
Output 11: rpa_full results for snr_house_officer.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'snr_house_officer' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
snr_house_officer             |update          |ae_consultation
snr_house_officer             |update          |diagnosis
snr_house_officer             |update          |patient_diagnosis
Output 12: rpa results for snr_house_officer.
281
snr_house_officer has 3 permissions directly assigned to it, as given by the 3 rows returned from rpa
(Output 11). rpa_full returns these 3 rows, plus the 8 representing permissions inherited from house_officer
(Output 12). Like house_officer, snr_house_officer also inherits from doctor.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'snr_house_officer_d' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'snr_house_officer_d' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
snr_house_officer_d           |select          |ae_consultation
...
11 rows selected.
Output 13: rpa and rpa_full results for snr_house_officer_d.
snr_house_officer_d inherits  from  snr_house_officer as  house_officer_d inherits  from
house_officer, and again has no permissions directly assigned to it (Output 13). The rows returned by rpa_full
for snr_house_officer_d are not all shown in Output 13, since they are exactly the same as the ones returned for
snr_house_officer.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'specialist_registrar' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
specialist_registrar          |insert          |patient_diagnosis
Output 14: rpa results for specialist_registrar.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'specialist_registrar' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
specialist_registrar          |insert          |patient_diagnosis
specialist_registrar          |select          |ae_consultation
specialist_registrar          |select          |bed
specialist_registrar          |select          |diagnosis
specialist_registrar          |select          |patient
specialist_registrar          |select          |patient_diagnosis
specialist_registrar          |select          |room
specialist_registrar          |select          |usr
specialist_registrar          |select          |ward
specialist_registrar          |update          |ae_consultation
specialist_registrar          |update          |diagnosis
specialist_registrar          |update          |patient_diagnosis
12 rows selected.
Output 15: rpa_full results for specialist_registrar.
specialist_registrar inherits  from  snr_house_officer,  and  also  has  1  permission  assigned
directly.  Thus  rpa retrieves  1  row  (Output  14),  and  rpa_full retrieves  1+11=12  rows.  (Output  15)  Unlike
house_officer and senior_ house_officer, this role has no day_duty or night_duty divisions.
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SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'consultant' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
consultant                    |insert          |ae_consultation
Output 16: rpa results for consultant.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'consultant' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
consultant                    |insert          |ae_consultation
consultant                    |insert          |patient_diagnosis
consultant                    |select          |ae_consultation
consultant                    |select          |bed
consultant                    |select          |diagnosis
consultant                    |select          |patient
consultant                    |select          |patient_diagnosis
consultant                    |select          |room
consultant                    |select          |usr
consultant                    |select          |ward
consultant                    |update          |ae_consultation
consultant                    |update          |diagnosis
consultant                    |update          |patient_diagnosis
13 rows selected.
Output 17: rpa_full results for consultant.
consultant inherits from specialist_registrar, and has one permission directly assigned, as again
indicated by the rows retrived by rpa (Output 16) and rpa_full (Output 17).
4 Job Roles: Nurses
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'student_nurse' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
student_nurse                 |select          |bed
student_nurse                 |select          |patient
student_nurse                 |select          |room
student_nurse                 |select          |usr
student_nurse                 |select          |ward
Output 18: rpa results for student_nurse.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'student_nurse' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
student_nurse                 |select          |bed
student_nurse                 |select          |patient
student_nurse                 |select          |room
student_nurse                 |select          |usr
student_nurse                 |select          |ward
Output 19: rpa_full results for student_nurse.
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SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'nurse' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'nurse' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
Output 20: rpa and rpa_full results for nurse.
student_nurse has 5 permissions directly assigned (Output 18 and Output 19). Although it inherits directly
from  nurse,  this has no permissions assigned to it  (Output 20).  student_nurse_d and  student_nurse_n
inherit directly from  student_nurse via is_a relationships. They also respectively inherit from  day_duty and
night_duty (data not shown).
As shown in  Output 21 and  Output 22,  staff_nurse inherits directly from student_nurse (as well as
from nurse). Day-duty and night-duty roles staff_nurse_d and staff_nurse_n also exist (not shown). Note
that because usr is defined as selectable for both student_nurse and staff_nurse, the query on rpa_full in
Output 22 displays it twice (once for student_nurse, and once for staff_nurse). Using select distinct
would prevent this duplication.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'sister' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
sister                        |update          |patient_diagnosis
Output 23: rpa results for sister.
284
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'staff_nurse' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
staff_nurse                   |select          |ae_consultation
staff_nurse                   |select          |diagnosis
staff_nurse                   |select          |patient_diagnosis
staff_nurse                   |select          |usr
staff_nurse                   |update          |patient
Output 21: rpa results for staff_nurse.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'staff_nurse' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
staff_nurse                   |select          |ae_consultation
staff_nurse                   |select          |bed
staff_nurse                   |select          |diagnosis
staff_nurse                   |select          |patient
staff_nurse                   |select          |patient_diagnosis
staff_nurse                   |select          |room
staff_nurse                   |select          |usr
staff_nurse                   |select          |usr
staff_nurse                   |select          |ward
staff_nurse                   |update          |patient
10 rows selected.
Output 22: rpa_full results for staff_nurse.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'sister' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
sister                        |select          |ae_consultation
sister                        |select          |bed
sister                        |select          |diagnosis
sister                        |select          |patient
sister                        |select          |patient_diagnosis
sister                        |select          |room
sister                        |select          |usr
sister                        |select          |usr
sister                        |select          |ward
sister                        |update          |patient
sister                        |update          |patient_diagnosis
11 rows selected.
Output 24: rpa_full results for sister.
sister inherits  directly from  staff_nurse (Output  23 and  Output  24).  Day-duty and night-duty roles
sister_d and sister_n also exist (not shown).
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'specialist_nurse' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
specialist_nurse              |insert          |diagnosis
specialist_nurse              |select          |ae_consultation
specialist_nurse              |select          |bed
specialist_nurse              |select          |diagnosis
specialist_nurse              |select          |patient
specialist_nurse              |select          |patient_diagnosis
specialist_nurse              |select          |room
specialist_nurse              |select          |usr
specialist_nurse              |select          |usr
specialist_nurse              |select          |ward
specialist_nurse              |update          |ae_consultation
specialist_nurse              |update          |diagnosis
specialist_nurse              |update          |patient
specialist_nurse              |update          |patient_diagnosis
14 rows selected.
Output 25: rpa_full results for specialist_nurse.
.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'specialist_nurse' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
specialist_nurse              |insert          |diagnosis
specialist_nurse              |update          |ae_consultation
specialist_nurse              |update          |diagnosis
Output 26: rpa results for specialist_nurse.
Output 25 and Output 26 show how specialist_nurse inherits directly from sister. There are no day-
duty or night-duty roles for specialist_nurse.
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5 Job Roles: Administrators
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'receptionist' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
receptionist                  |select          |patient
Output 27: rpa results for receptionist.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'receptionist' order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
receptionist                  |select          |patient
Output 28: rpa_full results for receptionist.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa
where role = 'administrator' order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'administrator'
order by role, action, object;
no rows selected
Output 29: rpa and rpa_full results for administrator.
Output 27 and Output 28 show the rpa and rpa_full results for receptionist. This is the most junior
role in the administrator hierarchy, inheriting only from the (empty) role administrator (Output 29).
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object" from rpa_full
where role = 'manager'
order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
manager                       |insert          |patient
manager                       |update          |patient
Output 30: rpa results for manager.
SQL> select role "Role", action "Action", object "Object"
from rpa_full where role = 'manager' 
order by role, action, object;
Role                          |Action          |Object
------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
manager                       |insert          |patient
manager                       |select          |ae_consultation
manager                       |select          |ae_consultation
manager                       |select          |diagnosis
manager                       |select          |patient
manager                       |select          |patient_diagnosis
manager                       |select          |usr
manager                       |update          |patient
manager                       |update          |patient_diagnosis
9 rows selected.
Output 31: rpa_full results for manager.
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INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'consultant','house_officer','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'specialist_nurse','student_nurse','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'snr_data_manager','jnr_data_manager','_','_' );
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','receptionist','_','_' );
Code 63: Some inherits_rpa_path statements that apply to role manager.
manager has two permissions directly assigned to it (Output 30). However, its inheritance situation is complex.
manager inherits not only from receptionist, but also from the most senior roles of the other hierarchies, namely
snr_data_manager,  consultant and  specialist_nurse.  However,  it  does  not  inherit  all  of  the
permissions of these roles, due to path inheritance rules defined in Code 63. See Output 31.
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','house_officer','select','ae_consultation');
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','staff_nurse','_','patient_diagnosis');
INSERT INTO inherits_rpa_path( senior_role,junior_role,action,object ) VALUES 
( 'manager','staff_nurse','select','_');
Code 64: Further inherits_rpa_path statements that apply to role manager.
These  statements  mean  that  permissions  are  inherited  from  house_officer as  far  as  consultant;  from
student_nurse up to  specialist_nurse;  from  jnr_data_manager up to  snr_data_manager,  and
from  receptionist up  to  manager.  Therefore,  the  role  manager inherits  permissions  only  from
receptionist, and does not inherit from any permissions from the other hierarchies. However, exceptions to this
are also defined in Code 64.
Thus,  the  role  manager inherits  select permission  on  ae_consultation from  the  role
house_officer. It also inherits all permissions related to the table patient_diagnosis, as well as all select
permissions,  from  staff_nurse.  These,  together  with  the  roles  directly  assigned  and  inherited  from
receptionist, yield the 9 rows (8 unique) returned by rpa_full for manager.
Queries on d_rpa and d_rpa_full returned no rows (not shown), because no denials were assigned in this
model.
Static User Permissions and Authorizations (permittable, authorizable, 
permitted and authorized)
The results of these tests are given in terms of the Conditions in 3.4.1, with output explained only for some roles,
rather than for all roles, to avoid repetition.
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No Users Activated
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" 
from permittable where role = 'nurse'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorizable where role = 'nurse'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permitted where role = 'nurse'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorized where role = 'nurse'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
Output 32: permittable, authorizable, permitted and 
authorized results for nurse.
As explained previously,  nurse is a container role. Since it has neither users nor permissions assigned to it,
queries on permission and authorization views for it return no rows (Output 32).
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permittable where role = 'student_nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorizable where role = 'student_nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permitted where role = 'student_nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorized where role = 'student_nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
Output 33: permittable, authorizable, permitted and authorized 
results for student_nurse.
Again, no rows are returned. This is because although permissions are assigned to student_nurse, no users
are directly assigned (Output 33).
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permittable where role = 'student_nurse_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0016           |bed                           |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |patient                       |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |room                          |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |usr                           |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |ward                          |select          |student_nurse_d
Output 34: permittable results for student_nurse_d.
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permittable returns  5  rows  (Output  34).  This  is  because  1  user  (u0016)  is  assigned  to  the  role
student_nurse_d, which has 5 permissions assigned to it: 1×5=5.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorizable where role = 'student_nurse_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0016           |bed                           |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |patient                       |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |room                          |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |usr                           |select          |student_nurse_d
u0016           |ward                          |select          |student_nurse_d
Output 35: authorizable results for student_nurse_d.
authorizable returns the same rows as  permittable (Output 35). This is the case throughout the test,
because no denials are assigned.
permitted and authorized return no rows for this role (Output 36). This is because the user is not active.
This is the case throughout this part of the test, because no users are yet active.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permittable where role = 'student_nurse_n'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0016           |bed                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |patient                       |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |room                          |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |usr                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |ward                          |select          |student_nurse_n
Output 37: permittable results for student_nurse_n.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorizable where role = 'student_nurse_n'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0016           |bed                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |patient                       |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |room                          |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |usr                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |ward                          |select          |student_nurse_n
Output 38: authorizable results for student_nurse_n.
permittable (Output  37)  and  authorizable (Output  38)  return  the  same  rows  for  role
student_nurse_n as for student_nurse_d, because the same user (u0016) is assigned to both.
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SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permitted where role = 'student_nurse_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorized where role = 'student_nurse_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
Output 36: permitted and authorized results for student_nurse_d.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permittable where role = 'staff_nurse_d'
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0025           |ae_consultation               |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |bed                           |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |diagnosis                     |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |room                          |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |usr                           |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0025           |ward                          |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |ae_consultation               |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |bed                           |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |diagnosis                     |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |room                          |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |usr                           |select          |staff_nurse_d
u0026           |ward                          |select          |staff_nurse_d
18 rows selected.
Output 39: permittable results for staff_nurse_d.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permittable where role = 'staff_nurse_n' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0015           |ae_consultation               |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |bed                           |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |diagnosis                     |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |room                          |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |usr                           |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0015           |ward                          |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |ae_consultation               |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |bed                           |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |diagnosis                     |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |room                          |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |usr                           |select          |staff_nurse_n
u0027           |ward                          |select          |staff_nurse_n
18 rows selected.
Output 40: permittable results for staff_nurse_n.
As with  student_nurse,  permittable for  staff_nurse returns  no  rows.  However,  for  staff_
nurse_d (Output 39), it returns 9×2=18 rows: 2 users (u0025 and u0026) are assigned to this role, which (as shown
earlier) has 9 permissions associated with it (remembering that 2 of the 10 rows were the same). Again 2×9=18 rows are
returned, for the 2 users (u0015 and u0027) assigned to student_nurse_n (Output 40).
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SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorizable where role = 'sister_d' 
ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0014           |ae_consultation               |select          |sister_d
u0014           |bed                           |select          |sister_d
u0014           |diagnosis                     |select          |sister_d
u0014           |patient                       |select          |sister_d
u0014           |patient                       |update          |sister_d
u0014           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |sister_d
u0014           |patient_diagnosis             |update          |sister_d
u0014           |room                          |select          |sister_d
u0014           |usr                           |select          |sister_d
u0014           |ward                          |select          |sister_d
u0028           |ae_consultation               |select          |sister_d
u0028           |bed                           |select          |sister_d
u0028           |diagnosis                     |select          |sister_d
u0028           |patient                       |select          |sister_d
u0028           |patient                       |update          |sister_d
u0028           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |sister_d
u0028           |patient_diagnosis             |update          |sister_d
u0028           |room                          |select          |sister_d
u0028           |usr                           |select          |sister_d
u0028           |ward                          |select          |sister_d
20 rows selected.
Output 41: permittable results for sister_d.
permittable on sister_d (Output 41) and sister_n (not shown) each yield 2×10=20 rows (as before,
11 rows were returned in rpa_full, but only 10 were unique).
permittable on specialist_nurse (not shown) returns 2×13=26 rows.
The expected results were obtained for other roles (see Table 31).
Some Users Activated
The queries on  permittable and  authorizable produced the same results as for when no users were
activated. This is as expected. However, permitted and authorized returned some rows, relating to users who
had been activated. This is  elaborated in further detail in  Static User Permissions and Authorizations (permittable,
authorizable, permitted and authorized) (page  295), since the principle is the same:  permitted and  authorized
only return rows for active users.
All Users Activated
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permittable where role = 'student_nurse_n' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0016           |bed                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |patient                       |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |room                          |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |usr                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |ward                          |select          |student_nurse_n
Output 42: permittable results for student_nurse_n.
Since all users were active, permitted and authorized mostly, but not always, produced the same results
as permittable and authorizable. Where the results were different, this was because some users were defined
with more than one role in  ura; however, a user can only be active in one role at a time. Where this is the case,
permittable and  authorizable returned all permissions and authorizations that the user has in whatever role
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the user is defined as, while permitted and authorized returned only those relating to the role for which the user
is active.
For example, consider the rows returned for the role student_nurse_n.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorizable where role = 'student_nurse_n' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0016           |bed                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |patient                       |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |room                          |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |usr                           |select          |student_nurse_n
u0016           |ward                          |select          |student_nurse_n
Output 43: authorizable results for student_nurse_n.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from permitted where role = 'student_nurse_n' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role"
from authorized where role = 'student_nurse_n' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
no rows selected
Output 44: permitted and authorized results for student_nurse_n
permittable (Output 42) and  authorizable (Output 43) return the rows relating to the user,  u0016,
defined as student_nurse_n. However, u0016 is not active here as student_nurse_n, but as the other role
for which it  is defined,  student_nurse_d.  Since no user is active as  student_nurse_n,  permitted and
authorized both return empty sets (Output 44). As before, the equivalent dynamic (_cc) queries return no rows,
due to the constraint requiring a sister or staff_nurse to have been logged on for 2 hours not being fulfilled.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from permittable
where role = 'receptionist' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0005           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
u0009           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
Output 45: permittable results for receptionist.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorizable
where role = 'receptionist' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0005           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
u0009           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
Output 46: authorizable results for receptionist.
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SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from permitted
where role = 'receptionist' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
Output 47: permitted results for receptionist.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorized
where role = 'receptionist' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist
Output 48: authorized results for receptionist.
Similar behaviour can be seen from the role receptionist, where 3 users are defined as having this role, but
only one of these is active in it (Output 45–48).
Some Users Deactivated
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from permittable
where role = 'house_officer_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0005           |ae_consultation               |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |bed                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |diagnosis                     |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |patient                       |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |room                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |usr                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |ward                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |ae_consultation               |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |bed                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |diagnosis                     |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient                       |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |room                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |usr                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |ward                          |select          |house_officer_d
16 rows selected.
Output 49: permittable results for house_officer_d.
293
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorizable
where role = 'house_officer_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0005           |ae_consultation               |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |bed                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |diagnosis                     |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |patient                       |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |room                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |usr                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0005           |ward                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |ae_consultation               |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |bed                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |diagnosis                     |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient                       |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |room                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |usr                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |ward                          |select          |house_officer_d
16 rows selected.
Output 50: authorizable results for house_officer_d.
For  role  house_officer_d,  permittable and  authorizable output  rows  relating  to  both  users
defined for this role, namely u0005 and u0007 (Output 49–50).
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from permitted
where role = 'house_officer_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0007           |ae_consultation               |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |bed                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |diagnosis                     |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient                       |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |room                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |usr                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |ward                          |select          |house_officer_d
8 rows selected.
Output 51: permitted results for house_officer_d.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role" from authorized
where role = 'house_officer_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
u0007           |ae_consultation               |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |bed                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |diagnosis                     |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient                       |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |patient_diagnosis             |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |room                          |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |usr                           |select          |house_officer_d
u0007           |ward                          |select          |house_officer_d
8 rows selected.
Output 52: authorized results for house_officer_d.
However,  since  u0005 is  no  longer  active,  permitted and  authorized only return  rows  relating  to
u0007 (Output 51–52).
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Dynamic User Permissions and Authorizations (permittable_cc, 
authorizable_cc, permitted_cc and authorized_cc)
No Users Activated
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row" from permittable_cc
where role = 'nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row" from authorizable_cc
where role = 'nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row" from permitted_cc
where role = 'nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
no rows selected
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row" from authorized_cc
where role = 'nurse' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
no rows selected
Output 53: permittable_cc, authorizable_cc, permitted_cc and authorized_cc results for nurse.
As before, the queries on the container role nurse retrieved no rows (Output 53). The same is true of the role
student_nurse (not shown). Furthermore, all queries on both  student_nurse_d and  student_nurse_n
also return empty sets (not shown), although queries on static permission views for both these roles returned rows. The
dynamic constraints that apply to roles contained by student_nurse mean that users with such roles have no access
rights at this time: users with role  student_nurse have no permissions unless a user of a role contained within
staff_nurse has been logged on for at least 2 hours.
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SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row"
from permittable_cc where role = 'staff_nurse_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role                          |Row
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|-------
u0025           |ae_consultation               |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |c00001
...
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12345
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12347
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12352
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12353
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12354
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12355
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12356
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12357
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12358
u0025           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12359
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12345
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12347
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12352
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12353
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12354
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12355
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12356
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12357
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12358
u0025           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12359
...
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12346
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12348
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12349
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12350
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12351
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12360
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12361
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12362
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12363
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12364
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12365
u0026           |patient                       |select          |staff_nurse_d                 |12366
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12346
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12348
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12349
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12350
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12351
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12360
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12361
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12362
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12363
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12364
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12365
u0026           |patient                       |update          |staff_nurse_d                 |12366...
Output 54: Partial permittable_cc results for staff_nurse_d.
The queries on container role  staff_nurse also return an empty set, as expected. However, 210 rows are
returned by permittable_cc for staff_nurse_d. This is because a row is returned for every user, action and
database tuple for which access is granted. For most tables, a row representing every row in the table is returned,
because there are no row-level context constraints. However, permittable_cc returns the following rows for the
table patient (Output 54).The same users, u0025 and u0026, occur as in the static queries on staff_nurse_d.
However, while the table patient contains 21 rows, it is clear from the above query results that specific users only
have access to some of these rows in the table. The Row column holds the primary keys of rows in a table to which
access is granted. permittable_cc returns 11 rows each for select and update (the same rows for each action)
for user u0025. It also returns 11 rows for each of these two actions for u0026. However, the rows are different from
those returned for u0025, as is shown by the values of Row. This is because of a context constraint limiting access by
users of role  student_nurse and  staff_nurse to data of patients in wards to which they are assigned: these
users are assigned to different wards.
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permitted_cc and  authorized_cc, as before, returned no rows anywhere because no users have been
activated.
All queries on staff_nurse_n returned empty sets. This is because the test was run during the day, outside
the hours during which users in roles contained by night_duty are permitted to access data.
Some Users Activated
The queries on permittable_cc and authorizable_cc produced the same results as for when no users
were activated. This is as expected. However, permitted_cc and authorized_cc returned some rows in this test
run. For example, permitted_cc on staff_nurse_d returned 103 rows (compared to 0 rows when no users were
activated, and 210 rows returned by permittable_cc). permitted_cc returns all rows relevant to user u0025.
This is because in this test run, u0025 was activated, while u0026, the other user assigned to staff_nurse_d, was
not.
All Users Activated
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row"
from authorized_cc where role = 'receptionist' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role                          |Row
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|----------------
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12345
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12346
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12347
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12348
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12349
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12350
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12351
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12352
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12353
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12354
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12355
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12356
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12357
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12358
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12359
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12360
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12361
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12362
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12363
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12364
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12365
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12366
u0022           |patient                       |select          |receptionist                  |12367
23 rows selected.
Output 55: authorized_cc results for receptionist.
As with static permissions, Since all users were active,  permitted_cc and authorized_cc (Output 55)
produced the same results as permittable_cc and authorizable_cc, except in the case of users defined with
more than one role in ura.
Enforcement of RBAC in Meta-Data
As before, the test results of this section are described according to Conditions.
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No Users Activated
SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table"
FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0001                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
Output 56: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0001.
All attempts to access or manipulate data failed, as expected. Queries on the meta-data also showed that no
permissions were granted. Output 56 shows an example for user u0001.
This shows that the database user  HOSP_U0001 (corresponding to user  u0001 in the RBAC data) only has
permission on one meta-data table, which is necessary for logging in. The user has no permissions on any data tables.
The same is true for all users in this test, since no users are active.
Some Users Activated
No data access or manipulation could be performed when logged in as any inactive users. Active users could
perform actions that they were authorized to do by the RBAC rules.
Consider user u0002, active as role specialist_registrar. 
SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
OWNER                         |TABLE_NAME
------------------------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |WARD
HOSP                          |ROOM
HOSP                          |BED
HOSP                          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |USR
Output 57: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0002.
The SELECT statement in Output 57 retrieves all tables that are visible to the user (the WHERE clause prevents
tables from other irrelevant schemas, especially meta-data, from being returned). Note that if the user has no access
privileges on a table, then it does not appear in the results of this query. Effectively, the table does not exist for the user.
For inactive users, the query returns an empty set.
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SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table"
FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0002                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |ROOM
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |BED
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |USR
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_HOUSE_OFFICER       |UPDATE          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_HOUSE_OFFICER       |UPDATE          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_HOUSE_OFFICER       |UPDATE          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SPECIALIST_REGISTRAR    |INSERT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
13 rows selected.
Output 58: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0002.
The query in Output 58 returns the table-level static permissions granted to a user. Note the Grantee column
above, indicating the role through which the user obtains a particular access right. The Grantor is always HOSP, the
database user under which the database was set up. As before, the WHERE clause excludes irrelevant privileges, such as
those on meta-data.
SQL> SELECT * FROM ward;
WARD_ID   |TYPE      |WARD_CAPAC
----------|----------|----------
ward1     |Operating |10
ward2     |Hemotology|12
Output 59: HOSP1_U0002 reads ward.
Since  no  dynamic  constraints  apply  to  this  user,  SELECT queries  on  the  tables  named  in  the  query  on
sys.all_tables return all rows, as shown in Output 59 for user u0002.
SQL> SELECT * FROM nurse_ward;
SELECT * FROM nurse_ward
              *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
Output 60: HOSP1_U0002 fails to access nurse_ward..
However, when the user attempts to SELECT from a table to which he does not have access rights, the system
behaves as though the table does not exist, as shown in Output 60.
SQL> UPDATE patient_diagnosis SET diagnosis_desc = 'Coronary Heart Disease'
WHERE patient_diagnosis_number = 'pd00008';
1 row updated.
Output 61: HOSP1_U0002 updates patient_diagnosis.
UPDATE and INSERT statements that the user has the right to run are performed normally (Output 61).
SQL> UPDATE ward SET ward_capacity = 15 WHERE ward_id 
= 'ward1';
UPDATE ward SET ward_capacity = 15 WHERE ward_id = 
'ward1'
       *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-01031: insufficient privileges
SQL> INSERT INTO ward (
  2    ward_id,
  3    type,
  4    ward_capacity
  5  ) VALUES (
  6    'ward3',
  7    'Operating',
  8    12
  9  );
INSERT INTO ward (
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-01031: insufficient privileges
Output 62: HOSP1_U0002 fails to insert into ward.
 
SQL> DELETE FROM ae_consultation WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM ae_consultation WHERE 0 <> 0
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-01031: insufficient privileges
SQL> DELETE FROM authorized WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM authorized WHERE 0 <> 0
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
Output 63: HOSP1_U0002 fails to delete from 
ae_consultation and authorized..
If an attempt is made to  DELETE,  INSERT or  UPDATE a row in a table to which the user does not have the
appropriate privilege, but does have some privileges on it, then an Insufficient Privileges error is returned
(Output 62).
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If the user does not have any privileges at all on the table, then as before the table does not exist for the user, as
can be shown by the different behaviour of the two  DELETE statements in  Output 63. Note the  WHERE clause that
always fails. Deleting rows during the test run would make the database unusable for testing, so it is not done.
SQL> INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis (
  2    patient_diagnosis_number,
  3    diagnosing_doctor,
  4    diagnosis_desc,
  5    cons_number,
  6    
diagnosis_code
  7  ) VALUES (
  8    'pd00023',
  9    'u0010',
 10    'Stomach infection',
 11    'c00023',
 12    'diag002'
 13  );
INSERT INTO patient_diagnosis (
*
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-02291: integrity constraint (HOSP.SYS_C009415) 
violated - parent key not found
Output 64: HOSP1_U0002 inserts into 
patient_diagnosis.
Indeed,  for  this  test,  what  matters  when  attempting  to  INSERT,  UPDATE or  DELETE is  not  whether  the
transaction was ultimately successful, but whether it could be performed. For example, consider the INSERT on the
table patient_diagnosis in Output 64.
The INSERT fails because of an integrity constraint: the value 'c00023' is a foreign key that does not exist in
the referencing table. However, the fact that the statement was executed shows that (as expected) this user has the right
to insert rows into the table patient_diagnosis.
SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
OWNER                         |TABLE_NAME
------------------------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |WARD
HOSP                          |ROOM
HOSP                          |BED
HOSP                          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |USR
8 rows selected.
Output 65: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0003.
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SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0003                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |ROOM
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |BED
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |USR
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_HOUSE_OFFICER       |UPDATE          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_HOUSE_OFFICER       |UPDATE          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_HOUSE_OFFICER       |UPDATE          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
12 rows selected.
Output 66: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0003.
SQL> SELECT diagnosis_code "Diag_Code", illness_name "Illness_Name", usual_symptoms "Usual_Symptoms" FROM 
diagnosis;
no rows selected
Output 67: Table diagnosis as seen by HOSP1_U0003.
User u0003 is activated here in the role snr_house_officer_n. Since this a night_duty role, and the
test was performed during day_duty hours, this user should have no access. The user can see tables, and is shown as
having privileges granted. This is because the rows returned by the meta-data views sys.all_tables (Output 65)
and sys.all_tab_privs (Output 66) are determined by static privileges.
Therefore, it looks as if the user can SELECT and UPDATE data from various tables. Yet, an attempt to read any
such table produces an empty set (Output 67).
These results are due to the way dynamic RBAC is handled in Oracle VPD. Dynamic context constraints are
implemented internally by adding WHERE clauses to statements before they are run. For a user in a night_duty role
running a query during day_duty hours (or vice-versa), the WHERE clause always evaluates to FALSE (it compares
the current time with SYSDATE), thus causing an empty set to be returned for all SELECT queries. The mechanism is
called Fine-Grained Access Control, and was originally introduced in Oracle 8. 
SQL> UPDATE diagnosis SET usual_symptoms = usual_symptoms || ', with foaming at the mouth.'
WHERE diagnosis_code = 'diag003';
0 rows updated.
Output 68: HOSP1_U0003 updates diagnosis.
When a user  is  prevented by a context  constraint  from performing an  UPDATE or  DELETE statement,  the
database cannot find the row to modify, as shown in Output 68.
A row in  diagnosis does  exist  for  diagnosis_code = 'diag003'.  However, when logged in as
u0003 at this time the system cannot see the row, as it  cannot see any rows in any table for which the temporal
constraint is defined. Therefore, no update is run.
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SQL> SELECT * FROM ward;
WARD_ID   |TYPE      |WARD_CAPAC
----------|----------|----------
ward1     |Operating |10
ward2     |Hemotology|12
Output 69: HOSP1_U0004 inserts into ward..
 
SQL> SELECT * FROM room;
ROOM_ID   |WARD_ID   |TYPE      |BED_CAPACI
----------|----------|----------|----------
Room1O    |ward1     |Public    |4
Room2O    |ward1     |Public    |4
Room3O    |ward1     |Private   |2
Room1H    |ward2     |Public    |4
Room2H    |ward2     |Public    |4
Room3H    |ward2     |Private   |4
6 rows selected.
Output 70: HOSP1_U0004 reads room.
User u0004 is active as  snr_house_officer_d. This is a  day_duty role, and so the user should have
access to the data as the test is run during day_duty hours. Queries on all_tables and sys.all_tab_privs thus
produce similar results to those for u0003. However, accesses to data tables are successful, as shown in Output 69–70.
SQL> SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", 
date_of_birth FROM patient;
Patient_ID|Last_Name           |First_Name          |Address                                          |DATE_OF_BI
----------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------
12348     |Philips             |Cindy               |10 Brentworth Road                               |04-MAR-77
12361     |David               |Frances             |177 Calder Pass                                  |02-JUL-66
Output 71: HOSP1_U0004 reads patient.
The query on patient returns only two rows out of the 22 actually in the table, as shown in Output 71.
SQL> select usr "User", object "Object", action "Action", role "Role", row_id "Row" from authorized_cc
where role = 'snr_house_officer_d' ORDER BY usr, object, action, row_id;
User            |Object                        |Action          |Role                         |Row
----------------|------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----
...
u0004           |patient                       |select          |snr_house_officer_d          |12348
u0004           |patient                       |select          |snr_house_officer_d          |12361
...
138 rows selected.
Output 72: authorized_cc results for snr_house_officer_d concerning patient and u0004.
Compare this to the rows produced by authorized_cc for this user and the patient table (Output 72).
SQL> UPDATE diagnosis SET usual_symptoms = usual_symptoms || ', with foaming at the mouth.' WHERE diagnosis_code =
'diag003';
1 row updated.
SQL> UPDATE ae_consultation SET cons_description = 'Diarrhea and Vomiting' WHERE cons_number = 'c00022';
1 row updated.
SQL> UPDATE patient_diagnosis SET diagnosis_desc = 'Coronary Heart Disease' WHERE patient_diagnosis_number = 
'pd00008';
1 row updated.
Output 73: HOSP1_U0004 updates diagnosis, ae_consultation and patient_diagnosis.
Updates on tables for which this is permitted by the static rules were also run.  Output 73 shows user  u0004
successfully updating tables diagnosis, ae_consultation and patient_diagnosis, as the user should be
able to do when active in role snr_house_officer_d.
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SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
OWNER                         |TABLE_NAME
------------------------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |URA
HOSP                          |SENIOR_TO
HOSP                          |INCLUDED_IN
HOSP                          |INHERITS_RPA_PATH
HOSP                          |IS_A
HOSP                          |RPA
HOSP                          |D_RPA
HOSP                          |USR_SESSION
HOSP                          |DSD
HOSP                          |SSD
HOSP                          |WARD
HOSP                          |ROOM
HOSP                          |BED
HOSP                          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |NURSE_WARD
HOSP                          |USR
HOSP                          |PASSWORD
HOSP                          |ROLE
HOSP                          |D_S
22 rows selected.
Output 74: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0017.
SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0017                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |ROOM
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |BED
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_DATA_MANAGER        |SELECT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_DATA_MANAGER        |UPDATE          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_DATA_MANAGER        |DELETE          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_SNR_DATA_MANAGER        |ALTER           |WARD
...
154 rows selected.
Output 75: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0017.
User u0017 is active as role snr_data_manager, and so has all privileges across all tables (Output 74).
The last row listed in Output 75 is for an ALTER privilege, allowing the user to modify the table structure (not
tested).
All statements in the test run were executed, and ran on all rows. This includes DELETE statements, which in
this model can only be run by users active as role snr_data_manager. However, the always-FALSE WHERE clause
prevented the DELETE statements from having any effect (not shown).
SQL> DELETE FROM currently_active WHERE 0 <> 0;
DELETE FROM currently_active WHERE 0 <> 0
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-01732: data manipulation operation not legal on this view
Output 76: Attempting to delete a view.
Some DELETE statements could not be run because they were operating on views, not tables (Output 76).
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SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0018                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |ROOM
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |BED
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_JNR_DATA_MANAGER        |INSERT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
Output 77: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0018.
User u0018 is activated in the role jnr_data_manager. Users in this role have only INSERT privileges on
specific tables (think of this role as being a data entry clerk) (Output 77).
This user has no  SELECT privileges. However, attempts to  SELECT the tables listed in  sys.all_tables
(not shown) and sys.all_tab_privs produce different results from those found previously.
SQL> SELECT * FROM ward;
SELECT * FROM ward
              *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-01031: insufficient privileges
Output 78: HOSP1_U0018 fails to read ward.
An  insufficient privileges error  is  returned instead of the previous  ORA-00942: table or
view does not exist. The table is known to the user (because of an INSERT privilege on it), but its contents
cannot be viewed (Output 78).
All Users Activated
SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
OWNER                         |TABLE_NAME
------------------------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |WARD
HOSP                          |ROOM
HOSP                          |BED
HOSP                          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |USR
8 rows selected.
Output 79: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0005.
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SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0005                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |ROOM
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |BED
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |USR
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
Output 80: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0005.
User u0005 is defined as a receptionist, but is active here as house_officer_d. As such, the only
privileges given to this user are those of a house_officer (Output 79–80).
SQL> SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", 
date_of_birth FROM patient;
Patient_ID|Last_Name           |First_Name          |Address                                          |DATE_OF_BI
----------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------
12349     |Jones               |Julia               |12 Oakley Road                                   |12/12/1979
Output 81: HOSP1_U0005 reads patient.
This can be shown by the query on table  patient (Output  81) (the output is  as  it  is  without  formatting
commands).
If  u0005 were active as a  receptionist, then this query should return all 22 rows of the patient table.
However, since  u0005 is active as  house_officer_d,  the query returns the one row that satisfies the context
constraint attached to the role  house_officer. User  u0009, the other inactive  receptionist, is active as a
consultant, and so can see all rows of the patient table anyway.
SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
OWNER                         |TABLE_NAME
------------------------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |PATIENT
Output 82: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0022.
SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0022                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_RECEPTIONIST            |SELECT          |PATIENT
Output 83: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0022.
User u0022, being active as a receptionist, has only a SELECT privilege on the patient table (Output
82–83), but with no row-level constraints. [There is, however, a temporal constraint, restricting receptionist users to
accessing data during the hours 0900−1700, Monday to Friday; this is defined in the office_hours role.]
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SQL> SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", 
date_of_birth FROM patient;
Patient_ID|Last_Name           |First_Name          |Address                                           |DATE_OF_BI
----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------
12345     |Smith               |John                |33 Oak  Street                                    |12/12/1979
12354     |Davies              |Kenneth             |405 Kingston Road                                 |12/12/1979
12353     |Williams            |Louise              |15 Wellstone Street                               |12/12/1979
12352     |McDonald            |Ronald              |23 Portobello Road                                |12/12/1979
12355     |Wilkinson           |Matthew             |15 Touchwood Lane                                 |12/12/1979
12356     |Matthewman          |Wendy               |23a Tisbury Road                                  |12/12/1979
12357     |Kenwood             |Robert              |14 Minster Lane                                   |12/12/1979
12358     |Constantine         |Frederick           |1 The Avenue                                      |12/12/1979
12347     |Fowler              |Robert              |443 Sidney Gardens                                |12/12/1979
12359     |Kelly               |Yasmin              |14 Crusader Road                                  |12/12/1979
12349     |Jones               |Julia               |12 Oakley Road                                    |12/12/1979
12346     |King                |Steve               |44 Fulham Broadway                                |12/12/1979
12350     |Cole                |Katherine           |22 Bridge  Road                                   |12/12/1979
12351     |Robinson            |Tim                 |11 Horsenden Lane                                 |12/12/1979
12360     |James               |Timothy             |16 Bender Lane                                    |12/12/1979
12361     |David               |Frances             |177 Calder Pass                                   |12/12/1979
12362     |Treville            |Marcus              |103 Stanford Drive                                |12/12/1979
12363     |Mckenzie            |Angus               |100 Creswood Road                                 |12/12/1979
12348     |Philips             |Cindy               |10 Brentworth Road                                |12/12/1979
12364     |Churchill           |Winston             |88 Kenwood Drive                                  |12/12/1979
12365     |Bhatti              |Salima              |10 Firewood Lane                                  |12/12/1979
12366     |Dijkstra            |Ravi                |17 Strongwood Close                               |12/12/1979
12367     |Christ              |Jesus H.            |The Stables, The Inn, Bethlehem                   |0000-12-25
23 rows selected.
Output 84: HOSP1_U0022 reads patient.
Therefore, u0022 can see the whole patient table (Output 84). [The final row, Patient_ID=12367, was
added during the test by user u0017.]
SQL> INSERT INTO bed (
  2    bed_id,
  3    room_id,
  4    type
  5  ) VALUES (
  6    'Bed023',
  7    'Room1G',
  8    'Electric'
  9  );
INSERT INTO bed (
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
Output 85: HOSP1_U0022 fails to insert into bed when logged in as receptionist.
SQL> INSERT INTO patient (
  2    patient_id,
  3    last_name,
  4    first_name,
  5    address,
  6    date_of_birth,
  7    bed_id
  8  ) VALUES (
  9    12367,
 10    'Christ',
 11    'Jesus H.',
 12    'The Stables, The Inn, Bethlehem',
 13    '0000-12-25',
 14    'Bed023'
 15  );
INSERT INTO patient (
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-01031: insufficient privileges
Output 86: HOSP1_U0022 fails to insert into patient when logged in as receptionist.
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User u0022 is also defined in the role jnr_data_manager. However, since the user is not active in this role,
he has none of the privileges associated with it (Output 85–86).
If  u0022 were active as  jnr_data_manager,  these  INSERT statements would be run. Note,  again,  the
difference in behaviour between the two statements. This user has no access at all to table bed, so the session behaves
as if this table does not exist at all.  However, the session does know about the table  patient,  due to the user's
SELECT privilege. Therefore, the insufficient privileges error results.
Conversely, u0022 would not be able to SELECT the patient table if active as jnr_data_manager.
The results for  u0021 show a shortcoming in Oracle implementation of this DRBAC: this user (active as
manager) can do everything through permissions inherited from the  snr_data_manager. This is not supposed to
happen due to inherits_rpa_path definitions.
Some Users Deactivated
SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
no rows selected
Output 87: No tables visible to user HOSP1_U0005 after deactivation.
SQL> SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", 
date_of_birth FROM patient;
SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", date_of_birth 
FROM patient
                                                                                                                  
*
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
Output 88: User HOSP1_U0005 has no access to table patient after deactivation.
SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0005                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
Output 89: No privileges granted to HOSP1_U0005 after deactivation.
SQL> SELECT * FROM bed;
SELECT * FROM bed
              *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-00942: table or view does not exist
Output 90: User HOSP1_U0005 has no access to table bed after deactivation.
User u0005 is one of the users that is deactivated. Therefore, this user now has no access privileges, and cannot
see any tables (Output 87–90).
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SQL> SELECT owner, table_name FROM sys.all_tables WHERE owner = 'HOSP';
OWNER                         |TABLE_NAME
------------------------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |WARD
HOSP                          |ROOM
HOSP                          |BED
HOSP                          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |USR
8 rows selected.
Output 91: Tables visible to user HOSP1_U0007.
SQL> SELECT grantor "Grantor", grantee "Grantee", privilege "Privilege", table_name "Table" FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = 'HOSP';
Grantor                       |Grantee                       |Privilege       |Table
------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------
HOSP                          |HOSP1_U0007                   |EXECUTE         |SET_CONTEXT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |WARD
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |ROOM
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |BED
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |DIAGNOSIS
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |USR
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |AE_CONSULTATION
HOSP                          |HOSP1_HOUSE_OFFICER           |SELECT          |PATIENT_DIAGNOSIS
9 rows selected.
Output 92: Privileges granted to HOSP1_U0007.
SQL> SELECT patient_id "Patient_ID", last_name "Last_Name", first_name "First_Name", address "Address", 
date_of_birth FROM patient;
Patient_ID|Last_Name           |First_Name          |Address                                           |DATE_OF_BI
----------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------
12352     |McDonald            |Ronald              |23 Portobello Road                                |12/12/1979
12364     |Churchill           |Winston             |88 Kenwood Drive                                  |12/12/1979
Output 93: HOSP1_U0007 reads patient.
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SQL> SELECT * FROM bed;
BED_ID    |ROOM_ID   |TYPE
----------|----------|----------
Bed001    |Room1O    |Bunk
Bed002    |Room1O    |Bunk
Bed003    |Room1O    |Bunk
Bed004    |Room1O    |Bunk
Bed005    |Room2O    |Bunk
Bed006    |Room2O    |Bunk
Bed007    |Room2O    |Bunk
Bed008    |Room2O    |Bunk
Bed009    |Room3O    |Bunk
Bed010    |Room3O    |Bunk
Bed011    |Room1H    |Bunk
Bed012    |Room1H    |Bunk
Bed013    |Room1H    |Bunk
Bed014    |Room1H    |Bunk
Bed015    |Room2H    |Bunk
Bed016    |Room2H    |Bunk
Bed017    |Room2H    |Bunk
Bed018    |Room2H    |Bunk
Bed019    |Room3H    |Bunk
Bed020    |Room3H    |Bunk
Bed021    |Room3H    |Bunk
Bed022    |Room3H    |Bunk
Bed023    |Room1G    |Electric
23 rows selected.
Output 94: HOSP1_U0007 reads bed.
In contrast, user u0007 is still active, in the same role as u0005 (house_officer_d) (Output 91–94).
Separation of Duties
Tests were performed to determine whether the records in ssd and dsd correctly enforced separation of duties.
SQL> start ssd_dsd.sql
SQL> CONNECT hosp/hosp
Connected.
SQL> 
SQL> SET ECHO ON;
SQL> 
SQL> SELECT * FROM ura WHERE usr = 'u0010';
USR             |ROLE
----------------|------------------------------
u0010           |house_officer_n
Output 95: User u0010 is defined in the role house_officer_n.
Output 95 confirms that user u0010 is defined in the role house_officer_n.
SQL> INSERT INTO ura(usr, role) VALUES ( 'u0010', 'specialist_nurse' );
INSERT INTO ura(usr, role) VALUES ( 'u0010', 'specialist_nurse' )
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-20000: Conflicting roles: cannot assign u0010 to specialist_nurse.
ORA-06512: at "HOSP.URA_BEFORE_INSERT", line 23
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 'HOSP.URA_BEFORE_INSERT'
Output 96: Role conflict error when attempting to define user u0010 as a specialist_nurse.
309
SQL> SELECT * FROM ura WHERE usr = 'u0010';
USR              |ROLE
-----------------|------------------------------
u0010            |house_officer_n
Output 97: User u0010 is still defined only as house_officer_n.
INSERT INTO ssd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'doctor', 'nurse' );
Code 65: ssd definition preventing the same user from being both doctor and nurse.
As expected,  u0010 could  not  be  additionally  defined  as  specialist_nurse: the  attempt  returned  a
programmer-defined  error  ORA-20000: Conflicting roles (Output  96),  and  the  role  assignment  failed
(Output 97). This because of a static ssd preventing the same user from being defined in both a doctor role and a
nurse role (Code 65).
Repeating the previous SELECT query confirms that the attempted INSERT was unsuccessful.
Here, u0010 could not be activated in the role painter, because the user is not assigned to this role in ura
(Output 98). Indeed, the role does not exist.
SQL> INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'manager' );
INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'manager' )
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-20000: Conflicting roles: cannot activate u0010 as manager.
ORA-06512: at "HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT", line 52
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 'HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT'
Output 99: Role conflict error when attempting to define user u0010 as a 
manager.
INSERT INTO ssd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'manager', 'consultant' );
Code 66: ssd definition preventing the same user from being both manager and 
consultant.
The attempt to activate u0010 as a manager also fails (Output 99), because of another ssd definition (Code
66). In any case, u0010 is not defined as a manager, so this attempt would fail anyway.
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SQL> INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'painter' );
INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'painter' )
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-20000: Not assigned to role: cannot activate u0010 as painter.
ORA-06512: at "HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT", line 56
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 'HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT'
Output 98: Attempt to activate user  u0010 in (non-existent) role painter.
SQL> INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'consultant' );
INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'consultant' )
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-20000: Not assigned to role: cannot activate u0010 as consultant.
ORA-06512: at "HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT", line 56
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 'HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT'
Output 100: Attempt to activate user u0010 in role consultant to which he is not assigned.
Again, an attempt to activate u0010 as a role to which he is not assigned is unsuccessful. This time, the role is
consultant, which does exist (Output 100).
The ura assignment in Output 101 is successful, since it is not prevented by any ssd entries. 
SQL> INSERT INTO usr_session(usr, role) 
VALUES ('u0010', 'consultant' );
1 row created.
Output 102: Activating user u0010 in role 
consultant.
SQL> SELECT * FROM ura WHERE usr = 'u0010';
USR              |ROLE
-----------------|------------------------------
u0010            |consultant
u0010            |house_officer_n
Output 103: User u0010 now assigned to both 
consultant and house_officer_n.
The user can now be activated as a  consultant (Output 102).  Output 103 confirms that  u0010 is  now
assigned to two roles.
INSERT INTO dsd( role1, role2 ) VALUES ( 'day_duty', 'night_duty' );
Code 67: dsd constraint preventing simultaneous activation of day_duty and night_duty roles.
Output 104 shows that an attempt to activate u0016 in the role student_nurse_n is unsuccessful because
u0016 is already active as student_nurse_d. A user cannot be simultaneously active in both a day_duty and a
night_duty role. This is due to a dsd constraint (Code 67).
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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SQL> INSERT INTO ura(usr, role) VALUES ('u0010', 'consultant' );
1 row created.
Output 101: Assigning user u0010 in role consultant.
SQL> INSERT INTO usr_session( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0016', 'student_nurse_n' );
INSERT INTO usr_session( usr, role ) VALUES ( 'u0016', 'student_nurse_n' )
            *
ERROR at line 1:
ORA-20000: Conflicting roles: cannot activate u0016 as student_nurse_n.
ORA-06512: at "HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT", line 52
ORA-04088: error during execution of trigger 'HOSP.USR_SESSION_BEFORE_INSERT'
Output 104: Attempt to activate user u0016 in role student_nurse_n causing a dsd conflict.
